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INTRODUCTION 
Party patronage is a recent notion in the literature. Often confused with clientelism, 
corruption and other distributive practices, this concept has to do with the cartel party 
(ideal) type and the party-state relationships, offering new and alternative resources for 
the parties based on the public money. 
Defined as the power of party to appoint people in public and semi-public life 
(Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012), party patronage has been studied analysing the 
governmental sphere, the public and semi-public agencies and the bureaucracies in the 
general framework of the public administration. 
But does party patronage exist only when the patrons (the parties, their leaders, their 
representatives) distribute public appointments? Is traceable a further dimension of 
party patronage within the legislative assemblies in which the parties could directly or 
indirectly distribute jobs? 
This dissertation aims at answering these questions, providing an expansion of the 
definition, achieved after relevant theoretical efforts, and of the field of research, 
starting from common features such as the exploitation of public resources in order to 
fulfil party goals. 
The main argument of this work is that also the analysis of parliamentary patronage is 
helpful to explain the relationship between party and the state, investigating here the 
mechanisms of party installation within the Parliament, its working to satisfy its 
representative and legislative functions, its internal decision-making processes, its 
networks inside and outside the floor. 
The thesis is composed of two parts. In the first part (chapter 1 and 2) we explore the 
literature on patronage with its multifaceted points of view and the various historical 
experiences of patronage around the world, each one with its own peculiarities that 
contribute to the emersion of parliamentary patronage definition. 
In the first chapter we will consider the intricate confusion that, not without prejudices, 
scholars have caused across the time about the essence of patronage and its connection 
with the society and the state, both at micro and macro level. Further clarifications will 
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be given to distinguish more explicitly patronage and corruption. Moreover, new 
models of patronage will be developed on the basis of the intersections between merit 
and party affiliation, two categories usually conceived as mutually exclusive in the 
debate. A perspective on the evolution of patronage in regime changes that affect the 
party system or the public administration system will contribute to contextualize the 
phenomenon in a macro-scenario. Lastly the possible forms of parliamentary patronage 
in broad sense will be individuated, each one considered as a distributive relationship 
with different patrons and clients/recipients. It will follow a detailed focus on the 
specific kind of patronage object of this research, defined as the power of parties to 
distribute jobs in parliamentary structures. 
The second chapter examines the historical, empirical and social experiences of 
patronage, describing the American, European and African patterns without any 
ambition to include the whole course of the history, but just commenting upon specific 
cases with the purpose to underline the main trends in party-state relationship and take 
them into consideration into the explanation of the empirical research. The US case 
(Schudson, 1998) will outline the evolution of the patronage on two sides: the object of 
the exchange and the features of the clients. From the findings of comparative research 
in 15 European countries it will not emerge a European model, but the causes and the 
factors that at the end make the difference from a country to another country. In the last 
section dedicated to the African patronage, we will focus on the ethnical networks at the 
basis of it as point of departure to explore (party) factionalism and its consequences on 
patronage. 
The second part of the research consists of a preliminary and thorough study of the two 
dimensions of patronage in Italian experience: on one hand the party, the party system, 
its rules and its intra or inter party dynamics; on the other hand, the Parliament, here 
intended as a part of the state, its functioning and its permeability. This part prepares the 
ground for the empirical research and leads us to draw some hypotheses that will be 
present in the last chapter. 
In the third chapter, the first dimension will be illustrated with an in-depth focus on the 
last three legislatures, starting from the new electoral system approved in 2005 and now 
replaced by the so-called Italicum. The reforms in party financing, the party switching 
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and the legislative turnover, the emergence of new tools for the re-legitimation of the 
parties as the primary elections even for the parliamentary offices are expounded as 
possible factors respectively in the increase of the need for patronage, in modifying the 
resources at disposal and in shaping the patron-client relationship. 
Through a re-examination of the parliamentary functions and a study of the rules of 
procedure, the fourth chapter tries to identify the potential clients and the potential 
patrons in Parliament. In a first step, we zoom out on the actual development of the four 
types of parliamentary patronage theoretically distinguished in the first chapter. Once 
isolated and concretely defined the parliamentary patronage examined in this 
dissertation (the distribution of jobs within the Parliament), two types of patrons are 
found: collective (the parliamentary groups) and individual (the institutional office-
holders). 
The empirical research, conducted through semi-structured and conversational 
interviews to a mix of patrons, will be oriented to trace the general features and trends 
of parliamentary patronage, without going in details in the single party performances, 
fully aware of the slippery field of study if not observed with the proper tools. 
Following partly the scheme of Kopecky, Mair and Spirova, we will assess the reach, 
the depth and the motivations of parliamentary patronage, adding then new elements of 
analysis based on the stressed differences between the institutions where patronage 
grows. Lastly we will draw the profile of the clients involved in parliamentary 
patronage. 
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PART 1 
CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES
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CHAPTER 1 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
‘There is nothing more practical than a good theory. 
Lewin (1952, 169) 
 
The state, which is invaded by the parties, and the rules of which are determined by the 
parties, becomes a fount of resources through which these parties not only help to 
ensure their own survival, but through which they can also enhance their capacity to 
resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives. The state, in this sense, becomes an 
institutionalized structure of support. 
Katz and Mair (1995, 16) 
 
1.1 PATRONAGE: DEFINITIONS AND DIFFERENCES 
 
The evolution of party organizations has shaped the relationships between party and the 
state. In this sense, the emergence of cartel party model (Katz, Mair, 1995), replacing 
the mass-party (Duverger, 1954), represents a Kuhnian paradigm shift in the conception 
of party as institutional and political actor related to civil society and state. 
On one hand, the decreasing role of the parties as point of connection for both 
citizens and voters has progressively unfastened the ‘transmission belt’ linking parties 
and specific groups by social cleavages at national or local level (Webb and White, 
2007). The gradual ‘privatization’ of political life in a more and more complex society 
has dramatically weakened identities, ideologies and grand narratives, creating 
alternative forms of interest aggregation and other tools for social integration, depriving 
parties of memberships and traditional issues used to get electoral support (Whiteley, 
2011). 
The exercise of citizenship took place in other collective and no partisan entities 
such as voluntary, charity associations or interest groups, or it happened in an 
individualized scenario dominated by modern media, such as tv or internet, without 
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face-to-face relationships. The ownership of politics slipped out of parties and social 
elites and became widespread in various peripheral centres. (Schudson, 1998) 
The decentering of the parties in the political ground moved the attention and the 
interest of citizens and their energies out from the traditional organizations recognized 
as mass parties. This detachment in the bottom-up support caused the slackening of the 
grasp of the political class on ruled class and on those organizations such as unions, 
associations and factions usually blended and confused with parties. As Burnham 
observed, parties had “the character of an item of luxury consumption in competition 
with other such items, an indoor sport involving a host of discrete players rather than 
the teams of old” (1967, 305). 
Furthermore, the collapse of party activism and the difficulties to mobilize even 
their own membership forced parties to look for new and modern incentives to the 
participation. Material and solidary incentives, such as basic fringe benefits or social 
recognition, were already overcome in developed democracies and richer and 
secularized societies. (Clark, Wilson, 1961) 
For all these reasons, parties were obliged to find refuge elsewhere, away from 
the civil society, in order to survive and to secure the organization and the working of 
democratic life. As an instinctive resistance reaction, parties took shelter in an 
incompletely explored arena: the state. In this new context, parties have turned in quasi-
governmental agencies or public utilities, focusing more on governmental functions and 
on the control of public resources and becoming more and more dependent on the state. 
(Epstein, 1986; Biezen, 2004; Ignazi, 2012, 2014). 
Rephrasing Sartori’s minimal definition of a party (1976, 63), we could define 
the modern parties as political groups identified by an official label that run at elections, 
and are capable of allocating, before or after the elections, public resources. 
In recent years the space of domestic policy-making process in EU countries has 
been significantly restricted by European institutions: the progressive Europeanization 
promoted an integration on national ‘policies, politics and polities’ (Börzel and Risse, 
2003) that asked also for policy coherence commitments and, especially in some 
countries, spending standards “by authoritative European rules” (Risse et al. 2001, 3). 
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Similarly, even because of this pressure, the presence of the state in the economy of a 
country, particularly the Southern ones, started to draw back. The higher degree of 
economic liberalism in the industrial policies lessened the traditional concentration of 
distributive powers in the hand of the state, both as law-maker and political player. 
Nevertheless, parties still keep playing an important role within the state, conserving 
their distributive powers and self-managing their organization and campaigning, by 
controlling the legislation and providing rules for media access and legal framework for 
their existence and activities. (Biezen, Kopecky, 2007, 2014) 
A huge variety of public resources is available for parties. Public funding, even 
if nowadays called into discussion and reformed or abolished in many countries, clearly 
symbolizes the growing relevance of the state in financing party activities or in 
refunding electoral campaigns. In turn, the availability of public sources for their 
subsistence has made less attractive for parties to try to obtain private resources, by 
reactivating and strengthening relationships with social groups. 
However, the social and democratic value of public funding has not to be 
neglected here since state resources to the parties guarantee the participation in politics 
to groups otherwise excluded from the electoral competition or able to take part in 
political arena only if they represent special interests and achieve particular goals, 
supported by specific fund givers. 
Patronage is a further means used by the parties to increase their legitimacy both 
within and outside the state. In Biezen and Kopecky scheme, patronage embodies and 
measures the third key dimension of the party-state relationship, in addition to the 
dependence on the state (public funding) and the management by the state (party 
regulation).
1
  
Scholars from different fields of research have tried and found several ways to 
define ‘patronage’ in a continuous multidisciplinary struggle that involves particularly 
political science, comparative politics and public administration studies (Stokes, 2009; 
                                                          
1
 This dimension has slightly evolved during the time: in 2007 they define it “the extent to which parties 
themselves control the state” in terms of “party rent-seeking”, where as in 2014 it is more emphasized as 
“the capture of the state by parties”. That said, party patronage emerges as a powerful tool of penetration 
in the state to gain benefits for the party. 
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Bearfield, 2009). Conceptualizing patronage has also changed because of the evolution, 
in the time and in the space, of party organizations and political life. Equally, 
remarkable progresses have been reached by refining approaches and strategies to 
operationalize this concept in order to purify it from anthropological bias and moral and 
negative prejudices.
2
 
Starting from Sorauf (1959, 115, 117), patronage was described as “essential to 
a strong and vital party organization”, “a bastion of party”. Although its domain in the 
American civil service at the time was extremely more limited compared to the past, as 
we will see in the next chapter, the abilities of parties to administer patronage, the 
necessity of patronage for effective parties, the vitality of patronage as reward or 
incentive are lucidly pointed out as push factors for the good working of the parties
3
. 
This demonstrates that some features of patronage are not affected by the time, 
but remain essential and almost constitutive of the practice. Blondel (2002, 241) 
provided a summarizing definition of patronage ad “distribution of favours to 
individuals in exchange for political advantages accruing — or being expected to 
accrue- to those who give the favours.” 
A further micro definition (Kaufmann, 1974, 285) points at the presence of a 
patron and a client, not hierarchically equal, equally involved in an ‘interpersonal 
exchange’ relationship ‘based on the principle of reciprocity’, mutually valid until if 
each actor is satisfied by the exchange
4
. 
Like in the prisoner’s dilemma, the classical game theory scenario, this dyadic 
relationship lasts until the two actors cooperate in achieving mutual goals, but, unlike 
the prisoners, they know each other and establish a stable contact and a faithful alliance 
in order to be familiar with each other and know how to cooperate. 
                                                          
2
 This ambiguity and the orientation to generic definitions of both practices have crossed different works: 
Graziano (1976); Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Gellner and Waterbury (1977); Shefter (1977); 
Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984), Kahane (1984); Kristinsson (1996); Warner (1997); Martz (1997); 
Kitschelt (2000), Müller (2000); Hopkin and Mastropaolo (2001); Gordin (2002); Eaton (2004); Taylor-
Robinson (2006); Benton (2007); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007); Levitsky (2007); Manzetti and Wilson 
(2007); Wang and Kurzman (2007). 
3
 Already in 1937, Pollock noted that “employees who are politically appointed are naturally expected to 
attend political meetings, make speeches, canvass voters, and do all the other things involved in political 
activity.” (p. 32) 
4
 An alternative, but similar definition is later given by Lande: “vertical dyadic alliance … between two 
persons of unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone 
superior or inferior to himself (1977, p. xx) 
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From this minimal and timeless definitions of patronage at micro-level, it would 
follow that party patronage considers the party acting as a patron that distributes 
benefits in exchange of something, but that definition is still so skeletal and basic that 
draws a vague and zoomed out picture of how patronage is actually understood
5
. 
Indeed, in the course of the literature, patronage has been better explained for 
differences with other similar phenomena such as corruption and clientelism (Scherlis 
2010, Kopecky and Scherlis 2008). Clientelism and patronage have been brands used 
for too long time as synonymous to explain the same practices. Moreover, many have 
seen it both as evil practices of manipulation related to rural or not developed society 
and have considered the client as a socially marginalized actor, forced to get resources 
from the patron in order to survive (Blok, 1974; Chubb, 1982). 
Democratization processes, economic growth and citizen empowerment weaken 
this assumption: clients may now count on a number of personal and material resources 
higher than in the past and they do not necessarily need party support. Citizens and 
groups become more independent in their choices even when they play the role of 
clients. Actually, the demise of parties as political machines and social linkage 
providers extends the power of clients, now free to select the patrons they prefer 
(Piattoni, 2001). These dyadic relationships are not anymore enduring as in the past, 
with an increasingly shaded nuance of paternalism and far from primitive lure. 
A denotative approach helps us to distinguish clientelism and patronage. What 
makes the difference is the object of the exchange between patron and client. Patronage 
distributes only jobs, both at lower (contracts) and upper level (appointments), whereas 
clientelism uses different type of resources such as goods and material benefits (food, 
water, medicine in the poorest contexts, pensions or other subsidies in less emergency 
areas). (Stokes, 2007) 
Clientelism may also distribute jobs, but only at low level and just in exchange 
of electoral support. In this sense, clientelism represents “an electoral tool in which 
benefits are delivered to obtain the recipients' vote” (Kopecky, 2011, 282) and looks 
                                                          
5
 Patronage as “the submission of public officials to an overlord” that “diminishes their ability to serve the 
public interest at large” is mentioned among negative consequences to be prevented by a civil service act 
in a short paper published by SIGMA Support for Improvement in Governance and Management, a joint 
initiative of the OECD and the European Union to improve public governance (Cardona, 2002).  
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like a non-professional-oriented practice limited to a mutual and personal exchange, 
closed in a one-to-one relationship. 
Compared to patronage, clientelism takes place outside from the state, both in a 
legal and illegal way whether allowed or forbidden by the law. Even if patrons may use 
public money, coming from party funding, to foster clientelistic relationships, they still 
do not hold public offices and do not necessarily distribute state resources
6
 (Stokes, 
2011). 
The nature of the client here ranges from ordinary citizens, willing to get 
immediate and individual benefits from the personal vote-selling, to specific social 
groups organized to improve their own conditions conveying collective and mobilized 
support to a certain candidate or party.  Usually these groups, especially when organized 
in constituencies or districts, are able to attract a richer quantity of resources, generally 
funds. They could receive it privately, without formal identification and recognition, or 
publicly, through particular public policies.  
The latter is called pork barrel legislation or pork barrel politics (Müller, 2007, 
251), a legal method to target benefits to specific groups, passing laws or provisions 
directed mainly to people that share the place where they live (Lancaster and Paterson, 
1990; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). This particular exchange consists of buildings, 
infrastructures or any other form of public intervention distributed in favour of few and 
well defined geographic blocs of citizens, but paid by the whole community (Aldrich 
1995, 30). These pork barrel policies are generally condemned as unethical or immoral 
since based on a veto power of the patrons/legislators, called instead by the 
constitutions and the norms to serve their own communities, representing their needs 
and desires during the mandate. 
To be honest, pork barrel legislation leaves large room for free riders: one can 
benefit from new roads and take advantage from new constructions, without paying any 
electoral money to the patron. As in the rational choice theory (Olson, 1965; De Mucci, 
2009), individuals could have no personal incentive to support a specific candidate if 
they consider high the cost of voting such candidate and take for granted that they will 
receive in any case some benefits.  
                                                          
6
 In the case of pensions, patrons are in the condition to ask and receive benefits through personal 
channels within legislatures or government, but they do not control them directly. 
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The withdrawal from the electoral action in favour of that candidate deprives 
patrons of the traditional power and that hierarchical and superior positions, so widely 
recognized from the scholars. If every member of the specific constituency makes the 
same calculation, no one would vote for that candidate that promises benefits in change 
of electoral support. The attempt to avoid this paradox, at the extreme extent, and the 
need for the patrons to affirm their power in a given community have had a relevant 
effect on the legislation writing and making process, particularly in the budget laws: the 
more specific a law provision is, the higher is the probability to reach a distinct array of 
people that have secured electoral support. 
Coming back to patronage and clientelism features, the first one allocates public 
jobs and appointments by discretional criteria. These criteria are not limited to the 
electoral support, but they found strong motivations in alternative goals, such as parties’ 
organizational necessities, mainly in electoral campaigning stage. In its basic meaning, 
patronage shares with clientelism reward-oriented functions and the core principle of 
‘take there, give here’ (Graham, 1997), but a distinctive point between these two 
practices is represented by the nature of the clients in patronage relationships. 
Patronage clients do not inevitably have to belong to a party or to demonstrate 
electoral affiliation with their patrons. In patronage, patrons and clients are reciprocally 
reliant on each other and their relationship is less asymmetrical and time-limited than in 
the clientelism since clients give something more than the their ‘simple’ vote. Here we 
state ‘simple vote’ because in the democratic play the right and the act of vote is 
available for every eligible citizen, potentially a client that demands benefits on the 
clientelism market. 
If patronage is a topdown concept, stressing the central importance of the 
patron/party in a network, clientelism, on the contrary, could represent a bottom-up 
perspective, more related to a wider social context and more focused to the role of the 
client as part interested in being involved in a clientelistic relationship to secure 
electoral allegiance. 
For this reason, clientelism potentially reaches more individuals and social slices 
than patronage. Its vastness is related to the lack of special prerequisites that the benefit 
recipients are not asked to satisfy. In patronage mechanics, the requirement of minimal 
skills, albeit statically pointed out in terms of study title, income, age or gender, works 
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as filter in the selection of the client, selected on a merit based system, not officially 
licensed, but discretionally defined time by time. 
There are good reasons for it. Parties can stand as patrons in clientelistic 
exchanges before the election in the form of a central or local committee or factions or 
candidates. Later, once accomplished their primary goals like getting electoral 
consensus and seats in Parliament and offices in the cabinet and in the government, they 
take the form of office-holder parties, that is to say political groups that now prepare 
themselves to confirm and extend their power until the control of decision making 
process. 
We can suggest here that clientelism as ‘vote of exchange’ (Parisi and Pasquino, 
1979; Katz, 1986; Parisi 1995) is a preliminary condition for the patrons to involve new 
clients in patronage exchanges, most effectively named ‘spoil system’. Without a solid 
electorate, that parties could significantly extend also through clientelistic channels, it is 
impossible for them to cross the electoral threshold or achieve a notable quota of seats 
in order to play as parliamentary subjects able to influence polity and policies
7
.  
To sum up, the existence of widespread ‘clientages’, definable in nutshell as 
adherents or supporters consciously ready to tie with a patron, does not directly imply 
clientelism or patronage. In fact, if this clientage, both at individual and collective level, 
relies on direct electoral purposes, it follows that clientelism occurs, whereas if 
clientage is connected with a party or a politician without direct electoral reasons, but 
with other motivations to contribute to party/candidate’s success, patronage happens8. 
The figure that follows suggests an iconic representation and a synthesis of the 
difference between the two phenomena: what separates clientelism from patronage is an 
electoral result for the parties acceptable enough to go beyond the gate that separates 
civil society and the state. Once they overstep it, probably through the distribution of 
material and particular benefits, they are ready to distribute public jobs and appointment 
                                                          
7
 Some scholars argue that electoral systems with personal vote encourage clientelism (Kitschelt, 2000). 
Even if others (Stokes, 2011) do not completely agree and the argument is still discussed, we could state 
with more certainty that patronage is not affected by the electoral system. An attempt to explain and 
observe a ‘post-electoral patronage’, in the form of “revolving doors” available for not elected candidates, 
is given by De Mucci et al, 2009. 
8
 As Hilgers (2011, 575) wrote: “Patronage is closely linked to clientelism, although its key defining 
characteristic, the discretionary distribution of public office, is not necessarily shared by clientelism. 
Patronage entails the distribution of public sector jobs by a candidate or party to loyal supporters who 
have helped to generate votes. The votes in question are often produced through clientelism.” 
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derived from their installation within the state. It is self-evident that this process is 
cyclical and fluctuating: in order to keep their patronage power within the state, parties 
have to secure a solid electoral base. Clientelism can be practiced to reach this purpose
9
. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Patronage and clientelism 
 
The most recent and comprehensive definition of patronage frames it as “the 
power of parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life” and as 
“an organizational resource” (Mair and Kopecky, 2006; Kopecky, Mair, and Spirova, 
2012). This dissertation follows their understanding, observing this practice in Italian 
parliamentary context and aiming at enlarging the realm of what has been conceived so 
far as ‘state’. 
The assumption of appointment power, linked to the cartel party (ideal) type, has 
put forward several original contributions in the literature of patronage, reshuffling old 
explanatory models. The penetration and the control of public offices and job resources 
have revitalised the weak power of parties to attract citizens in the political sphere. They 
potentially allow parties to find fresh and, till then, unexploited energies and reinforce 
organizational structure, even promoting their advancement in the society. 
The collusive neighbourhood with other parties, in order to exclude, as a ‘cartel’, 
other new, upcoming or small political actors from the arena, has not been fully 
confirmed so far by the facts. The broad agreements in Parliament in reforming electoral 
                                                          
9
 The circle closes with Downs’ definition of political parties as “a team of men seeking to control the 
governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (1957, 25). 
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system, typically in the direction of raising the threshold required to running lists for the 
entry in legislative assemblies, could provide an evidence of party veto power to new 
comers in the electoral market. By this bi-partisan agreement, they disincentive the 
electoral presence of other political formations stimulating not only electoral, but also 
organizational fusions.
10
 It is though easier to imagine parties, even the major parties, as 
fighting each other in the electoral arena trying to increase at maximum their rent-
seeking power. This competition takes place also in the intra-coalitional dynamics once 
parties have won preeminent positions within the cabinet and the government.  
In this scenario, electoral contests work as a preparatory step, an external test for 
management abilities and problem-solving skills in a political debate communicated by 
the media, with passive citizens that vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ like in the referendum scheme. 
To win the contest, parties are obliged to address electorate through generic and 
so inclusive platforms founded on minimal common values. Interclass ‘catch-all’ parties 
(Kircheimer, 1966), born to widen the traditional audience of a party, provide still today 
valid notion to analyse the political life, especially in times of volatile, if not fleeting, 
electorates (Bartolini and Mair, 1990) and of progressive decline in turnout, at the 
beginning fearfully considered as a deterioration of democracy and now commonly 
accepted as an evolved form of civic independence from the politics.   
With an unmoved society and a growingly relevant government, parties have to 
embrace the opportunity to turn to the state, cover governmental functions and dismiss 
their function of representative agency, that is the typical motivation of the 
parliamentary initiatives. 
But do they really totally dismiss the representative function when they deal 
with patronage? Or, better, do they deal with patronage when they serve as “means of 
representation” (Sartori, 2005, 24) and legislative parties within the proper institutions? 
Does patronage exist only in government arenas, in agencies and in administrative 
bureaus? This dissertation would answer these questions enriching the study on 
patronage and exploring a so far hidden distributive process: the parliamentary 
patronage. This phenomenon is here understood as the patronage that takes place within 
the legislative assemblies, and not as the patronage of the Parliament as a whole. 
                                                          
10
 An example is constituted by the reform for the election of Italian members at European parliament in 
2009, passed few months before the elections (Natale, 2009). 
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Rewording Kopecky and Mair definition, parliamentary patronage is the power of 
parties to distribute jobs within parliamentary structures. In doing so, we examine how 
parties establish themselves in a constitutional body, how they arrange themselves 
within the Chamber or the Senate in order to develop their working inside and outside 
these institutions. 
After this first introductory section, now we deal with the functions and the 
styles of patronage as underlined in the recent studies (Kopecky et al. 2012, Bearfield 
2009). This scheme will be useful to theoretically define parliamentary patronage and 
formulate some expectations in the last part of the chapter. 
 
 
1.2 FUNCTIONS AND STYLES OF PATRONAGE 
 
The huge variety of patronage definitions has shown the different dimensions of this 
many-sided concept. Now, in order to ascend to a more macro-level comprehension, we 
set down functions and styles of patronage intended as the power of parties to distribute 
positions within the state structure.  
Although fruitful and innovative, the governmental definition of patronage is 
still in the early stages and to some extent in a minority position in the literature 
developed until now. The obstacles to operationalization process, put by the anything 
but unanimous conceptualization and the variety of (difficult) measurement methods, 
have hindered and delayed the ‘installation’ of a common and shared basis. 
This section contributes to circumscribe properties and quality of patronage 
intended as a dimension of ‘party-state’ relationship, going beyond the derby between 
patronage intended as electoral/reward or governmental/control resource (Kopecky et 
al., 2012) and trying to achieve an essential pattern of patronage capable of involving 
any contextualization of this practice. By doing so, we will be able to apply this pattern 
to parliamentary patronage. 
 In brief, in our assumption, party patronage as organizational resource represents 
a means to: 
 Support party activities at financial level in a lateral and indirect way; 
 Build and reinforce party internal organizations; 
 Increase the professionalization of party management. 
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The first two functions compensate the otherwise decaying financial sources and 
organizational networks, whereas the third function equips parties to face modern 
challenges, especially in the electoral campaigning. 
First, changes in public party funding oblige parties to find alternative legal 
ways in order to secure their financial independence and sustain their activities both at 
national and local level. The presence of party within the state guarantees in this sense a 
minimal insurance from the risk to completely disappear from the political landscape. 
Parties staff their structures, mainly at central level, with low level patronage and 
guarantee party activities’ working and functioning ruled by professional staff 
comparable to those ones on the regular party pay-roll (Webb, Kolodny 2006) Using 
public state resources, parties reduce the recourse to private funding to sustain certain 
activities. In this way they have a larger margin to manoeuvre in their budgets to spend 
money in other directions according to their priorities.  
Moreover, clients are often asked to contribute to the party budget with a certain 
percentage of their salaries as a return for appointments and jobs (Sorauf, 1969). This is 
also true at higher level when MPs are called to destine a quota of their parliamentary 
income to the party. It could be matter of debate whether this kind of patronage is legal 
or not, but here we assume that this practice respects the legal constraints, especially 
when party activities overlap the range of activities run by other state organizations that 
can offer patronage. In this sense, patronage represents an indirect surrogate of public 
financing. 
Second, patronage can be used as intra-party cohesion and organizational loyalty 
facilitator (Panebianco, 1988a): the distribution of selective incentives to party members 
in exchange of stable external support could help to stimulate and reinforce, as a glue, 
the unity of internal structures at political level and keep party stable in its connections 
with local entities. This is true both for big and small parties. In the big parties with 
catch all ideologies, the internal use of patronage recognizes the existence of different 
factions that could stand as a party within the party. A shared management of patronage 
mechanisms and distributive processes keeps the party united in all its heterogeneous 
components, preventing party splits and conflicts (Giannetti, Benoit 2009), “wielding 
the different blocs within the party into a unified whole” (Sorauf, 1969). With the same 
  
24 
scheme and for the same purposes, patronage practices also are managed in coalitional 
government and contexts not only during the constitutive moments. As for the small 
parties, patronage is necessary to reinforce and motivate ties in a limited dimension. The 
absence of available patronage resources could weaken the internal cohesion, especially 
in majoritarian contexts, and discourage the belonging to small sized entities. In 
proportional contexts, on the contrary, small parties, in particular if they hold a veto 
power, could maximize their rent-seeking orientation, providing discrete quantity of 
patronage resources to their membership. 
Third, the discretional power of parties to distribute state jobs is a lever to raise 
the professional level of party management. In the electoral professional party, contacts 
between politicians and citizens are mediated by professionals, ‘so-called experts, 
technicians with specialist knowledge’ (Panebianco, 1988a, 264). The lack of stable 
points of connection with the civil society makes necessary the use of professionals to 
taps communication channels and develop policy proposals and platforms. The notion 
of patronage as control resource (Kopecy, Mair, Spirova, 2012), purified by any 
reference to governmental sphere and to the partyness of government (Blondel, Cotta, 
2000), can be easily reconducted in this function.  
What their theoretical framework argued about the point remains valid with a 
broader sense: “By staffing the state with trusted individuals, political parties can make 
their policies flow more effectively, can be better informed, and can thereby enhance 
their policy-making capacity and reputation”. “Through patronage, and through the 
appointment of party personnel to key agencies and institutions, parties can hope to gain 
an oversight of the likely demands posed to political leaders, as well as of the likely 
policies and programmes that are needed to meet these demands. In this sense, 
patronage can also serve as the basis for a powerful network of communication between 
policy-making sectors, expressed both vertically and horizontally”. (2012, 10, 11) 
The professionalism in party working deserves more attention in patronage 
studies, not only to understand patron’s motivation, but also to focus more clearly on 
clients. Patronage studies are in fact affected by a lack of analysis on clients, more 
independent in modern patronage. This lack has been biased by a conception of 
patronage as an overwhelming practice of patrons on clients at top-down level. Here we 
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assume that a market of clients actually exists since clients can choose their patron and 
change it if not satisfied by the relationship. 
Professionalism has really revolutionized party patronage. Clients now offer 
expertise and competence tied by autonomous, entrusted and contractualized ways 
(Wilensky, 1959; Brante, 1990; Webb and Fisher, 2003). Compared to traditional party 
bureaucrats, they have more status, a more professional commitment free from personal 
acritical devotion, but fully engaged in party’s mission. 
 A further decisive contribution to patronage literature has been given by 
Bearfield (2009, 68-73) by pointing out four “styles” of patronage according to the 
principal or principle goals pursued by patrons. Even if these styles are formulated 
starting from the American experience, this typology has remarkable relevance for the 
object of this dissertation and for the future studies. The four patronage styles are: 
1. Organizational patronage, “used to strengthen or create political organizations”; 
2. Democratic patronage, a means “to achieve democratic or egalitarian goals”. 
3. Tactical patronage, used “to bridge political divisions or cleavages as a means of 
achieving political or policy goals”. 
4. Reform patronage, a paradox situation in which “those committed to reforming 
the existing patronage system themselves engage in the practice as the means of 
replacing the corrupt political regime that preceded them”. 
We have already considered with other labels the organizational and the tactical 
patronage in the previous pages. Democratic patronage and reform patronage open 
interesting scenarios for reflection and debate. According to Bearfield, democratic 
patronage is “the most vulnerable to distortion and abuse”, but actually “can be a useful 
tool for creating a representative bureaucracy”. His considerations take the cue from 
Jacksonian experience with the ‘rotation of the offices’ against patronage as a prelude to 
corruption and a detachment from public interest, but can also be extended to 
consensual or consociational democracies. In Netherlands, for example, the politics of 
accommodation secured political stability and political pluralism (Lijphart, 1968). In his 
study about Dutch political system, Lijphart pointed out that “the Netherlands presents a 
paradox. On the one hand, it is characterized by an extraordinary degree of social 
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cleavage. On the other hand, Holland is also one of the most notable examples of a 
successful democracy”, stable and effective.  
The spirit of accommodation among political elites is one of the decisive factors to 
explain this political miracle in terms of democratic management. Accommodation 
means “settlement of divisive issues and conflicts, where only a minimal consensus 
exists” (1968, 103) and, in order to be feasible, it could be rendered even into jobs, 
official positions and appointments reallocated and distributed among the ‘self-
contained blocs’. 
As highest and most explicit example of this practice, we could mention the 
Lebanese National Pact, established in 1943. Negotiated between the Shi'ite, Sunni and 
Maronite representatives, it stated in unwritten form that the president would have been 
always a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunnite Muslim, the speaker of the 
National Assembly a Shīʿite Muslim, the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and 
the Deputy Prime Minister Greek Orthodox. According to this pact, the ratio of 
Christian to Muslim representatives in Parliament would have been six to five. 
11
 
In Italy, a country with low rational-legal authority in Max Weber’s meaning, the 
so-called lottizzazione explains the democratic quality of patronage as means of power 
sharing and guarantee of pluralism. Mancini (2009) showed how during the First 
Republic the Italian public service broadcaster (RAI) has been object of pervasive party 
patronage according to party quotas, even by internal factions of the parties (a 
‘lottizzazione within lottizzazione’, Padovani, 2005). This consolidated scheme 
practically applied the principle of pluralism and assured their presence and their 
representation in the media. 
Economically expensive, democratic patronage has been considered as the prelude 
of corruption. Lijphart study (1999), though, denied the virtues of majoritarian 
democracies in terms of limited corruption and demonstrate the no significant 
relationship between consensus democracies and corruption, arguing on the contrary 
                                                          
11
 As Zahar puts (2005), “the legislature turned into a private club as leaders promoted their protégés. The 
elites almost secured a monopoly of representation. Hence patronage politics did not bode well for 
legislative responsiveness to popular demands”. 
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that “consensual democracies are slightly less likely to be corrupt than majoritarian 
democracies” (2008, 97). 
Reform patronage allows us to introduce a snake-biting-its-tail process. What if 
reformist parties elected against a given patronage system try to install their new 
patronage system? “If they stick to their ideals of not using (or, in their minds, abusing) 
patronage, the movement will die once the zeal of their initial supporters has waned” 
Bearfield wrote (p.72). “However, if the reformers build their own political machine 
and opt to use patronage to staff the organization with people loyal to their cause, they 
would appear as hypocrites, making themselves vulnerable to both political rivals and 
the next wave of reformers”. 
This ironic paradox, overcome - according to the author - by the implementation of 
“a new patronage network under the guise of meritorious hiring of experts based on a 
specific set of experiences or credentials” (p- 73), concerns a serious issue about 
patronage and regimes, their consolidation and crisis. 
According to Morlino (1998, 2005), parties with their own organizations and 
patronage
12
 serve as ‘anchors’ “able to perform” in an asymmetrical relationship 
between people and elites “a hooking-and-binding effect on more or less organized 
people within a society” (1998, 446; 2005, 745). In so doing, the reach and the extent of 
patronage affect the domestic anchoring process, that is the gradual presence and 
adaptation of anchors and their development within a democracy with rules at electoral 
and decisional level. 
In Morlino’s theory, anchoring process is a crucial component in the mix that leads 
to the complete and solid establishment of democratic structures, institution and norms, 
called ‘consolidation’. Only firm and fully developed anchors, after a reasonable lapse 
of time from the installation enough to let the dominance grow over the civil society, 
make possible to achieve consolidation in a context of exclusive legitimation with low 
consensus towards the democratic institutions and with alternative political groups out 
from the political field. In addition, firm anchors can prevent the emergence of a crisis. 
                                                          
12
 In his work, Morlino referred to patronage as Kristinsson’s definition (1996, 355; 2005, 435): “the 
selective distribution of material benefits to individuals or small groups in change of their political 
support”. 
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The breakage of the flukes happens also when the economic, political and social cost of 
the anchors oversteps reasonable levels. 
Even if for long time the conventional wisdom has associated patronage with waste, 
corruption and clientelism, this phenomenon is not a curse for democracy and 
government. On the contrary, it provides and guarantees the full functioning and 
stability of democracy although at extreme extent its freezing could bring to an 
inflexible and blocked system that only a crisis can unlock. Morlino’s scheme helps to 
rethink patronage as one of the vehicles of democracy and consubstantial to it. Its fine 
working and its dynamic stability represent an insurance policy for a long-lasting 
democratic play. Patronage is not necessarily an evil and is not the devil so black as 
some scholars have painted. It is the cost of patronage that makes the dangerous 
difference even in a condition of widespread legitimation with large consensus for the 
institutions and absent support for alternative regimes.  
Morlino’s theoretical efforts stimulate us to draw some questions. When does a 
patronage system go to crisis? When does a patronage system stay below the tolerance 
threshold? Does reform patronage necessarily represent a patronage crisis? Answering 
them could contribute to widen the focus on the reasons why transitions in patronage 
models may occur, relying to some extent on their legitimacy. We assume here that 
party changes and state reforms do not affect patronage systems. We could define them 
external variables of patronage and we actually know that they can reduce the 
distribution of job positions and have an impact on how the distribution takes place, but 
focusing on internal variables of exchange relationships in this step allows us to 
underline the fundamentals. 
Patronage systems could be distinguished by the intersections between merit criteria 
and party allegiance. Some scholars (Mainwaring, 1999, 177) have defined patronage as 
“the use or distribution of state resources on a non meritocratic basis for political gain”. 
Our concept of patronage does not necessarily exclude meritocratic basis since 
patronage, as we said, is a means to increase the professionalization of party 
management and attested and acknowledged professional skills are necessary whereas 
party allegiance does not seem enough to guarantee all alone the achievement of 
political goals. Democracy is an exercise that requires both expertise and commitment. 
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From the two dichotomies merit-based/non merit-based and partisan/no partisan 
patronage four different patterns emerge: 
 
MERIT 
Weak Strong 
PARTY 
ALLEGIANCE 
Weak Patronage zero 
Patronage by the 
experts 
Strong Low-level patronage 
Patronage by partisan 
experts 
 
Table 1.1. Party allegiance and merit: internal patronage models  
 
Patronage zero represent the phase in which people with low party allegiance 
and low merit are recruited. Parties have little advantage to hire such persons, but 
actually sometimes they are ‘obliged’ to do if relatives or friends are involved. This 
phenomenon, called nepotism, weaken the legitimacy of both parties and states. 
Patronage by partisan experts could find the highest level of acceptance if parties have a 
large consensus. State resources are used to engage skilful people in order to fulfil party 
goals within the state and their costs could be easily tolerated by the citizens. The shift 
from patronage to patronage shapes the substance of party-state relationship and affect 
the quality of patronage. 
However, party-state relationship can change if party systems or the state face 
changes, causing the crisis of the pre-existent model of patronage. The passage from 
consensual to competitive party systems, for example, reduces the space for multi-party 
patronage especially if the pervasiveness of the state is weaker. At the same time, 
distributive politics in jobs and state position needs some adaptations if the number of 
ruling parties grows: the sharing power with oversized coalitions could require an 
expansion of the state in order to satisfy parties’ demands. 
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STATE 
Weak presence Strong presence 
PARTY SYSTEM 
Consensual Shared patronage Diffused patronage 
Competitive Mono patronage Exclusive patronage 
 
Table 1.2 Party systems and states: external patronage models 
 
1.3 WHY PATRONAGE IS NOT CORRUPTION 
 
In the confusional, but prosperous state of the literature, the general notion of patronage 
has been coloured with misleading meanings, interpreted almost as an activity with 
para-lobbystic influence, quite close to corruptive practices and often overlapped. This 
section explains why patronage is not corruption and how and when these two concepts 
could correspond to each other.  
“Without influence, which you call corruption, men will not be induced to 
support government, though they generally approve of its measures” said John 
Mortlock, British banker, Member of Parliament, and thirteen times Mayor and Master 
of the Town of Cambridge in 1780s. His sentence shows a common trait between 
patronage and corruption: the influence, intended as an authoritative exercise of an 
established power in a dyadic relationship. At the same time, if we substitute the term 
‘corruption’ with ‘patronage’ or ‘clientelism’, the sentence remains meaningful with its 
multifaceted consequences. 
Like in the case of patronage, the conceptualization of corruption is not 
completely defined. The first effort is to distinguish between systemic and individual 
corruption or grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption has been summarized as that 
kind of corruption that “occurs at the highest levels of government and involves major 
government projects and programs” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 27), whereas petty 
corruption “occurs within a framework where basic laws and regulations are in place 
and implementing officials seize upon opportunities to benefit personally” (Rose-
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Ackerman, 2007, xviii). It is to be taken for granted that usually corruption raises from 
petty to grand. 
We may start our comparison by examining the World Bank definition of 
corruption as an “abuse of public office for unauthorized private gain” (2000). In this 
term, corruption occurs everywhere, no matter if society, government, democracy or 
economical sector are advanced or not. By this view, modernization thesis of corruption 
(Huntington, 1968; Scott, 1969; Heidenhimer, 1970) have completely failed in bringing 
into the proper focus the phenomenon. Those theories considered corruption like a 
dependent variable of the development of a society: the more a country is modernized, 
the less is expected to observe corruption, declined after the transitional stage.  
A wider definition spells out that political corruption is “the abuse of entrusted 
power by political leaders for private gain, with the objective of increasing power or 
wealth. Political corruption need not involve money changing hands; it may take the 
form of ‘trading in influence’ or granting favors that poison politics and threaten 
democracy” (Transparency International Annual Report, 2004, 10).  
As such, the term “abuse” represents the constitutive element of corruption, 
distinguishing corruption from patronage. The abuse of power actually generates a 
violation of law and so corruption treads on the borders of the law whereas patronage 
practices are regulated by legal and regulatory provisions with always recognizable 
clients and patrons. So even if corruption uses “legal means to deliver favors, for 
example, by rewriting bills to include or exclude certain sectors from the scope of a bill” 
(Yadav, 2011, 5), its use is illegal.  
An analytic typology of corruption has been advanced by Heidenheimer (1989). 
He defined three types of corruption from the literature:  
1) public office-centered, focused on the public official. By this view, 
“corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because 
of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or 
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence. This 
includes such behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgments of a person in 
a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship 
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rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for 
private-regarding uses)”. (J.S. Nye, 1967, 966). Actually nepotism is situated at the 
border between patronage and corruption: when the discretional power of parties to 
distribute public jobs or positions also to relatives and members of the family is not 
limited by the law, nepotism assumes more a form of debatable favouritism that 
damages other potential clients than a practice that directly breaks the law; 
2) market-centered (van Klaveren, 1957, 4) when “a corrupt civil servant regards 
his (public) office as a business, the income of which he will seek to maximize. The 
office then becomes a maximizing unit. The size of his income depends upon the market 
situation and his talents for finding the point maximal gain on the public demand 
curve.” Obviously, officers’ income could be maximized also by good and not 
corrupted performances, such as productivity and goal-oriented incentives. 
3) public interest-centered, as a “deviant behaviour associated with a particular 
motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense” (Friedrich, 1972, 127). Here 
the contrast is between private gain and public expense since a power-holder undertakes 
decisions or actions that advantage all those offer illegal payments or other rewards 
against public interest. 
The first and the third meaning of corruption are inextricably intertwined since 
generally public officials’ activities are supposed to be guided by strong esteem and 
respect for public interest. This consideration makes public offices, and civil service as 
a whole, value-holder entities spreading civic principles through their existence, 
structure and working. 
Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) stated the most comprehensive definition of 
corruption: “a hidden (due to its illegality) violation of a contract that, implicitly or 
explicitly, state a delegation of responsibility and the exercise of some discretionary 
power; (ii) by a public agent (the bribee) who, against the interests or preferences of the 
principal (its public organization) (iii) acts in favor of a third part (the briber) from 
which he receives a rewards (the bribe)” (pp. 16-7). 
 
Several initiatives have been taken to fight and destroy political corruption and 
sanitize institutions. The types of corruption control have been classified by Gillespie 
and Okruhlik (1991, 6). A first step, as we said, is the social strategy, the body of ethical 
norms, education and public vigilance that inhibit corrupt practices. No other clean up 
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provision (legal or political) could be forceful and compelling without the recourse of 
informal social sanctions. Their effectiveness depends on the level of acceptance, 
approval and promotion of social norms that encourage certain standards of behaviour 
and foster the abstract and practical respect for public interests. 
Secondly, legal strategies and procedures emerge as a further factor to 
discourage corruption. Every country has more or less successfully erected an anti-
corruption system, mainly through regulating agencies that “provide centralized 
leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity” (Meagher, 2005, 70), in order to 
prevent the proliferation of bribes and kickbacks, especially in public works. In the last 
decades, public officials have been asked to show their asset situation, to abstain from 
conflict of interest, to refuse gifts over a certain value. Law enforcement makes the 
difference: a special and severe sanctionary system against corruption crimes with a 
strong rule of law largely intended affects the capacity of state structures to be 
penetrated by corrupters.  
Market strategies have been considered as a third pillar. In last twenty years, 
policy platforms and agendas have been generally distinguished by a lower presence of 
the state in the economies and in the productive sectors of economic life. Government 
intervention in economy has actually lead to market distortion, facilitating collusions, 
oligopolies or ineffective monopolies that restraint perfect competition. The withdrawal 
of government from economic activities and the promotion of free market policies 
represent an additional factor to clean up corruption, avoiding strong asymmetries and 
disequilibria between demand and supply.  
Lastly, political strategies to reduce corruption focus on authority, access to 
political process and administrative reforms. According to Gillespie and Okruhlik, the 
eradication of corrupt activities could be achieved if the decisional powers are assigned 
to committees, collective boards, rather than to individuals. The administrative reforms 
opening for more transparency, fairness and normative and administrative 
simplifications could reduce the bureaucratic shadowy space that allows to corruption to 
infiltrate. Even the law-making process has an influence on corruption practices, 
although it is more likely that corruption has more influence on determining bills’ 
writing and decision-making processes than the opposite. Some principles should guide 
the law-making: laws should be prospective, not retrospective and should be relatively 
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stable. Moreover, particular laws should be guided by open, general and clear rules that 
make possible a limited discretion of authoritative -delegated- powers in their 
application and enforcement. (Raz, 1979; Maravall, 2002) 
Other strategies to fight corruptions focuses on open participation of citizens in 
the political processes in order to promote an effective control and scrutiny of ruled 
class upon the ruling class. Public officials can also be empowered as whistleblowers to 
denounce corruption crimes within the public administration. The degree of adhesion to 
this practice can vary from country to country and depends on social factors and the 
protection effectiveness secured to whisteblowers. Even an incentivisation of fair 
behaviours and good practices could be pursued by monetary benefits, increasing 
salaries and awarding non corrupted public officials. 
 
To sum up, corruption has to do with rule of law more than patronage does and 
has much more implications with democracy at its roots than patronage. Actually, the 
rule of law represents a procedural dimension of democracy, one of the eight possible 
qualities to check how good a democracy is (Morlino, 2011), along with electoral and 
inter-institutional accountability, political participation and competition (each of four 
procedural dimensions), freedom, solidarity (both substantive dimensions) and 
responsiveness (outcome dimension). 
In the studies on quality of democracies, the rule of law is “not only the 
enforcement of legal norms”, but “entails at least the capacity, even if limited, to make 
authorities respect the laws, and to have laws that are non-retroactive, publicly known, 
universal, stable, and unambiguous” (Morlino, 2011, 197). In this sense, the 
“institutional and administrative capacity to formulate, implement, and enforce the law; 
focus on the governance system (parliament and government) capable of ensuring the 
production of high quality legislation and its implementation throughout the country and 
a transparent policy-making process allowing for the participation of civil society, and 
the presence of a professional, neutral, accountable, and efficient state bureaucracy” 
(Morlino, 2011, 197) represents one of the basic sub-dimensions of rule of law that 
include also the “effective fight against corruption, illegality, and abuse of power by 
state agencies; focus on the existence and implementation of the comprehensive 
legislative framework to prevent and fight corruption”. 
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Our assumption here is that patronage is not corruption, but is completely legal, 
potentially and generally transparent, subordinated to laws and norms. This helps us not 
only to give more dignity to the object of our study, but also to fully understand the 
reach of patronage within the state in total compliance with legislations and procedures 
and without damages for democracy’s quality. 
In Kaufmann definition of patronage (1974), the exchange relationship between 
patrons and clients is characterized by an “only loosely” anchoring “in public law”. 
Under this aspect, the evolution of patronage notion, in this case related more to the 
public administration transformation, wipes out every margin of ‘looseness’ or 
ambiguity. If patronage moves itself within discretional criteria allowed by the law, this 
discretionality takes the form of an abuse, even in its basic step, when corruption 
occurs. 
It is worthy to identify a further constitutive tract of corruption in order to 
getting out of the jungle of ‘bribery and kickbacks’ that plastically and materially 
describe the concept and of the forest of adjectives (political, economic, administrative) 
that pinpoint its field of action (Deysine, 1980): secrecy and secretiveness are associated 
with corruption. Patrons and clients in corruptive practices, or better the corruptor and 
the corrupted, work clandestinely, especially in the advanced democracies.  
Secrecy is due mainly to the illegality of the corrupt acts, but also to the social 
consensus towards certain practices and to the moral costs personally sustained by the 
corrupter. The higher is the degree of social acceptance towards bribes or kickbacks, the 
higher is the probability that corruption overflows without limits even if bribes and 
kickbacks are forbidden and punished according to the law. Moreover, “The higher the 
“moral cost” for a given agent, the stronger will be his “preference for lawfulfillment” 
(that is, the kind of psychological suffering associated with the violation of legal 
norms), influenced by his personal preference as well as by values and informal codes 
prevailing in.” (Della Porta, Vannucci, 2005, 2-3). 
Although secrecy could represent a virtue for democracy when it aims at 
guaranteeing national or international security or a better quality of decision-making 
processes, in this case it damages democracy structures. As, in a paradox, Kunicova and 
Rose Ackerman put, “the secrecy and lack of transparency involved make it hard for 
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constituents to tell whether the overall impact of having a corrupt political 
representative is beneficial” (2005, 578). 
Party patronage is not secret at all and for this reason provokes less scandal. It is 
likely that precisely the introduction of open and transparent norms to regulate 
relationships between parties and state has liberated patronage from that halo of occult 
pervasiveness which has discredited it so far. Obviously one can say that since laws and 
rules are proposed and passed essentially by the parties themselves as Parliament 
majority members or government builders, the power to decide what is corruption or not 
is up to the parties or the politicians themselves, but actually the empowerment of 
citizens and their more conscious and informed exercise of citizenship and social and 
political rights have restricted the secretiveness of discretionality, making it more 
accountable. 
The financial crisis and the restraints in the national budgets have raised the 
attention level of the citizens on corruption, seen as a factor that increases the costs paid 
and shared by the community and undermines the efficiency of a government system. 
This does not mean that the civic engagement has been exerted with scrutiny in the 
polling booths to choose the less corrupted party. Actually a new climate with claims in 
favours of transparency, oriented to require more accountability and responsibility to the 
ruling class, has emerged. Low turnout forced parties and politicians to ask themselves 
more moral and legal behaviours, promote strict criteria in the selection of the 
candidates and push in their policy agendas the fight against corruption. 
The notion of ‘control patronage’ (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012) or ‘power 
patronage’ (Müller, 2006), that is the appointment used to monitor and determine the 
governmental process, could at extreme extent bring to corruption if this process is 
polluted by corrupt ends: parties could distribute important public jobs and positions in 
order to control channels for illegal party financing or other criminal activities by 
influencing decisions not oriented to public interest. 
The following table summarizes the considerations made in this section. 
 
  
37 
 PATRONAGE CORRUPTION 
WHERE Within the state 
Inside and outside the 
state 
OBJECT OF EXCHANGE Jobs 
Public provisions in 
change of money 
LEGAL Yes No 
SECRET No Yes 
AGAINST THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 
No Yes 
DAMAGES FOR 
DEMOCRACY’QUALITY 
No Yes 
Table 1.3 Patronage and corruption 
 
1.4 PARLIAMENTARY PATRONAGE: A STEP FORWARD AND SOME 
EXPECTATIONS 
 
Systematic and detailed studies or at least hefty debates of “parliamentary patronage” or 
“patronage in Parliament” in the literature are still missing. It is true that just recently 
this concept has found more solid grounds after decades of carefree and not orderly use 
of ‘patronage’ term and so the lack of theoretical and empirical analyses in this 
particular field do not make surprise. 
 This dissertation tries to fill this empty space, assessing the power of parties to 
distribute jobs within legislative assemblies and parliamentary structures. In order to do 
it, we try to make a step forward compared to the reach of the literature so far, and at the 
same time a step behind about the ability of parties to control governmental decisions 
inside those bureaucracies. In some degree, our analysis could re-experience the mass 
party or cadre party performance in term of distributive practices, going back to the 
basic party organization. 
Moreover, the term “within” is to be underlined.  Some committees of the 
Parliament are entitled to elect the members of public companies’ board, following a 
practice principally associated with the party government scheme. At the most stretched 
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degree, in some occasions, the body of MPs intended as the representation of the 
sovereign popular will take part in joint parliamentary session to elect, for example, 
heads of the state, members of the constitutional court or other constitutional bodies. 
Through inter-party negotiations and agreements, these democratic and accountability-
oriented procedures and arrangements could produce lateral and sophisticated forms of 
‘control patronage’ with clients that serve in apical roles thanks to party allegiance and 
so likely to fail in their duties of impartiality and independence. In addition, Parliament 
as a whole or by its speakers or even with some internal branches can determine or 
intervene in appointment procedures, securing a ‘constitutional guarantee’ or a scrutiny 
to the process. It happens often that binding or non-binding preliminary hearings are 
held by the Parliament in the competent committees in order to approve, with or without 
a brief, governmental appointments
13
. 
Moreover, patronage in Parliament could occur when change in internal 
organization in terms of advancements of career for some high-level officials take place. 
These advancements for particular roles may depend on decisions made by politicians 
serving as chairs or components of steering bodies responsible for Parliament 
organization. Professional or personal linkages can play as a key factor in these 
decisions, advantaging close persons in an anyway limited number of persons, each one 
selected by public and competitive procedures, each one asked to fulfil certain 
requirements. 
Neither ‘patronage’ will be the focus of this dissertation. The first one (external 
institutional patronage) is in some cases quite far to be scientifically defined as a high-
level patronage and is more interpreted as an expression of Parliament in its sum of 
political sensibilities, performing also as institutional counterweight in relation with 
other constitutional bodies or institutions. The second one (inner patronage) covers a 
very narrow array of persons that has limited explanatory powers about the general 
relationships between parties and state. There is also a third form of political patronage 
in the parliamentary practices: the distribution of parliamentary institutional offices and 
chairs among the majority parties or the opposition parties according to both inter-
groups and intra-group negotiation. After formal or informal consultations, these 
                                                          
13
 On UK experience, Matthews and Flinders (2015). 
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agreements are formally sealed by an internal electoral moment We will explain this 
“chair patronage” in the light of the Italian experience in the last section of the fourth 
chapter. 
In our study, this “chair patronage” is one of the sources of the parliamentary 
patronage as defined in this dissertation. We consider as parliamentary patronage 
(internal institutional patronage) the process through which parties staff themselves 
within parliamentary structures in order to guarantee their survival and working. The 
rationale of this kind of patronage differs somewhat from the traditional meaning of 
patronage: it moves itself among political science, constitutional and parliamentary law, 
considering Parliament as a branch of the state without any reference to the spoil 
systems, more related to the different sectors of the public administration. 
The conceptualization and the operationalization of party patronage has crucially 
turned around the relationship between political parties and the executive - or the 
government in a broader sense - as a dimension of party-government (Mair 2008; Rose 
1974). The effort of this dissertation is to overcome the conventional wisdom and 
transfer with the proper tools the study of patronage from governmental arenas to the 
legislatures, assuming that the party government model, indeed, does not thoroughly 
explain the entire sphere of patronage practices and represents a condition sufficient, but 
not necessary for the emergence of patronage linkages. This table offers a synthesis of 
what we have explained so far. For the sake of the brevity, we will use the term 
‘parliamentary patronage’ in the next chapters as interchangeable with the “internal 
institutional patronage”.  
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 PATRONS CLIENTS 
RESOURCES 
PROVIDER 
EXTERNAL 
INSTITUTIONAL 
PATRONAGE 
MPs as members of 
assembly or 
committees that 
serve as electorate 
Experts or other 
high-ranking 
politicians 
External institutions  
CHAIR 
PATRONAGE 
MPs MPs Internal institutions 
INNER 
PATRONAGE 
Institutional office-
holder in their 
administrative tasks 
High-ranking 
officials for internal 
career advancement 
Parliament 
INTERNAL 
INSTITUTIONAL 
PATRONAGE 
Institutional office-
holders, MPs and 
parliamentary 
groups  
Chosen by the 
patrons with total 
power of discretion 
Parliament 
 
Table 1.4 Different forms of parliamentary patronage. 
On one hand, parliamentary patronage shares with the Mair’s and Kopecky’s 
notion the anchoring within a public structure (even if parliament constitutes a 
constitutional body), its potentially cyclical renewal, the exchange of public resources 
(jobs) and the existence of a patron that offers the job and a client that seek and receive 
it. On the other hand, in certain public administration systems the ‘appointment’ 
patronage (here labelled also “managerial patronage”) is more embedded within the 
state structure, formally recognized as a spoil system in which the apical administrative 
officials are selected by the political vertex, with effects on the whole structure of a 
public administration. Parliamentary patronage, instead, works as a ‘reserve’ within the 
state – intended as a sum of representative assemblies - that coexists and does not 
replace the parliamentary bureaucracy, selected by competitive procedures. This 
‘reserve’, not permanently installed within the parliamentary structure, goes parallel 
with the internal bureaucracy and is more oriented to the political and institutional goals 
of the temporary patrons with no influence on the whole institution. To same extent, 
Parliament “hosts” patronage and patrons in an enclave with a very limited reach and 
zero counter-effects on its institutional functioning, apart from the costs that it bears for 
it. 
The growing relevance of parliamentary groups in party activities goes beyond 
the basic function of party cohesion, that is “the parliamentary endorsement of 
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government measures’ (Rose, 1983, 283). Parliamentary groups provide additional 
resources to parties: “in some legislatures Fraktion status is a prerequisite to chairing 
committees, serving on administrative bodies, and even gaining staff and other 
legislative resources.” (Bowler et al., 2003, 161) 
In this case, the Parliament itself, here conceived as part of the state, offers 
public financial resources to parliamentary groups for their working
14
, giving them 
autonomy of budget within the borders of law and procedure constraints. In times of 
financial decline and low legitimacy, “parties penetrate the state to acquire more 
resources; these resources, which are managed by the national headquarters and by 
party groups within the representative institutions, are then selectively used to 
materially compensate militants and rank-and-file” (Ignazi, 2014, 166). 
 
 
 MANAGERIAL PATRONAGE 
PARLIAMENTARY 
PATRONAGE 
Reach 
Basically extended, at least at the 
top of the administration 
Limited 
Nature of the token 
of exchange 
Appointment  Job 
Effects on the 
administration  
Yes No 
Table 1.5 Managerial patronage and parliamentary patronage. 
 
 The preliminary considerations made in the previous sections have to be tested 
in the light of parliamentary patronage. With its representation dynamics, Parliament 
constitutes the point of the intersection between the ruins of the ‘party on the ground’, 
the ‘party in central office’ and the ‘party in the public office’ (Katz and Mair, 1993). 
Local party elites and party members (‘party on the ground’) turn to parliamentary 
groups in order to make MPs aware of local, social or personal issues manageable at 
parliamentary level. This linkage could be strengthened by the effective and successful 
submitting of parliamentary acts about the raised issues (bills, resolutions, questions). 
The exercise of an “expressive function” (Bagehot, 1867) for internal goals stands along 
with the capability to distribute financial resources at parliamentary level. Sometimes 
local party members could address parliamentary groups to get financial resources in the 
                                                          
14
 It is worth to make reference here to the “Short Money” practice in UK experience, that is a special 
funding for opposition parties and the support of their parliamentary duties. 
  
42 
form of legislative activities’ communication ‘on the ground’. It usually occurs also that 
a portion of MP monthly salary is directly destined to cover some expenses at local 
level, in the constituency where MP has been elected. 
The decline of party membership and the general distrust have gradually 
deprived parties not only of independent figures sitting in party boards without partisan 
affiliation, but also of a presence of party members in those boards significantly larger 
than the parliamentary representatives. “Parliamentarians and their leaders now tend to 
be accorded greater weight in these bodies” (Katz, Mair, 2002, 125), in so achieving a 
colonization of the party. Especially in the small parties -that refer to small 
parliamentary groups- the “party in central office” corresponds approximately to the 
core of the party in public/parliamentary office. This is even more true when new 
parties originate from parliamentary splits. The independence of the party in central 
office so faded along with its capability to convey financial resources, giving free field 
to the dominance of the ‘party in parliamentary office’15.  
In an extensive sense, we could state that parliamentary patronage tends to 
embrace both the notions of “clientelism at the top” and “clientelism at the bottom” 
(Sotiropoulos, 2004). These concepts are here used not to refer to clientelism
 
as 
explained in the first chapter (the vote-exchange). In parliamentary patronage, it is not 
the vote in itself to be the object of exchange, but the belonging to a party machine or an 
organization that contributes to the vote-seeking activities. The connections with the 
electoral campaigning are supposed to be strong both for high-ranked party managers 
and for the simple party workers, activists and volunteers, creating two broad categories 
of clients involved in exchange relationships. In the same extensive sense, we could 
mention here Gingerich’s distinction between job patronage (low-level patronage) and 
resource patronage (2004), interpreting it with regard to the organizational needs of the 
party/individual politicians and to the internal hierarchy of jobs rather than to its effects 
on the state penetration that are assumed as paltry. 
Parliamentary patronage motivations are supposed to differ from the 
governmental patronage mechanisms mainly because the object of the exchange 
                                                          
15
 Actually “the resources which remain within the central office appear to be increasingly devoted to the 
employment of contractual staff and consultants, and to the provision of outside expertise” (Katz, Mair, 
2002, 125). 
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relationships shifts from a formal appointment with discretional powers to a job without 
relevant decisional autonomy related to the internal structure of Parliament. For this 
reason, reward motivations are expected to be more incisive than the control 
motivations and party organizations’ needs exert a considerable influence on the 
distributive processes, especially for the small groups. The electoral campaigns 
represent an important source of recruitment, providing career occasions to party 
members and activists. In this sense, parliamentary patronage embodies at the same 
time the meaning of patronage both as organizational and post-electoral resource. 
The appearance of several patrons, often not necessarily strongly tied with party 
dynamics, leaves space for a personalized patronage, sharing a common trait with the 
Italian governmental patronage for ‘solitary leaders’ (Di Mascio, 2012b). Job selections 
in Parliament are not always held by party or parliamentary boards: usually group 
leaders and other MPs eligible to distribute state jobs select their staff basing on 
personal networks with a scrutiny of professional experiences. 
For its nature, parliamentary patronage is more unstable and changing even if 
firmly anchored to a certain fixed availability of resources. Clients are more 
professionally oriented to ordinary and practical pursuits linked to parliamentary 
activities such as legislative drafting, institutional and political communication or 
organizational functions. 
Parliamentary groups concentrate the timing of job distribution at the beginning 
of the legislature, forming their staffs and the internal hierarchy, individuating persons 
responsible for each area or function. The same happens for single MPs entitled to hire 
personnel, paying it by public resources (be them part of the single MP salary explicitly 
devoted to this goal by the rule or directly provided by the institutions). 
Political factors can impact on patronage dynamics: party switches in Parliament 
can increase or decrease the size of the parliamentary groups from which the amount of 
public funding derives. The emergence of new parliamentary groups, not necessarily 
linked to parties, creates new opportunities of patronage, obviously diminishing the 
supply of other groups. Also a change in group leadership or in the institutional offices 
moves the consolidated order to new offers of jobs, especially in the key positions. 
Comprehensive studies on parliamentary patronage are still missing in the 
literature, probably because of its different nature and its limited scope considered as a 
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matter of mere hiring and staffing. The notion of parliamentary patronage is indeed 
build here as an attempt to challenge the traditional expectation that patronage is an 
exclusive sinew or sinecure of the party government and to extend the reach of the 
cartel party model to the legislatures, assessing its depth and its internal mechanisms. 
The Italian case study illustrated in this dissertation tries to give a systematic focus on 
parliamentary patronage and an empirical demonstration of what we have developed 
here in assumptive way. The next chapter will go through some particular experiences 
of patronage in the world, letting emerge some features that parliamentary patronage 
could share. 
Our research design adopts a qualitative method with semi-structured interviews 
and conversations at different steps, firstly with experts (high-skilled clients and 
officials in a preliminary stage) and then with patrons (MPs and leading administrative 
chiefs of Parliamentary groups in Parliament in the core part of the research). We will 
intendedly use part of the same approaches and indicators adopted by Mair’s study, 
considering it as a meaningful point of departure to explore patronage, but gradually 
improving it by focusing on the specific parliamentary dynamics that could shape 
patronage relationships. The participant observation oversees not only the correct 
development of the empirical research, but also its theoretical ground.  
The considerations expressed in the third and in the fourth chapter about Italian 
parties and Italian Parliament will allow us to trace in detail the fundamental aspects 
that shape patronage relationships. We consider this part of the dissertation preparatory 
for the correct and complete setting of the hypotheses that inspire the empirical 
research. Here we could write down the first basic research questions that will guide the 
study of Parliament as institution penetrated by the parties, developed in the fourth 
chapter:  
1) To what extent do party distribute patronage in Parliament? 
2) Which factors influence the distribution of patronage in Parliament? 
3) Who are the patrons?  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PHENOMENON AROUND THE WORLD 
“When Abraham Lincoln was elected president, he stated that his policy in 
filling offices would be ‘Justice to all’. What that meant to him was that all the 
factions within the Republican Party that had served the national ticket would 
be rewarded with federal jobs.” 
Michael Schudson (1998, 148) 
The first chapter has largely illustrated the theoretical framework of patronage, retracing 
the evolution of this concept, marking the difference with bordering notions such as 
clientelism and with unconformable practices such as corruption. In addition, we have 
specified in depth functions and styles of party patronage, contextualizing this 
phenomenon in the theory of democratization processes and putting forward the 
parliamentary patronage dimension. 
This chapter briefly recaps some literature contributions of party patronage 
experience in three wide, but defined areas: United States, Europe and Africa. This 
apparent digression on historical - and then empirical - evidences gives us further 
elements to fully understand patronage. Our hypothesis, indeed, is that parliamentary 
patronage concept and practice embrace and contain blended characteristics of 
traditional and modern patronage. A detailed overview in an evolutionary time and 
space perspective, based also on short cases and relevant historical passages, allows us 
to materially distinguish common tracts, discrepancies and gaps between patronage 
models emerged in and within different continents. Obviously this chapter does not 
constitute a cross-continent and subcontinent-comparison, but rather a summary of how 
parties have practically put down roots in the state developing patronage systems in 
incomparable and more or less fertile ground. 
Here we focus on three macro-geographical areas such as US, Europe and 
Africa. We find these three aggregates amply explanatory of the various facets of 
patronage, of its functions and styles. There is a large number of reasons that indicate 
why we select US, Europe and Africa as comprehensive field of analysis. Actually, 
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patronage has been studied in several countries, from diverse conceptual trends and 
slants. Party patronage, indeed, exists everywhere in the world as an embedded and 
unalienable component of democratic life, with organic and functional values for 
parties, politicians and political and social elites. It takes place in post-colonial states, in 
newly institutionalized states, in democratic transition, consolidation and crises context, 
in poor and in wealth economies, in rural and urban national and subnational 
communities. 
2.1 PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN US: FROM THE POST OFFICES TO 
THE PLATFORM PATRONAGE. 
In the rural America, patronage represented a means of not only political inclusion, but 
also of social integration. During the colonial era, town meetings were open only to 
property-owning adult males and not the whole body of people entitled to vote went to 
the polling booths. In Massachusetts, the turnout ranged from 20 to 60 percent of 
eligible voters for town elections and from 10 to 30 percent of adult males in colony 
elections (Mansbridge, 1980). Social hierarchy was pronounced and political 
relationships were conducted in personal ways with social distinctions. 
 A deference system diffused the custom of non-competitive elections that 
reinforce the gentry rule. Gentlemen had the right to vote in any county where they 
fulfilled the freehold requirement and so ran for the office in any county where they 
were eligible to vote. The control of the public affairs was in the hand of local social 
elites through the forms of representative government: politics was understood as a 
“responsibility attached to high social standing” (Schudson, 1998, 30) 
Few years after the coming into force of the American Constitution, the Post 
Office Act was approved by the Federal Government: it lowered the postal rates for 
newspapers in order to allow the most effective circulation and at the same time protect 
local press from competition. Notwithstanding this improvement, the postal service was 
almost a prerogative of the Federalists that could delay correspondence and newspapers 
of antifederalist propaganda during the debates over Constitution ratification. In 1775, 
Benjamin Franklin was appointed by the Continental Congress as the first Postmaster 
General, an attractive patronage post for parties until 1971. 
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One century later, the postmasterships keep representing plum offices since 
postmasters served in partisan way, withholding opposite mails and behaving also as 
party organizers and not as independent officials. Even the post offices were used as 
partisan places with political billboards and postal workers at low level organized 
fundraising campaigns, using their charges for political goals. For this reason, in 1887 
the president Grover Cleveland banned these activities through an executive order that 
in some cases was ignored. 
The widespread presence of postal offices made relevant for parties their capture 
and exploitation: in 1896 almost 80 thousand positions were available for patronage, 
200 of which controlled by a member of the Congress belonging to the presidential 
party. The distribution of such jobs involved also the senators that held power in the 
districts characterized by opposite party’s representation. 
In an age of internally heterogeneous parties focused more on party affiliation 
and personal attacks, patronage was helpful to cement identities, affinities and 
belongings and, even as a tactical tool, to maintain together different factions. It 
happened also to president Abraham Lincoln that was able -and compelled- to satisfy 
Californian Republicans divided for the seeking of key positions in San Francisco 
(postmaster, collector of the port, superintendent of the mint, sub-treasurer). During his 
mandate, Lincoln substituted approximately the 80% of the personnel appointed by the 
president and patronage was close to be used as a ready-made token for the re-election 
campaigning. Dismissals and firings of anti-Lincoln officers were not uncommon at the 
end of his mandate, but Lincoln plans were turned upside down by his assassination in 
1865. Not only the public positions were part of the parties’ stakes: also the private 
sector was controlled by the political machines through public contracts. 
Not only Lincoln and the Republicans had to face and deal with the office 
seekers’ ambitions: the politics of 19th century in New York City and State was mainly 
managed by Tammany Hall, the Democratic Party political machine. “Taking the 
Tammany- controlled number of public payroll jobs as a percentage of the vote totals 
for Tammany’s mayoral candidates, the ‘payroll share’ of the vote was 20 percent in 
1897, as high as 36 percent in 1913 and never under 20 percent until the 1920s” 
(Schudson, 1998, 147).  
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The New York Customhouse produced in the 1870s and in the 1880s more than 
the half of federal government revenues. Five times more profitable than any other 
private company in the country, it constituted the largest federal office anywhere, 
obviously not exempted from patronage practices. This institution indeed attracted 
people to employ from different corners of the country, under the strict control of 
Roscoe Conkling, leader of the Stalwarts, a faction of the Republican Party, and of the 
opposition to President Hayes' attempt to administer Civil Service Reform at the New 
York Customs House. In 1881 Conkling resigned from the Senate because of some 
controversies with President James A. Garfield (Republican) about New York Customs 
House patronage. 
In the same year, patronage plots reached tragic and extreme peaks with the 
assassination of the President Garfield. Charles Guiteau, seeking a federal office 
through a more intense political commitment, became more and more nervous for the 
few opportunities to deliver speeches that the Republicans gave to him. His ambitions 
were oriented to the position of consul in Paris, although he did not know any other 
language than American. The Secretary of the State, James G. Blaine, told Guiteau that 
he would have never assigned to that office and so Guiteau, considering the denial 
linked to his position as Stalwart within the Republican party, decided that just 
Garfield’s death would have brought himself to become consul. 
The distribution of jobs had fruitful and direct consequences on party finances. 
Assessments on the salaries of those hired by patronage mechanisms were the rule at the 
end of the 19
th
 century, however displayed as voluntary contributions: “There was a 
time in New York City when even the scrubwomen who earned their dollar a day by 
hard labor in the city hall yielded their toll to the party’s war-chest as the price of 
continued employment” (Munro, 1912, 188). 
In this internal fundraising activities, parties assumed the form of business-
oriented machines aimed at catching as much money as possible with solicitation letters 
to the workers (roughly the 3 percent of the wage was asked as contribution). This kind 
of practice started to be less frequent at the end of the century at national level, even 
labelled as an old barbarism by Clarkson, the Republican National Committee 
chairman.  
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Along with these indirectly state-financing system, parties asked financial 
support also to their candidates in order to guarantee their presence in the ticket: a 
candidate for the House or the Senate was called to donate more than 20 thousand 
dollars (Ivins, 1970). A practice still habitual nowadays in Italy at the time of the 
national blocked lists. 
In a so exasperated context, the civil service reform was very soon perceived as 
a policy priority that in the same years was diffused around the world. In 1883, the 
president Chester A. Arthur signed into law the Pendleton Act: competitive 
examinations were finally in force under the supervision of the Civil Service 
Commission in order to secure merit-based hiring processes. The first president of the 
commission was Dorman Eaton, a strenuous opponent of patronage system that 
materially wrote the act. Even if the need for the civil service reform was claimed also 
by local association such as the New York Civil Service Reform Association, the 
Pendleton Act was only valid at federal level and not at state or local level. 
It was not without difficulties that parties adapted themselves to this sort of 
revolution. Notwithstanding a bipartisan commitment, the merit system took 
approximately two decades to expand itself in American civil service. The Pendleton act 
took away from the parties’ grasp nearly the 11% of positions and in 1900 there was a 
difference equal to twenty thousand positions between the patronage (still prevailing) 
and merit appointments. 
In any case, the civil service reforms contribute to change the nature of the 
parties, partially anticipating what it would have happened in Europe after the demise of 
mass parties. American parties were now forced to find new resources out from the state 
in order to preserve their structures and their linkages, but their weakening and their 
transformation was not late to come. The challenges advanced by the new system 
resounded as a far cry in the words of George Washington Plunkitt in Plunkitt of 
Tammany Hall: “How are you goin’ to interest our young men in their country if you 
have no offices to give them when they work for their party?” (1905). 
Patronage phenomenon was so deeply rooted not only among the political class, 
but also in the American society that even famous writers such as Nathaniel Hawthorne 
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(clerk in the Salem Customhouse, Massachusetts), Walt Whitman (part-time copyist in 
the army paymaster’s office) or Herman Melville (inspector for the New York 
Customhouse) were involved in patronage practices. 
That is why, as ten years before his election as president, Theodore Roosevelt, 
wrote, the majority of the people was not able to fully understand the “vicious theory of 
party appointments”: “public confidence is a plant of slow growth and public 
knowledge grows but little faster, so it is not surprising that after a sixty years’ carnival 
of patronage politics, the average man has to grow to regard it as part of the order of 
nature that only the adherents of both parties, by distributing them among the 
congressmen” (1890).  
Roosevelt attacked the reigning spoils system much less because one party or 
another monopolized the offices than because all the politicians occupy them at the 
expense of the people. At the same time, he denounced clearly the attempts to stop the 
reforms and impede their executions in order to make the law not effective. 
The outputs of the civil service reforms were under the eyes of everybody: 
“nearly a fourth of the total number in the service in the United States are now 
withdrawn from the degrading influence of the spoils system; and as a direct result, in 
these offices the public business is performed more honestly and efficiently than ever 
before, while the offices themselves no longer form part of the vast bribery fund which 
is what the official patronage has become” (Roosevelt, 1890). 
The ‘sanitization’ of civil service passed through the merit system “thoroughly 
American”, opening the public service to worthy men, no matter their rank in their life. 
This new system is hence essentially democratic according to Roosevelt, giving the 
opportunity to all the people to access to the public process and confirming their 
positions if they serve the public interest and work in honest and efficient way. “The 
merit system is the system of fair play, of common sense and of common honesty, and 
therefore it is essentially American and essentially democratic” (1890). 
A further element of criticism by the reform opponents was the selection 
procedure adopted by the Commission with questions that appeared impractical and 
irrelevant. The Commission asks the distance from Mars!, they replied. Contesting this 
  
51 
argument, Roosevelt put that “no questions can be so irrelevant to a man’s duties as 
copyist or railway mail clerk as are questions about his political backing and about how 
he voted at the last election”. Reforms deleted the party affiliation criteria replacing 
them with examination that required geographical and historical knowledge, grammar 
and writing tests. 
From Theodore to Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) the meaning of patronage 
shifts from bureaucratic to more personal and policy requirements, pushing once again 
parties out from the patronage management. In a time of democracy ruled by the 
leaderships and by the experts, FDR organized the first presidential staff at the White 
House and the centre of the government passed from the legislature to the bureaucracy 
under direct presidential authority.  
A certain sense of a managerial democracy was explicit when during a speech in 
the campaign preceding his first mandate, he turned the sentence “The day of 
enlightened administration has come” -prepared by his speechwriter- to “The day of the 
managers has come” (Milkis, 1993). This managerial attitude was not totally conceived 
by FDR as the government by the pure and autonomy expertise. The independent 
agencies, for example, felt under the presidential control and new federal agencies 
founded by FDR were not considered civil service and so merit based system was not 
applied. 
Although during the 31
st
 presidency of US the number of merit system offices 
grew to 80% of the federal positions, the percentage of classified positions drastically 
diminished by 20% after FDR’s first term. In 1936, whereas Americans were largely in 
favour of civil service and some associations were actively involved in supporting it, the 
increase of 300 thousand employees at federal level, registered in three years, was also 
conditioned by the new 100 thousand positions exempt from civil service. 
These figures do not witness the invasive return of the party in the state as we 
have seen during the Gilded Age. Democratic party, not without some quarrels, was 
though put aside and used more as an electoral majority than an organizational structure. 
The commitment required to fill the available positions within the government, 
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especially in the agencies, were not tied to the party, but to the New Deal platform, a 
sort of policy control not unbound from professional criteria. 
Some years later, the Ramspeck Act and the Hatch Acts extended the limit of the 
civil service until the 95% of the federal employees. Moreover, after some accusation to 
local Democrats for their patronage use of the Works Progress Administration and with 
some doubts of FDR that signed an act on the deadline day, they introduced strict rules 
to underline the border of political activities both in first and in second row. 
The evidences from the American experience here briefly summed up show the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the parties to recur to patronage resources. The evolution and 
the transformation of the exchange tokens at the stake (from post offices to 
governmental position) confirm the inclination of the parties to occupy state sphere in 
order to get political benefits. 
The progressive awareness demonstrated across the time by the American 
politicians themselves as legislators in dealing with patronage reinforces the idea that, 
although regulated by the law, excesses and anomalies of patronage could provoke 
abuses to the democracy and the understanding of citizenship. The gradual reduction of 
positions available for party politics has normalized the recourse to public resources for 
partisan goals, even in a majoritarian democracy accustomed to the saying “To the 
victors belong the spoils” (William L. Marcy, New York Senator, 1832). 
Some conclusions could be drawn from the lesson of the American history about 
patronage: 
1) the stepwise advancement of the merit as standard rule for the personnel 
selection, with partisan or policy affiliation on the background; 
2) the slow, but steady removal of parties from the patronage relationships, 
replaced by personal networks anything but intertwined with party 
dynamics; 
3) the orientation to fulfil the policies than fill public positions by patronage. 
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2.2 PATRONAGE IN EUROPE: BETWEEN STATE PENETRATION 
AND PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION. 
The cross-comparative analysis elaborated by Kopecky, Mair, Spirova (2012) 
with other scholars has dealt with patronage in a more systematic sense, firstly defining 
it as the power of parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life 
and then making remarkable efforts in order to get an index patronage, investigating the 
reach, the depth and the motivations of patronage.  
The partial affinity of this dissertation with that research design, both in terms of 
definitory and empirical approach, suggests us to summarise here trends and patterns 
that that study has organically traced. The observed phenomena and their explanations 
provide us examples and precedents of what we are going to analyse within a different, 
but not completely far context. 
The “public and semi-public life” was empirically translated into 9 different 
policy sectors (Finance, Judiciary, Media, Military and Police, Health Care, Culture and 
Education, Foreign Service, Regional and Local Administration) and 3 institutional 
levels (ministerial departments, non-departmental agencies and commissions, executing 
institutions). Regional and Local Administration have been explored as a macro 
category that include regional and local government and subnational branches of other 
policy sectors’ institution. 
The findings of the research conducted through single national studies in 15 
countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, UK) by expert interviews 
do not close in geographical cages the patronage models, confirming the conventional 
wisdom that predicts Southern countries more exposed to patronage practices than the 
Northern ones.  
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Figure 2.1. Index of Patronage (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012, 367) 
On the contrary, compared to the European mean, some countries of the old 
democracies such as Austria and Germany show considerable levels of politicization 
along with Southern countries like Greece and Italy or post-soviet states like Hungary 
and Bulgaria. UK and Nordic countries confirm the expectation of low patronage 
whereas some penetration degrees are registered in Portugal and in Norway. 
Far from achieving a homogenous and unitary framework, the average European 
patronage pattern -whether it exists- appears more concentrated on the ministerial 
structures, more oriented to the professional criteria in the appointment and selection 
procedures. As for the influence of the party system, it is found that the more 
fragmented is a given system, the less the parties as a whole behave as single actors of 
patronage relationship and make room for personal channels and networks.  
Putting the ranking aside, let consider the degree of partyness of the patronage 
matching two different pairs of countries. As Kopecky and Mair put, “Bulgaria and 
Spain are two of the very few polities where […] the party as such plays a more 
prominent role in the appointment process than the individual ministers and leaders” 
(2012, 359) whereas in Italy and Czech Republic the personal networks replace the 
choices of the party in appointment process.  
The motivations are different: in the 1990s in Bulgaria patronage was used as a 
reward resource, “a necessary element of both reforming the state and building new 
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parties” (Spirova, 2012, 58) based on party identity and allegiance, whereas nowadays 
the control motivations are increasing mostly at the higher level. The predominance of 
the qualifications required for the appointments reflect the strong politicization of 
patronage processes: 90% of respondents point at political loyalty as main feature of 
appointments. Professional criteria count as much as the personal networks. 
In Spain, the control motivations prevail with a less recent tradition and through 
the dominance of the political party as appointment maker that follows often criteria 
related to the political closeness and exclusiveness. Furthermore, in Spain the 
decentralization has multiplied patronage opportunities allowing to the parties, 
increasingly looking for offices particularly after the transition, to occupy relevant 
sectors of the state with no depth ambitions and limiting their presence to the top level 
(Gomez, Verge, 2012). Anyway, here the professional-based selection stands out as the 
most relevant. 
The emergence of individual-driven patronage, common in not precisely similar 
countries like Czech Republic and Italy, stresses the widespread withdrawal of the party 
as a whole in appointment processes replaced by selection channels directly controlled 
by the office holders. This feature derives from the weak party institutionalization and 
the penetrable administration: “with the new democracies, Italy shares both the 
generational factors of new parties that are governing without having first 
institutionalized their own organizational infrastructure, and a weakness of the public 
administration, from which the private networks of leaders extract resources”. (Di 
Mascio, 2012b, 247). 
So a party-independent patronage arises also in Czech Republic where “it is not 
uncommon to observe that it is the party that emanates from patronage, rather than that 
patronage emanates from the party” (Kopecky, 2012, 88). Here, as in any new 
democracy, patronage also emerges as party-building factor, a necessary anchor to 
tightly bind the party to the system. 
At the extreme, UK zero-patronage (Flinders, Matthews, 2012) shows, as in US 
experience mentioned before, the impact of the civil service reform: by establishing the 
Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA) in the mid-1990s, a 
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broader merit-based system was actually introduced, centralizing the appointment 
power under the control of bureaucratic actors. The provision was expanded later to the 
healthcare system. In general, a bureaucratic patronage was promoted provoking in 
return the awareness that party affiliation could have represented more a stain than a 
merit.  
The zero party-patronage pattern includes also as a consequence the salience of 
control motivations and professional criteria, sometimes, especially recently, linking the 
concept of ‘merit’ to a past experience in the sector. Considering this limited boundary, 
the nature of the governmental appointment under the responsibility of the ministers has 
basically excluded the opposition and those not in the surrounding of the government 
personnel. This is less true at local level where a less majoritarian and exclusive 
approach is diffused. 
On the opposite side of the scale, the findings from Greece emphasized a 
maximum degree of permeability of the minister structures in an overall context in 
which the state is perceived as an appreciable employer, with all the consequences that 
this has recently implied in terms of economic costs (Pappas, Assimakopoulou 2012). 
The invasive presence of the party within the state is highly demonstrated by the 
extended reach of patronage, especially in the bottom level of the administration, here 
dramatically penetrated compared to the other countries. The forms of this bottom 
patronage is multifaceted: even temporary contracts or low administrative positions 
constitute the object of the exchange between patrons and clients, to reinforce their 
reward-oriented linkages as expected. 
Moreover, from the Greek case it emerges the highest rate of political allegiance 
(100%) in determining the appointments. To be more accurate, political allegiance is 
however mixed with the other qualifications set by the research (professionalization or 
personal networks), but the lower is the level of the appointment at stake the more likely 
it will be that personal networks plus party affiliation condition the process. As partially 
found in the UK case, the spoil sharing varies according as the positions are at the top or 
not: “spoils sharing is more common at the bottom level of appointments in the public 
sector and, more particularly, in the local administration. The reason for this is, quite 
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obviously, the importance of interpersonal relations at this level and of course the great 
number of posts that have to be filled” (Pappas, Assimakopoulou, 2012, 157-158). 
The problematic reach of the Greek patronage has been more and more evident 
during the austerity reforms, as a recent research show (Afonso, Zartaloudis, 
Papadopoulos, 2015). The comparison between the Portuguese and the Greece reaction 
to the need for austerity reforms has marked a “greater difficulty in finding 
compromises about austerity in Greece” just because of “the greater extent of 
clientelistic linkages”. The incapacity of the traditional Greek party system and its 
mainstream parties (Pasok and ND) to fully enact reforms with enormous electoral and 
organizational costs has led to a reshuffle of the party system with the ascendance of 
radical and anti-system parties such as Syriza or Golden Dawn.  
The Portuguese case, instead, indicates the lowest patronage depth among the 
Southern European countries (Jalali, Silva, Moreira, 2012). It is the state supply that 
makes the difference here because of its small top-level offer of appointments. That 
does not mean that on the contrary the range is limited as well: “Portuguese parties 
attempt to ‘colonize’ a wide range of institutions but mainly appoint to the upper 
echelons of the civil service” (Jalali, Silva, Moreira, 2012, 306). 
This limited supply and distribution has actually contributed to fulfil reforms 
policy in time of austerity. It mainly concerned the lower electoral costs occurred by the 
Portuguese parties, used to promise less with the awareness that they may distribute 
few: “alienating clienteles was a minor concern in its reform agenda” (Afonso, 
Zartaloudis, Papadopoulos, 2015, 325) Along with a more stable party 
institutionalization, this factor explains why parties in Portugal have been able to reach 
compromises and negotiations about reforms and face the need for austerity. 
Also the inclusion of opposition in patronage mechanisms spread the awareness 
of a shared progressive withdrawal from the state through a negotiate consensus about 
austerity reforms. It constitutes a natural heritage from the past: “incumbent parties have 
an incentive to share patronage appointments with the opposition, to avoid wholesale 
purges of their appointees once they lose power. Moreover, consistent with this 
equilibrium, the sharing of patronage resources does not occur with all parliamentary 
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parties alike, but rather is more evident with the main opposition party, which can lead a 
subsequent government” (Jalali, Silva, Moreira, 2012, 312). 
 A kind of consensual patronage emerges also from the studies about 
Netherland. The latter derives from Dutch history characterized by a tradition of 
cooperation, pillarization and consociationalism (Lijphart, 1999) oriented to a shared 
power that distributes shares of appointments. This democratic style of patronage has 
actually led most scholars to claim that patronage in Netherland does not exist. Actually 
the motivations of party patronage exist and bring rarely to some forms of relationships 
not connoted by ‘amoral familism’ (Banfield, 1958).  The 18% of experts declared that 
sometimes the personal networks, anyway not detached from an impressive 
professionalism, involve friends and former colleagues (Van Thiel, 2012). 
Van Thiel’s focus includes also an interesting reflection about gender patronage 
and its debate. The female participation, encouraged in the elective assemblies by 
gender quotas, is increasingly concerning also the Dutch patronage change, along with 
the decentralization of the appointments that at local level are less influenced by the 
national parties and the rise of the new public management, by nature oriented to the 
highest level of professionalization in order to manage the administration in an almost 
entrepreneurial way. 
As for the Nordic countries, in Norway the expected low control of the parties 
has reached its higher extent within the ministries, reinforcing the European trend. Here 
parties do not play a leading role in patronage distributions, including the party in 
government. When they play it, the party size matters in the positions’ assignment 
without involving personal networks – the lowest in the 15 countries after Denmark. 
(Allern, 2012). 
In Danish patronage the parties are almost absent, the exception is represented 
by the executive structure as well. The non-influential role of the parties is also related 
to the strong civil servants’ commitment to their work that make so useless the recourse 
to loyal (personal or partisan) people. “The socialization of Danish civil servants into 
faithful servants of their political masters appears to be extremely effective. 
Unprompted, one civil servant after another depicted a strong ethos of service and 
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loyalty in the civil service” (Bischoff, 2012, 108). This aspect has to be observed also in 
the light of the weak party identification that lower both the supply and the demand of 
reward. With the words of Marcellus in Shakespare’s Hamlet, it seems that nothing is 
rotten in the state of Denmark.  
A less marginal role of the party characterizes the Icelandic pattern, substantially 
changed in the last twenty years through the increase of the public administration 
professionalization and the dismantlement of many state assets. These two factors have 
reduced the space for reward patronage, remained to same degree present as a 
reminiscence of the past glorious clientelism undermined by the 1990s reforms 
(Kristinsson, 2012). 
As for the post-soviet countries, Hungarian ministers have a stronger role than 
the prime minister in selecting appointments, but they do not exert alone this power, 
sharing it essentially with the party in the public offices. Patronage has served as anchor 
for the Hungarian parties that so reached a certain degree of consolidation and 
competitiveness through the building of party elites. 
The need for party-building has also produced a sort of reform patronage 
(Bearfield, 2009), a reaction push that replaced the old bureaucrats of the former regime 
and their legacies as essential component of the democratization process (Morlino, 
2011). This happened also in other countries that experienced the transition to 
democracy like Portugal and Spain. 
 The detailed empirical research of that study has generically affirmed that 
patronage has been used more as an organizational resource than an electoral resource. 
Staffing the state has generically provided channels and linkages between leaders, 
parties and the administration that have been mostly oriented to the control of the 
decision making, both in terms of regulatory and financial decisions. As Mair puts, 
“patronage resources therefore appear to be increasingly concentrated in the hands of a 
relatively narrow group of partisan elites, usually occupying positions in the public 
sphere” (Kopecky, Mair, 2012, 372). 
The admission of a certain political discretion in appointments, managed by a 
narrow elite, has been the founding element for the patronage distribution, entitling 
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politicians to place close people in the state structures and delimiting their margin of 
manoeuvre in doing so. This integration between party and state has been expected and 
detected in some sensitive policy sectors, such as the media, but in general no uniform 
trends have emerged. 
This kind of state capturing has also been conditioned by the degree of 
autonomy that the appointed clients would have had in executing the control functions. 
In this sense, the top level positions have represented in this study the most desirable 
jobs to distribute in order to successfully manage the internal structure of the states, 
especially the ministries. 
 In examining the parliamentary patronage, we take into great account the lessons 
from this study not only for its successful effort to clearly define what party patronage 
is. It is for this reason that we will adopt not only part of its definition, but also part of 
the scheme of the empirical research with no comparative ambitions. 
Obviously the focus of our research will be oriented on a narrow, but significant 
portion of the state by its nature different from the state dimensions analysed by 
Kopecky, Mair, Spirova and other scholars. The Parliament with its internal patronage 
opportunities is not comparable at all with the whole body of state structures: in our 
research we expect to not meet so influent internal command positions, also because of 
the deliberate choice to not observe certain forms of patronage, such as the internal 
career advancement dependent on patrons’ decisions. 
The latter form of patronage deviates significantly from our definition of 
patronage as the distribution of jobs managed by the party. The reason is twofold. On 
one hand, the patrons involved in that relationship confer a more or less temporary 
appointment to persons already enrolled in the parliamentary organization after passing 
a competitive selection procedure. On the other hand, here politicians serve as 
institutional patrons, selecting people that are expected to serve the institutional 
machine guaranteeing its functional working without any relationships with the party. 
However, the distinction between organizational and electoral patronage remains 
the relevant heritage from Kopecky, Mair and Spirova study and the prevalence of one 
or another style will represent the main research question of our dissertation. 
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2.3 EXCHANGE POLITICS IN AFRICA: THE ETHNICAL 
NETWORKS. 
Studies on African patronage have been distinguished by a mixed orientation 
both to anthropologist, historical, sociological and political science studies. The 
particular degree of backwardness performed by the continent has facilitated the 
conceptual stretching of the patronage concept.  
Also the weak nature of the party organizations and structures, mainly local or 
personalized, and of the public administration has enhanced that stretching, particularly 
focused on private benefits. Despite of these difficulties, the interest towards some new 
African democracies has provided a renewed nourishment to study this practice under 
the umbrella of the governmental studies (Arriola, 2009; Kopecky, 2011). 
In any case, as in every political sphere, patronage involves exchange 
relationships between two actors mutually interrelated. This section aims at letting 
emerge one of the main linkage motivations in African patronage: the ethnical network
1
. 
As in every developing context, African patronage has frequently conceived as a 
sub or pre-dimension of neopatrimonialism, that is patrimonialism mixed with a modern 
bureaucracy (Eisenstadt, 1973), a vertical distributive relationship with a strong 
hierarchy inaugurated by the patron to build around him a limited constituency of 
clients by extraction of state resources. (Englebert, 2000; van de Walle, 2001; Beekers, 
van Gool, 2012). So, as Erdmann/Engel draw (2007), the neopatrimonalism is 
characterized by a “patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination”, with an 
accepted difference between public and private resources, and personal relationships.  
The ideal type features compared by Beekers and van Gool (2012) have stressed 
the strong legitimacy of patronage as a democratic and less corrupted tool to distribute 
resources, with an inclusive approach in an informal politics. In their re-examination, 
patronage is typically described as a less concentrate and centralized power with more 
accessible linkages tied with the society while neopatrimonialism, indeed, works as a 
cartel. 
                                                          
1
 This network has also been studied in other countries. About India, Chandra, 2004. 
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Beyond this conceptualization, exchange relationships have been also practiced 
in order to secure the political stability to a given system, both at national or at local 
level. In this, the ethnically polarized systems have been object of attention: “the 
extreme diversity of most African countries, coupled with the politicization of ethnicity 
before independence, has obliged incumbents to recruit coalition partners from a cross-
section of ethnic groups in order to ensure their tenure.” (Arriola and Johnson,2014, 
497). 
In this sense, the ethnicity makes meaningful exchange relationships not only 
inside each ethnic group, but also in its interrelations with other ethnic groups and other 
minorities. To same extent, ethnicity constitutes both a priority weight and a 
counterweight for the political stability of a given society
2
, emerging as the most 
relevant variable in cabinet appointments for example. The use of the ethnic arithmetic 
to achieve ethnic balance appears to confirm this assumption. 
Here ethnical networks are significantly more important than gender, as Arriola 
and Johnson have demonstrated through their research. This study also provides further 
contributions and considerations to gender patronage: while, as seen in the previous 
section, Van Thiel (2012) observed in Netherland an increasing attention to women as 
clients or recipients of appointments, in Africa just “big men who can deliver their 
ethnic constituencies through the distribution of patronage” are co-opted in cabinet 
formation and “women […] rarely become ethnic patrons” (2014, 507)3. 
By stressing the belonging to a sympathetic community that shares common 
values and identities often with a parochial dimension where communication and 
interactions take place (Naroll, 1964), the ethnicity plays a strategical role in the 
political interactions “between self-interested actors with divergent interests” (Berman, 
1998, 312) splitting and apportioning both society and state. It also helps to fuel the 
political mobilization around hierarchical leaderships. 
                                                          
2 Diverging opinions are always present. As Samora Machel, the Mozambican revolutionist socialist 
leader, said, 'For the nation live, the tribe must die' (Quoted in Mahmdani, 1996, 135). 
3 The authors also suggest that weak clientelistic ties or exchange relationships called by any other name 
could enhance women participation in politics and within the cabinet. If so, as a paradox, patronage could 
bring at the same time more democracy and less democracy, bridging ethnical gaps, but creating gender 
divides. 
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Ethnical groups define themselves not only setting geographical and cultural 
boundaries, but also building internal organizations in order to address the social life. 
The distribution of the benefits -and the demand for them- appears rooted in the social 
meaning of the exchange, excluding individuals by “cultural differentia” that work as a 
social cleavage (Barth, 1969; Lipset, Rokkan, 1967). 
So the patronage suppliers adopt a selective targeting, stable across the time in 
order to create and develop faithful linkages. This does not assume that these exchanges 
occur in a closed environment, without any form of competition. On the contrary, the 
size of the ethnic group could lead the office-holders to offer patronage to other ethnic 
groups as well in so enlarging their own constituency and get more or at least enough 
consensus. “If their own ethnic category is large enough to be independently 
efficacious, [office-holders] will have no incentive to distribute any benefits to members 
of other ethnic categories” (Chandra, 2007, 101). 
In a such system, voters should conclude that they would take more benefits 
with a large trust in co-ethnical relationships and actually they do so, as the 
Afrobarometer has shown
4
. Some reliable motivations have been found after a study 
about Uganda, a state with a wide gap between trust in co-ethnics and non co-ethnics 
(more than 20%). As the authors state, “owing to norms of reciprocity that bind more 
strongly in within-group than in cross-group interactions, co-ethnics have greater 
incentives than non-co-ethnics to respond to trusting overtures in a trustworthy way”. 
(Habaryiamana, Humphreys, Posner, Weinstein, 2007, 16-17). 
In turn, also patronage has shaped internally ethnic groups and, more relevant, 
has fostered the “installation” of the colonial state within the ethnic building process.  
At the extreme degree, in amoral and competitive contexts, ethnicity though has turned 
into ‘political tribalism’ that emphasize more the existence of a top-down mobilization 
spreading, even violently, politicization from above. Scholars (Lonsdale, 1994; Orvis, 
2001; Klopp, 2002) have opposed to this concept the notion of a “moral ethnicity”, a 
synonym of civic and accountability-oriented citizenship that inspires democratic values 
                                                          
4
 On more than 25 thousands of respondents, the 50.6% declared to trust co-ethnics “somewhat” or “a 
lot”. Only 38.3% declared the same about non-co-ethnics 
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from below. This includes also a vertical orientation to the needs of the society, fighting 
inequalities (Lonsdale, 2010). 
Actually, recent researches (Durant, Weintraub, 2014) have tried to propose 
alternative institutional arrangements in order to cushion and thwart the influence of the 
ethnical mediation in patronage and distributive politics. Ethnic groups, indeed, play as 
“minimum winning coalitions, […] small enough to secure maximize the per capita 
value of […] benefits” (Bates, 1983, 164), led and represented by elites. 
Durant and Weintraub argue that turn-taking institutions could enhance 
cooperation and a better policy making, requiring a super threshold (60%) in order to 
win and govern for the whole term. If no party reaches that amount of votes, “the first-
place party takes the first and third years in office, and the second-place party takes 
the second and fourth years” (Durant, Weintraub, 2014, 65). A such system would 
guarantee the alternation of the ethnic groups and, one after the other, an equal access to 
the power and the distribution of resources. 
In addition, according to the authors, the likeliness to be governed by a turn-
taking institution determines some effects on the electorate. “First, the hardcore voters 
[…] have the incentive to form, enforce, and adapt a more balanced view of the proper 
scope of executive discretion […]. Second, conflicted insiders […] may find that it is 
worthwhile to leave the coalition when policy is bad” (Durant, Weintraub, 2014, 65). 
Although it provides an interesting framework, this theoretical design advances 
questionable issues: it takes for granted a noteworthy empowerment of the voters, able 
to express policy-oriented preferences, and their partial independence from the elites. 
Furthermore, it overestimates the influence of time variable, creating a form of power-
sharing tempered by a clustered split of a four-year terms in two equal parts. 
Notwithstanding this theoretically attractive attempt, the inter-ethnic power 
sharing is actually far to be removed from the African democracy and seems to count 
even more with the prevalence of the ethnic congress party – a multi-ethnic party- that, 
as a coalition, holds together ethnic groups often too small to gain seats in the 
Parliament and form government majority (Erdmann, 2004). As it usually occurs when 
coalitions rule the political game, a bloc could be identified and connected with a single 
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ethnic category, but at the same time not all the ethnic categories, mainly the smallest, 
could be identified and connected with a coalition party. 
It follows that a single ethnicity matters and results successful - not only in the 
party formation stage – when as three concurrent conditions are fulfilled: “1) 
Identification of one ethnic group with one party; 2) A relative large size of the ethnic 
group involved; 3) A high degree of political unity among the political elite of the 
ethnic group” (Erdmann, 2007, 25). This explains also the rare success of ethnic parties, 
based on a single ethnic group. 
The ethnic ‘favouritism’ in patronage distribution has been also fostered by the 
the lack of information in environments still anchored in the tradition and in the past 
patronage experience. The force of customs and consolidated practices not only cements 
the exchange relationships, but also makes them inflexible so to impede structural 
changes. In this sense, the ethnic favouritism tends to be a weapon to preserve the social 
system in conservative way, reaching autonomously a self-equilibrium (Chandra, 2007). 
 
The exploration of the ethnic patronage allows us to draw some reflections valid 
also for party and parliamentary patronage. Parties and parliamentary groups have often 
been considered as single monolithic actors, but, indeed, they work and serve as 
coalitions of individuals with a basically common share of values, identities and 
sensibilities. Especially in the big, catch-all and not homogeneous parties, these 
individuals could form subgroups and factions with smallest or no ideological distance 
in order to push forward with their specific policies, especially if not shared by the 
majority of the party (Sartori, 1976; Boucek, 2009). 
Party factionalism creates sub-units oriented both to veto-power and power-
sharing, claiming space in the internal party organization, be they a minority or not. In 
doing so, they behave as an ethnic group that tries to maximize its advantages just 
staying isolated and uncontaminated from the remaining part of the society, although it 
lives within it. 
As a consequence, patronage by factions/parties-within-a-party realizes a sub-
distributive process that could imply a large amount of available resources to distribute 
in order to satisfy each faction. The accommodation and the agreement between the 
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different factions could be achieved by tactical patronage that in turn makes possible the 
achievement of democratic goals (Bearfield, 2009). The so-called “Manuale Cencelli” 
in Italian tradition is an example of it: an arithmetic distribution of the offices that leads 
to the political balance and the peaceful working of the system. 
The mechanics of intra-party patronage is expected to depend also on the “faces 
of factionalism”. Three kinds of factionalism have been distinguished: cooperative, 
competitive, degenerative. (Boucek, 2009) The first responds to positive functions such 
as the contribution to the party building, even because it mainly occurs during a post-
founding phase. Here “a factional structure has the potential to increase the aggregate 
capacity of political parties and to facilitate intra-party cooperation where centripetal 
incentives exist” (Boucek, 2009, 469). 
In a such initial phase, it is likely that each wing of the party practices a sort of 
learning process with positive attitudes towards the other wings. With cooperative 
factions, patronage incentives the unity, however stable, of the party and aims 
essentially at democratic goals as a weapon of inclusion and consolidation. 
Competitive factions, instead, start to introduce some sources of discord. Here 
the inclination to the conflict is more stressed, combined with a centrifuge/exit tendency 
that increases the intra-party competition. “Divergent factional preferences and 
polarized party opinion create splitting pressures and loosen intra-party ties as factions 
become opposed rather than simply separate” (Boucek, 2009, 473).  
The policy capacity is extremely burdened, exerted through onerous and 
strenuous compromises to avoid internal gridlock. The distribution of patronage, here in 
tactical sense, could contribute to reach agreements, but it is potentially exposed to 
threats and blackmail that could increase the demands of patronage in a dangerous 
ultimatum game. 
Lastly, Boucek individuates the degenerative factionalism, situated in the last 
step of a climax after a gradual legitimacy of the faction. The risk at stake here is to 
produce “excessive fragmentation, privatized incentives and faction embeddedness”, as 
the Italian DC in 1970s and 1980s (Boucek, 2009, 473). 
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The absence of limits to the faction growth undermines the party unity and 
makes room to corrupt practices through which each faction seeks to prevail in the 
internal hierarchy. The legal boundaries of patronage are challenged and jeopardized: 
clientelism and corruption settle in the party whose stability is at risk. 
The following table summarizes the relationship between factionalism and 
patronage, explained so far: 
FACTIONALISM PATRONAGE 
Cooperative Democratic 
Competitive Tactical 
Degenerative Illegal (corruption) 
Table 2.1 Factionalism and patronage 
A recent empirical study has interestingly shown that factions, frequently 
conceived as a divisive and contentious component that destabilizes the party system, 
“can play a role in integrating extreme ideological streams of a party” and “tying 
extreme party politicians to more moderate faction leaders, who are better informed and 
so better placed to make decisions on behalf of a party” (Dewan, Squintani, 2015, 17).  
It is the cost of this integration that has to be monitored and makes the 
difference: if the factionalism takes degenerative forms, democracy is at risk. 
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PART 2 
THE ITALIAN PARTIES AND THE PARLIAMENT: 
WHICH PATRONS, WHICH JOBS 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ITALIAN PARTIES: THE DYNAMICS OF THE PATRONS 
Coalitions and parties will continue to exist 
in a peculiar mix which does not exist in other democratic regimes. 
Bartolini, Chiaramonte, D’Alimonte (2004, 19)  
 
The parliamentary patronage relationships are shaped both by parties and 
parliamentary structures. This chapter focuses on parties and party system considered as 
state resources ‘exploiters’ that serve at the same time as patrons of client networks and 
beneficiaries of the state. The first section analyses the evolution of Italian party system 
in last ten years ruled by the ‘majority-assuring’ proportional system, describing the 
transition from the traditional bipolarism to an unexpected tripolarism: this change is 
supposed to affect the external composition of the patrons. In the second section we 
explore the party switching phenomenon in Italian Parliament and the turnover of the 
parliamentary class, observing the last two legislatures and the parliamentary 
fragmentation. The third section assesses the change in Italian party financing systems 
offering key elements of reflection about party’s need for state. In the last section we 
discuss the role of primary elections as modern tool for party engagement and 
recruitment. 
Each one of these aspects is expected to influence the dynamics of parliamentary 
patronage mainly on patrons’ side with repercussions on clients:  
1) The continual transformation of parties with splits and fusions and the unrest 
of the political supply with the rise of anti-party system makes more fluid and unstable 
patronage mechanisms, encouraging a renewal of both patrons and clients;  
2) Party switching affects the number of parliamentary groups, their size and 
consequently the effective number of parties calculated in seats (Laakso, Taagepera, 
1979). In turn they have an influence on representativeness, power and the related 
availability of chairs and jobs. Also the financial budget of parliamentary groups is 
affected by the size of the groups according to the parliamentary rules, affecting the 
availability of contracts to distribute. The end of a term is supposed to reset patronage 
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relationships: the legislative turnover could at the same time break the personal linkages 
and provide new opportunities for clients; 
3) Reduced or eliminated state contributions to parties oblige them to find 
alternative way to secure their survival. In this sense, parliamentary patronage serves as 
surrogate of the party financing. 
4) Primary elections offer linkage occasions with the ‘party on the ground’ and 
create reward expectations once the winner of the primary election winner takes the 
office. 
3.1 THE ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM UNDER THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW. 
This section would provide a comprehensive re-examination of the party 
changes in last decade, that is the background of the parliamentary patronage. This 
evolution affects not only the emergence of new patrons, but also their internal 
reorganization and its effects on the parliamentary arena in a mix of splits and fusions.  
The new electoral law approved in 2005 (law 270/2005) introduced in Italy a 
proportional system with a majority award that theoretically should have assured stable 
and certain numbers in the Parliament, simplifying the political supply also through a 
threshold for coalitions at 10%. The voters’ choices were expressed through closed lists 
in order to supposedly fight the exchange vote. The law also allowed to the candidates 
to “run” in more than one constituency for the Chamber or region for the Senate, 
producing in some case a massive presence of the leaders and the prominent candidates 
within the lists (Fusaro, 2009). 
 The first election held under this system (April 2006) confirmed some doubts: 
the outcome was twofold with a ‘lottery’ effect (D’Alimonte, 2007; D’Alimonte, 
Chiaramonte, 2007) even if the alternation was achieved by the Prodi’s coalition 
victory. In the lower house, nearly 25 thousand votes of advantage for the red bloc were 
enough, according to the new system, to get the majority of the seats (340). The 
electoral competition at the Senate, instead, consisted in the sum of 21 different and 
autonomous electoral contests: the product was a narrow majority that made difficult to 
run the country. This predictable feature previously forced the parties to form catchall 
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and heterogeneous coalitions, united to defeat the opposite bloc. The bipolarism kept 
ruling the party system with an increased fragmentation: more than ten party or 
movement lists for each bloc supported the two left-wing and right-wing coalitions. 
 At the beginning of the term, Parliament reflected the crowded political scenario 
with thirteen groups at the Chamber of Deputies (12 plus the so-called gruppo misto – 7 
belonging to the Unione, Prodi’s majority, and 5 to the right-wing bloc) and eight at the 
Senate of the Republic (3 majority groups, 4 opposite groups). The difference with the 
XIV legislature (2001-2006) was immediately evident at the Chamber of Deputies 
where the number of the groups almost doubled. 
 On one hand, the precarious equilibrium of the Unione intensified and 
exacerbated the intra-coalition competition leading very soon to some internal splits that 
raise the degree of uncertainty and actually slowed down the progressive platform and 
policies, barely fulfilled by the Prodi’s cabinet. It was exactly its multifaceted nature, 
with some parties involved in the cabinet for the first time after decades of absence -
intended or not (Radical party and Communist Refoundation), that provoked a historical 
expansion of the size of the cabinet that numbered 103 members. The distribution of 
these offices here emerges as a mere lever of tactical high-level patronage (Bearfield, 
2009). 
 On the other hand, Berlusconi’s leadership constantly dominated the right-wing 
field engaged in a compact opposition, along with his long-standing allies. The four 
party alliance embraced an extensive set of values well rooted both in the northern part 
of the country -through the Northern League linkages- and in the centre and in the south 
part -through the traditional Cristian democratic organization of UDC (Baccetti, 2007) 
and of the changing network and issues of National Alliance (Tarchi, 2003). The 
unsuccessfully contested leadership of Forza Italia and its leader over the whole 
coalition was not long to stimulate strong divergences, partly faded very soon with the 
upcoming elections. 
 Notwithstanding the fear for Berlusconi’s return, the less moderate parties of the 
red coalition pushed the government to face some crisis about foreign policy. The 
continuous oscillations jeopardized the strength of the executive even later an 
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agreement based on twelve issues. After less than two-years, Prodi’s experience, 
inaugurated in 2005 through plebiscitarian primaries (Venturino, 2007), came to the end 
and the sense of a calm, but firm and independent leadership disappeared with it.  
In the meantime also the Ulivo experiment was replaced: already in October 
2007 the dismissal of this party cartel - that unified the two most important parties of 
the red bloc (Ds and the Daisy) under a single list for the Chamber of Deputies in 2006 
and that gave the name to the common parliamentary group in the lower house – was 
accompanied by the pressing emergence of the Democratic Party with its leader, Walter 
Veltroni, supporter of a “majoritarian vocation” that Unione coalition was unable to 
deliver together (Pasquino, 2009). This cold fusion was at the beginning a simple sum 
of the party elites, later developed on the ground not without obstacles (Ignazi, 2008). 
The elections were yet to come, regulated by the same electoral system that, 
under different political conditions, would have guaranteed an overwhelming majority 
to the blue coalition. In April 2008, the flaws underlined and criticized in the past 
became rapidly the strength of the present: the efforts to simplify the political supply, 
launched by the Democratic Party – that at its beginning it looked directed toward a 
single party installation within the left-wing coalition-, were immediately followed by 
the Berlusconi’s appeal to merge the moderate parties in a single political actor. 
Despite of his allies’ resistance (firstly Fini, then Casini that rejected his 
proposal), most of the right-wing political class – Fini included- contributed to the 
creation of People of Freedom (Pdl) as electoral list in February 2008 (the party would 
have been founded one year later). It was an act of political clarification for those forces 
committed to build the alternation to Prodi: on the left part of the bloc Casini with Udc 
decided to run alone to represent the “extreme center”, whereas on the opposite part of 
the coalition, Storace, leader of The Right, aspired to occupy the far right voters, 
deluded and disappointed by Fini’s choice. 
The fragmentation looked like a memory of the past after the passage from the 
catch-all coalitions to the catch-all list. Actually a wide array of leaders (in total almost 
30) ran as candidate with one single list, but the fears for a second uncertain outcome 
after 2006 spread the awareness toward the ‘useful vote’, that is the vote for those lists 
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that would have not reached the 4% threshold at national level for the lower house and 
the 8% at regional level for the Senate (Chiaramonte, 2010)
1
. 
 The product was a limited pluralism (Di Mascio, 2012b) expressed in a ‘winged’ 
would-be bipartitism with two main political actors allied with one or two local parties 
(Northern League and Movement for the Autonomies) or not ideologically defined 
movement (Italy of Values). The Left-the Rainbow, a party cartel that merged in one list 
all the leftist movements and parties that were noticed during the Prodi’s cabinet 
because of their noisy presence, did not pass the threshold, leaving out from the 
Parliament the heritage of the Communist and Green Party. 
 The electoral transformations though did not deeply change the substance of the 
party system, now less numerically overcrowded, but not more internally stabilized at 
organizational level than in the past. The building of two big parties indeed began to 
meet some failures already in the first year after the elections, stimulating the 
awakening of dozy centripetal forces. The Democratic Party’s leadership change from 
the modern Democrat Veltroni to the old social-democrat Bersani moved back the party 
in terms of policy issues and political class to the time of Leftist Democrat. It is so that 
Alliance for Italy led by Rutelli, former opponent of Berlusconi in 2001, started to move 
out from the perimeter of the traditional left-wing coalition that Bersani was ready to 
restore, along with the Italy of Values and Left Freedom and Ecology, the party founded 
by the communist Vendola one year after the total defeat of leftist list. 
The escape toward the centre concerned also the blue coalition. Despite his 
broad consensus and the success of his coalition at the regional elections in 2010, 
Berlusconi’s honeymoon stage was near to an end. The co-founder of his party and 
Speaker of the Chamber, Gianfranco Fini, progressively sustained the need for a 
moderate and modern right, able to deal with immigration without fears and populism, 
truly committed to push forward the values of the European integration and oriented to 
manage justice policies without personal profits. The divergences focused on the 
                                                          
1
 The effective number of the parties at electoral level decreased from 5.69 to 3.82, the effective number 
of parties at the parliamentary or legislative level from 5.06 to 3.07. 
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alliance with Northern League and on the personal leadership of Berlusconi, exerted 
even in the party building. 
Soon Rutelli and Fini, once rivals in mayoral elections in Rome, shared with 
Casini and Udc, from the beginning committed in a ‘republican opposition’, the 
exigence to restore a moderate and reformist centre against the populism, opening a 
short political age in which the centre was decisive and numerically conditioning as in 
the past First Republic. The split of Future and Freedom for Italy, the party led by Fini, 
reduced the margins of manoeuvre for Berlusconi and step by step, despite of the prime 
minister’s attempts to remain in charge, prepared the ground for the government led by 
the technocrats. 
As happened more or less during the previous term, party consolidation and 
system stability lasted not more than 2-3 years, upset also by the popular referenda 
about water, nuclear energy and immunity of high governmental officials held in 2011. 
The highly polarized result (approximately 95% of votes for the laws abolishment) and 
the extraordinary participation that permitted to get the quorum (almost 55% after 
fifteen years of failed consultations) reinforced the leftist spirit in the public debate and 
strengthen the opposition to Berlusconi’s majority, even in the left-wing coalition. A 
trend inaugurated by the local elections in relevant cities such as Milan and Naples 
(Chiaramonte, D’Alimonte, 2012). 
The worsening of economic and social situation stressed the inability of the blue 
bloc to run the country: the majority, even more shattered and confused also by the 
personal troubles of his leader, was forced to back out of the government and, along 
with its more moderate opponents (Democratic Party and UDC) aid the formation of an 
emergential cabinet inspired by the Head of the State and the European institutions and 
led by the independent Monti. 
The apparent pacification lowered the temperature of the system and oriented 
the whole body of policies to guarantee the financial stability and the health of the 
public accounts and restore the international trustworthiness. The struggle for reforms -
even unpopular after decades of delayed choices- ran early into social costs barely 
bearable by the population and for this reason the traditional parties progressively 
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started to keep a certain distance from Monti’s government, even if they kept supporting 
it. 
As a consequence, the reformist drive gradually fizzled out especially in terms 
of institutional reforms: new electoral law at least and Constitutional reforms were 
expected to be proposed after a large agreement between the new majority parties, but 
no effective outcome was actually produced after one year. Unable to achieve the 
restated and intended promises, parties started again to play in defensive way, a 
dangerous tactics while the Five Stars Movement, an anti-system party led by the 
comician Beppe Grillo, advanced both loudly and creepingly (Bordignon, Ceccarini 
2013; Diamanti, 2014). 
After decades of partial reorganization and internal rearrangement, the Italian 
party system began to know a totally diverse political actor. Following Panebianco’s 
genetic model (1988a,50) based on Eliassen and Svaasand, the development of the party 
organizations could be related to territorial penetration, a top-down process in which the 
periphery is stimulated by the center, or to territorial diffusion, a bottom-up process in 
which local elites guide the creation of party associations. 
The Five Star Movement (M5S) combined them operating through a “web-like 
structure consisting of micro organisations conducting a heterogeneous range of 
activities” in a “franchise system” (Bordignon, Ceccarini, 2013, 438); an innovative and 
attractive model that captured not only the political space left by the traditional parties, 
but also the mysterious zone of abstention and distrust, increasingly grown. This mix of 
peculiarity has represented the most relevant innovation at party organization level, after 
the business firm model embodied by Forza Italia in 1994, progressively turn in a 
personal party with particularistic interests (Hopkin, Paolucci, 1999; Paolucci, 1999, 
2008). 
The M5S emergence was particularly due to the evident gap between citizens 
and representatives, now increasingly ‘operationalized’ in protests against public money 
waste and abuse. The reaction of traditional parties was perceived as weak, 
notwithstanding the partial reform of party financing enacted by the law 96/2012, and 
the weight of the old unrealized promises flattened the electoral compactness that 
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Democratic Party (Pd) and People of Freedom showed in 2008 elections, questioning 
the Second Republic party system (D’Alimonte, 2013). 
2013 election results led to a further crash of the bipolarism through a more 
volatile electorate able to liquefy the rooted ideological vote already unfrozen by the 
‘useful vote’ in 20082 (Chiaramonte, De Sio, 2014). From the ballot boxes a tripolar 
party system came out: the astonishing recovery of Berlusconi’s bloc (that confirmed 
the People of Freedom, symbol notwithstanding the usual and pre-electoral internal 
divisions, along with seven lists), the failed win of the Democratic Party and its three-
lists coalition, the partial flop of three-party centrist alliance led by Mario Monti 
characterized the electoral scenario. 
With a decreased turnout on the background (5,3% less than 80% in 2008), the 
electoral vote legitimized the ascendance of M5S as first (non)party and proposed again 
at the Senate the same (even more alarming) spectres of uncertainty in 2006. The Senate 
region-based electoral system did not allow any party to have the majority in the upper 
house, forcing the coalitions to reach a broad agreement and secure the governability. 
After the failed attempt to form a M5S-leftwing coalition, Democratic Party, 
People of Freedom and Civic Choice (Monti’s rassemblement) restored the formula that 
supported Monti’s cabinet and agreed about Letta’s as prime minister, cutting once 
again the extreme wings as Left Ecology and Freedom (that benefited from the majority 
award) and Northern League and isolating M5S. Again, the need for reformist policies -
in order to keep fulfilling the European constraints and commitments- makes more 
meaningful the Lowi’s assumption that “policies determine politics” (1999). 
The following figure shows the steady decline of Italian bipolarism and the up 
and downs of Italian bipartitism (or better ‘bilistism’, only loosely anchored in the 
society), setting apparently a more contestable market. 
                                                          
2 The effective number of the parties at electoral level increased now to 5.3 (near to 2006 
number) whereas the effective number of legislative parties slightly grew (from 3.1 to 3.5). 
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Figure 3.1 Index of bipolarism and bipartitism. 
Selection from Chiaramonte, Emanuele (2013, 64, 65) 
 In the course of the XVII legislature, tripolarism has changed faces and 
dynamics: the intra-coalition divergence was more and more sharp and Pdl’s threats 
weakened Letta’s leadership to the extent that he was replaced as prime minister by 
Renzi, new Pd secretary after the primary elections held in November 2013. In the 
meanwhile, almost sixty MPs guided by Alfano, right-hand man of Berlusconi for long, 
left their party to found New CentreRight: a trustier Pd ally against the relaunch of 
Forza Italia. Berlusconi’s leadership began to be undermined first by a law conviction 
that excluded him from the Senate and later by the rise of Salvini, populist leader of 
Northern League. 
 So, in a sort of game between leaders, the left-wing bloc essentially constituted 
by Renzi’s Pd tried to present itself as the democratic bulwark against the populisms 
represented by M5S and Northern League, now recognized as the leading party of the 
old blue bloc. There was no space at the time for other possible alternatives, as the 
European elections showed. 
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This brief excursus individuates the evolution of the party system and its 
parliamentary arrangement in the last three terms, proving the fluidity of the 
parliamentary patrons and the continuous emergence of new leaders that, confirming 
their own personal networks, partly modernize not only the job offer structure, but also 
its internal composition. 
The lacking cohesiveness of the legislative parties has had no consequences on 
the electoral supply at the following elections - or at least a lesser impact compared to 
the party formation out from the Parliament, as the experiences of Left Ecology and 
Freedom and M5S show. The “intra-party” movements have though affected the 
equilibria and the majority in favour or against a government, conditioning its duration 
and bringing both in 2008 and in 2011 to the change of the cabinet. 
The next section focused on the party switching will provide further evidences 
of this parliamentary fragmentation, in an oscillation of competition and cooperation, 
that do not necessarily bring to party fragmentation. Its dynamics though, combined 
with division on policy issues, can change the nature of a party shaping the patronage 
relationships. In an overall view, as confirmed also by the ascent of an anti-party 
movement such as M5S, we can state that also the precarious and at the same time 
blocked coalitions have led to a weak institutionalization of party system, characterized 
by high levels of electoral volatility, low legitimacy and temporarily active and 
intermittent organizations.  
Party cartels and lists as an addition of candidates ran at the elections with weak 
roots in society and strong affiliation with the leaders, especially under the close-list 
system. The new electoral law (l. 52/2015) - if the constitutional reform will be 
approved by referendum in the next autumn -is expected to define a clear winner, 
securing it a list-based majority potentially after a run-off. The limit to close list only on 
the top in the 100 constituencies will increase both intra-list and inter-list competition 
(D’Alimonte, 2015). The Italian party consolidation still remains on the ground, 
conditioned mainly to the possible use of the list as party cartel in order to gain the 
electoral benefits, entry into the Parliament and then split in different parliamentary 
groups. 
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3.2 THE ITALIAN PARTY SWITCHING AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
TURNOVER: PATRONAGE AT STAKE AND CLIENTS AT RISK. 
Trasformismo has usually been a common feature of Italian politics. Once 
elected, parlamentarians can change party -and so their parliamentary group- in order to 
achieve their own goals or utilities (Carocci, 1992; Musella, 2003). This personal 
choice, consented by free and not imperative mandate explicitly guaranteed in the 
Italian Constitution (art. 67), depends mainly on the political situation (if the party or 
the leader is in decline or not) and personal incentives or essentially on offices, policies 
and votes (Strøm, 1990; Muller and Strøm, 1999). 
This process could have consequences on the executive determining at extreme 
extent its fall, and so majority parties, just like coalitions, tend or try to prevent it by 
building solid channels through the distribution of compensative policies, roles or 
offices among the different factions. 
We focus here on party switching as independent variable of patronage: the 
higher is the party hop from a party A to a party B, the higher will be the amount of 
resources at disposal of party B, the lesser will be the amount of money available for 
party A. This should depend on the rules of procedure adopted by the Parliament. 
In order to explain party switching, Mershon and Shvetsova’s approach (2008) 
assumed that incentives and motivations to hop party traverse specific periods of time 
and individuated five different stages within a parliamentary cycle: three legislative 
stages, the final electoral stage not necessarily at the end of the term and a ‘Dormant’ 
step that do not include the first four. 
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Figure 3.2. Switching behaviour and parliamentary cycle.                                                   
Source: Mershon, Shvetsova, 2008, 102 
The initial stage represents the step with high motivations because there is a 
huge availability of resources to assign (offices both in the executive and in the 
Parliament, staff, leadership and representation of the group in the different 
committees). MPs declare their affiliation to the group directly linked to the party that 
has elected them. This choice is almost obliged in the age of the electoral law called 
porcellum (l. 270/2005) with blocked lists: party select their own candidates at central 
level and simultaneously put them in an order from which their election depends. 
Parties control their candidates more than actually happened with the single member 
districts stated in the laws 276 and 277/1993. 
This first stage (A) has some implications in term of policy motivations since the 
distribution of the offices conditions policy issues and their agenda. In the second stage 
(B for Benefits) the resources available in A are assigned and their assignment increases 
the office seeking ambitions and expectations for the remaining MPs. Stage C is the step 
with more explicit implications in terms of policies since it is situated in a point far 
from the elections, able to develop relevant legislative activities with the main issues 
raised by policy proposals. In this phase switching could be aimed at influencing policy 
choices and affirming policy values. 
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In the last stage (E for Elections) the progressive nearing of the elections spreads 
the need for a pre-electoral positioning. The occurrence of non-parliamentary elections 
(European, regional, local, referenda) may reorganize the political landscape in which 
the single MPs perceive themselves and their personal career in the future. The stage D 
(for Dormant), not included in the figure, consists of all periods other than Stages A, B, 
C, and E. 
The studies on Italian party switching and party discipline (Verzichelli, 1996, 
1999; Giannetti, Laver, 2001; Ferrara, 2004; Heller, Mershon, 2005, Mershon, 
Shvetsova, 2008; Di Virgilio, Giannetti, Pinto, 2012; Pinto, 2015) have underlined high 
rates of affiliation change by Italian MPs. In the last two legislatures an increase of this 
phenomenon has been registered after a massive back and forth in the first two 
legislatures of the so-called Second Republic (on average more than 20% of the MPs 
switched). Here we focus on the hops occurred in the last three legislatures, providing a 
comparative framework. 
We start from assessing the most visible effect of the party switching: the 
variation of parliamentary/political groups number at the Chamber of Deputies
3
. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Numbers of Political Groups Chamber of Deputies (2006-2015) 
  
As we have already underlined in the previous section, the party system 
fragmentation in the course of each legislature finds its expression in the parliamentary 
arena through the proliferation of new groups. This happens especially when the 
                                                          
3
 The Gruppo Misto is not considered as whole, but each its internal sub-group is assumed as a single 
group. Those MPs not enrolled in a sub-group are considered as a single group. 
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number of groups is lower at the starting of the legislature: the Parliament dynamics 
appears a complicating factor for the party system. During the XVI and XVII (current) 
legislature, the number has essentially doubled, with a remarkable propulsion during the 
current term compared to the length, and has scattered and reduced the size of patronage 
sources. The following table provides further confirmations to this from a different 
perspective. 
 
Legislature Switched MPs (%) Total Switches Yearly Average Switched Period 
XV 8.5 65 33 2006-2008 
XVI 19.8 209 42 2008-2013 
XVII 19.6 167 55 2013-current 
 
Table 3.1 Incidence of Party Switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (2006-2015) 
Source: Legislature XV: Di Virgilio, Giannetti, Pinto, 2012. Leg. XVI and XVII: author. 
Note: The total number of deputies is 646 for Legislature XV, 683 for Legislature XVI and 663 
for Legislature XVII. Data updated to 15
th
 December 2015. 
 Beyond the quantitative weight of the phenomenon, party switching has been 
observed also in its motivations and timing, too often considered as an individual 
choice. Recently, as for the Italian XVI legislature, three main factors have been 
observed as reasons for the parliamentary reshuffle: “time” that measures personal 
ambitions, inevitably related to the re-election, “party type” with “ideologically 
coherent and catch-all parties” that “offer legislators different incentives to switch”, and 
“party structure” with the presence of factions that foster collective switching (Di 
Virgilio, Giannetti Pinto, 2012, 52). 
 The interesting case of the current legislature deserves more attention, both at 
the Chamber and at the Senate (Ceccanti, 2014). Here we focus on the switches that 
include more than one MP and occur on the same day, from the same group towards the 
same group. These switches are more likely to be related to policy or party issues and 
have significant effects on the (re)distribution of patronage. At the Senate, 45 collective 
moves have taken place in the first three years and half of the term. 13 of 45 have 
involved more than 5 senators mostly in the creation of new groups or in the formal 
  
83 
separation from other groups. Since Sc and Pi do not exist anymore, 8 of 10 
parliamentary groups have been affected by collective switching. 
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At the Chamber of Deputies, instead, the collective switches affect less the formation of 
the new groups because of a higher number required for their constitution. 
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Comparing the timing of the collective hops in the two houses leads us to state that a 
political switching asymmetry exists, partially motivated by the different threshold for 
the group formation and partially connected to the political relevance that Senate during 
this term represents because of its tiny majority. Moreover, the Chamber is more 
exposed to individual switching. 
 Changes also occur not only in the course of the legislature, but also between a 
legislature and one another. The legislative turnover, expected to let elites circulate, 
renews the political class and its policy issues and proposals and allows the emergence 
of new leadership. (Matland, Studlar, 2004; Manow, 2007), jeopardizing the persistence 
and the continuity of patronage relationships, cutting off the pre-existent linkages and 
reshaping or removing patronage motivations and patronage opportunities. The 
incumbent patrons – here considered as individuals- tend to lose their power shares and, 
consequently with them, offices, chairs and new resources. 
Despite of this, a successful political career, with advancements and progresses 
that lead to new more important offices, could confirm and enhance past patronage 
experiences, creating a fixed web of relationships durable across the time. This 
constitute a motivation for the clients as well, since they hope for a re-election or a 
prestigious assignment for their patron in order to get career benefits from it. 
The two Italian legislatures have shown an increasing turnover in both houses. 
The merit is not directly due to the voters’ choice. Last three elections have been ruled 
by a system of closed lists that do not allow citizens to directly express their preference. 
As would-be self-reformers, parties have pushed the renewal of the political class 
placing candidates never engaged in Parliament in the first positions of their electoral 
lists (Verzichelli, Tronconi, 2010, 2014). 
The exclusion of the incumbents has been flaunted as a distinctive element of 
their emergence -and so a competitive advantage - by new movements or lists such as 
M5S and Civic Choice. Also the traditional parties have promoted a partial renewal of 
the second-row politicians, selecting successful candidates from the civil society and the 
local branches of the party. In the following tables, the trend of legislative turnout of the 
last legislatures are shown. 
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 Women Men Total 
 XVI XVII XVI XVII XVI XVII 
Elected for the first time at the Chamber 10,0 21,75 37,6 44,29 47,6 66,03 
             Already elected at the Senate 0,3 0,79 4,0 1,90 4,3 2,70 
 
Already elected at the Chamber 7,3 9,37 45,1 24,60 52,4 33,97 
 
               Elected only at the Chamber 6,8 8,57 43,3 22,7 50,2 31,27 
Elected both at the Chamber  
and at the Senate 
0,5 0,79 1,7 1,9 2,2 2,7 
Table 3.4. Legislative turnover, Chamber of Deputies, XVI- XVII legislatures (%) 
Source: Our elaboration from data provided by the Chamber of Deputies
4
 
 
 
XV LEG. XVI LEG. XVII LEG. 
Elected for their first 
time and not 
previously elected at 
the Chamber 
37,8 35,5 60,6 
Elected for their first 
time and previously 
elected at the Chamber 
23,1 16,7 18,1 
Re-elected incumbent 
39,1 47,8 21,3 
Total 
100 100 100 
Table 3.5 Legislative turnover, Senate of the Republic, XV-XVII legislatures (%) 
Source: our elaboration from data provided by the Senate of the Republic.               
Note: numbers include also legislators who have replaced other senators after their 
resignation or death 
The unusual designation of the same MPs to the same institutional offices in the 
legislature t+1 held by them in the legislature t confirms the fluidity of patronage 
opportunities as well. On the contrary, patronage persistence is expected to be observed, 
to some extent, in those parliamentary groups which represent traditional or electorally 
consolidated parties. 
                                                          
4
 Numbers refer to the composition of the Chamber at the end of the legislature for XVI leg. The data 
about the current legislature are updated until 11
th
 December 2015. Original data available at these links: 
Leg. XVI: http://leg16.camera.it/564?tiposezione=C&sezione=1&tabella=C_1_8.                                     
Leg. XVII http://www.camera.it/leg17/564?tiposezione=C&sezione=1&tabella=C_1_8 
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3.3 REFORMS IN PARTY FINANCING: THE NEED FOR THE STATE 
Italian party system has to face a new dramatic challenge for its existence: the 
reform of party financing. Parliamentary patronage could provide surrogate tools to 
secure party to survive and maintain its minimal organization (Pizzimenti, Ignazi, 
2011). A focus on the evolution of party financing laws stresses the progressive and 
mandatory detachment of parties from the state in financial terms. 
At the end of 2013 a decree law
5
, approved according to Italian Constitution 
requirement in case of necessity and urgency, has revolutionized the party funding 
system. The illustrative premises of the decree 149/2013 look relevant: “the difficult 
economic situation of the country requires necessarily the adoption of provisions that 
affects the public spending, in line with citizens’ expectations to overcome public party 
funding”, “the popular will expressed by the electorate through the referenda about the 
issue has always confirmed its orientation to overcome such system and lastly emerging 
social misery forces political system to austerity measures”, “it is an unavoidable 
exigence to pass to a [funding] system based on the taxpayers’ free choices that 
empowers citizens and give them a central role in party financing, since parties are by 
nature associations constituted to contribute, according to democratic method, to 
determine national policies, under art. 49 of Constitution”. 
The decree has completely overturn the party funding systems that ruled for 
decades and during the years partially reformed. It removes public funding of political 
elections and financing for political activities, establishing in their place a procedure for 
sustaining political parties by voluntary tax-exempt contributions and indirect political 
contributions. In order to receive these benefits, political parties have to fulfil 
requirements of transparency and internal democracy fixed in the decree. 
                                                          
5
 Decreto Legge 28 dicembre 2013, n. 149, Abolizione del finanziamento pubblico diretto, disposizioni 
per la trasparenza e la democraticità dei partiti e disciplina della contribuzione volontaria e della 
contribuzione indiretta in loro favore [Elimination of Direct Public Financing, Provisions for the 
Transparency and Internal Democracy of Parties, and Control of Voluntary and Indirect Contributions in 
Their Favor] Gazzetta Ufficiale [Official Gazette] No. 47 (Feb. 26, 2014) 
  
88 
The stratification of existing laws (195/1974 known as Piccoli law approved to 
face scandals and collusions with illegality, 659/1981 and other next interventions with 
art. 1 of 422/1980 and art. 1 413/1985) built a financing system that provides a first 
state contribution for the ordinary functioning of parties and a further state contribution 
in the form of reimbursement for electoral campaigning spending in European, national 
and regional elections
6
. In June 1978, four years after the approval of the law, a popular 
referendum promoted by Radical Party failed to abolish the first kind of contribution: in 
an age of mass participation to direct democracy initiatives, the consultation reached the 
quorum (81,19% of electorate went to the polling booths) with the main parties of the 
so-called First Republic (Christian Democracy, Communist Party, Republican and 
Liberal Parties) allied in favour of maintaining direct public funding. The popular vote 
confirmed the existing system with 56,4 per cent of votes.  
In April 1993, in a different context characterized by the progressive collapse of 
the old party system and by a more awkward party-mobilization, Radical parties and 
other movements replied successfully the attempt. The same bunch of eight referenda 
that lead to the abolishment of Agriculture, Tourism and State Participation Ministers 
and push the change of electoral laws both for Chamber and Senate, passing 
substantially from a proportional to majoritarian system with single member districts, 
eliminated the first channel of direct contributions and made parties more dependent on 
the electoral reimbursement. Almost 77% of the eligible to vote took part in the 
consultation with 90,25 of voters saying yes to the abrogation of the articles 3 and 9 of 
195/1974 law. With animated anti-partitocrazia beliefs, Radical Party’s leading 
members proposed to replace public funding with an open financing system in which 
lobbies, foundations, unions could have financially supported parties, along with 
individual citizens that could have participated and engaged in local assemblies. 
This ambitious myth was very soon challenged by the reaction of ruling and pro-
system parties that already in December 1993 fixed the contribution for electoral 
spending without any correlation with the effective amount of party spending in 
campaigning (law 155/1993). The amount of this so-called reimbursement was 
                                                          
6
 On this: Rhodes, 1997; Musumeci, 1999; Bianco, 2001, Pelizzo, 2004; Pacini, 2002, 2009; Amato, 
2012. 
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calculated, in the case of two Chamber and Senate elections’ funds, as the multiplication 
of 800 liras per inhabitant of the Italian Republic in the whole legislature. Later this 
amount increased to 4000 liras in 1999 and up to 5 euros in 2002. Approximately 47 
million euros were distributed among parties in the first national elections after the 
referendum (1994). 
The financial crisis of parties that inherit the burdens of the past forced them to 
find legal alternative solutions within the state resources to keep financing their 
organizations. In this direction the decree 83/1995, though not converted in law, tried to 
anticipate the payment of the half of contributions already received for the same 
institution. In the same year, the reimbursement for regional elections was introduced, 
granted to those parties that got one seat in the regional assembly. Then in 1997 (law 
2/1997) a sort of direct public funding came back in the form of voluntary contribution 
by allocating 4×1000 of Irpef (personal income tax) to a generic “party financing fund” 
without giving the possibility of the taxpayers to explicitly indicate the party to sustain. 
The same law introduced formal controls of Chamber of Deputies’ Speaker on party 
budgets and balance sheets whereas Corte dei Conti, a constitutional institution with 
audit jurisdiction in matters of public accounts, is responsible for the control on 
electoral expenses. The final hit was stricken through law 157/1999 and its 
modifications that repeatedly inflated the costs of reimbursement system, firstly by 
lowering the quorum required to access to the reimbursement from 4% to 1% (l. 
156/2002) and then multiplying the amount of money owed to the parties for five years, 
independently from the real lasting of the legislature (l. 51/2006). In this scheme 
elections become a business that an early end of the legislature can increment. The 
following table represents 20 years of reimbursement system: 
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ELECTIONS 
A B C D E 
Verified 
expenses 
Received 
reimbursements 
Difference B-A % B/A % A/B 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
MARCH 1994 
36.264.124,34 46.917.449,32 10.653.324,98 129,38 77,30 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
JUNE 1994 
15.595.788,66 23.458.724,66 7.862.936,00 150,42 66,49 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
APRIL 1995 
7.073.555,52 29.722.776,08 22.649.220,56 420,20 23,80 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
APRIL 1996 
19.812.285,84 46.917.449,32 27.105.163,48 236,81 42,23 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
JUNE 1999 
39.745.844,39 86.520.102,57 46.774.258,18 217,68 45,94 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
APRIL 2000 
28.673.945,87 85.884.344,63 57.210.398,76 299,52 33,39 
NATIONALE ELECTIONS 
MAY 2001 
49.659.354,92 476.445.235,88 426.785.880,96 959,43 10,43 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
JUNE 2004 
87.243.219,52 246.625.344,75 159.382.125,23 282,69 35,38 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
APRIL 2005 
61.933.854,85 208.380.680,00 146.446.825,15 336,46 29,73 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
APRIL 2006 
122.874.652,73 471.973.696,56 349.099.043,83 384,11 26,04 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
APRIL 2008 
110.127.757,19 418.621.544,00 308.493.786,51 380,12 26,30 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
JUNE 2009 
39.587.801,52 180.147.837,03 140.560.035,51 455,05 21,97 
REGIONAL ELECTIONS 
MARCH 2010 
62.926.376,47 118.924.935,86 55.998.559,39 189,00 52,91 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
2013* 
45.444.781,99 40.162.145,45 -5.282.636,54 88,37 113,15 
TOTAL 726.963.343,81 2.480.702.266,11 1.759.021.558,54 341,24 29,30 
* Just 2 payments of 5 are considered. Source: Corte dei Conti, Delibera CSE 14 POL 2013, p. 340 
 
Table 3.6 Verified expenses and reimbursements received by the parties          
until 2014 in elections from 1994 to 2013. (Values in euros) 
 
A slow, but steady about face was made by the parties. Already in 2010 (decree 
78/2010 converted into law 122/2010) the amount of the funds was reduced by 10% 
starting from the following legislature and the ‘double reimbursement’ was deleted, 
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interrupting the five-years payments even related to early ended terms. In 2011 (decree 
98/2011 converted into law 111/2011) the funds were reduced by a further 10%. 
Obviously these tenuous improvements did not basically change the strong dependence 
of parties on public funding, certificated by the Greco Evaluation Report on Italy 
Transparency of Party Funding (2012, 5). 
 
Table 3.7 Percentage breakdown of public/private/other funding                                    
with  respect  to  major  political parties revenues. 
In 2012, during the unity government ruled by experts lasted less than a two-
year period, Parliament approved the law 96/2012 with a large majority, essentially the 
same that sustained the cabinet. The law was elaborated exclusively on the basis of 
parliamentary bill proposals and without any intervention of government: in a reform 
period that essentially put parties under temporary receivership with the pressure of the 
economic crisis, parties adopted austerity measures that included a partial revolution of 
the political financing and that tried to fill the worryingly growing gap between 
represented and representative. 
The current and future electoral reimbursements were halved and would have 
constituted the 70% of the total amount of state contributions (91 million euros). The 
remaining 30% would have been linked to the ability of party to self-finance their 
activities and would have been proportional to the membership fees and to the private 
funding raised. Party budgets were mandatorily submitted to stricter and less 
discretional controls managed by two different kind of review: first the audit firms and 
then a new committee composed of five magistrates chosen by the most important 
bodies of Italian judicial system were charged to guarantee reliable checks. More 
effective sanctions, decided by the committee according to punctual criteria defined by 
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the law, were enforced: the maximum penalty, in case of failed submission of the 
budget, consisted in a total cut of the contributions. 
Fiscal deductions to private contributions were encouraged by raising the rate 
from 19% to 26% rate and decreasing the maximum deductible amount to 10 thousand 
euros. More demanding transparency requirements were introduced, publishing the 
party budgets on both Chamber of Deputies and party website. Public declarations of 
private contributions to party are necessary for donations from 5k euros. 
Overturning Scarrow’s assumption7, even in front of an overall fund reduction 
parties were asked to supply their own statutes and charters in compliance with internal 
democracy’s principles stated by the art. 49 of Italian Constitution. This provision is not 
sufficient without a comprehensive definition of the legal status of ‘party’ in Italy, still 
far to be individuated. In the Italian legal systems, parties are actually considered as 
non-legally recognized associations: every attempt to achieve a more complete legal 
framework has failed
8
. 
The law 96/2012 also stated 5% reductions of public contributions if the number 
of the same gender candidates would have overcome the 66,6% of the total. At the same 
time, the approved bill would have delegated the government to prepare a law collecting 
all the rules and norms about political financing, but the government did not. 
The gradual emergence of Five Stars Movement as key political player in 2013 
elections made almost irrelevant those significant efforts that led to law 96/2012. The 
strong opposition against the cost of politics that characterizes the anti-establishment 
movement developed a noticeable pressure of public opinion upon the traditional party 
system, especially during the hang Parliament situation lasted two months after the 
                                                          
7
 “The introduction of either party finance regulations or subsidies has often been accompanied by new 
legal definitions of political parties […]. This legal language defines what a party is, and may even 
establish rules for getting onto a public registry of political parties, thus clarifying which organizations 
are covered by the new subsidies and finance rules” (Scarrow, 2011, 21) 
8
 The art. 49 of Italian Constitution in a liberal provision states that “All citizens have the right to freely 
associate in parties to contribute to determining national policies through democratic processes”. The last 
advanced attempt to fix a legal status of parties dated back to December 2012 when at the Chamber of 
Deputies (Constitutional Affairs Committee) the legislative iter of AC 244 stopped after the approval of 
some amendments. 
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electoral results. A new reform of party financing became immediately an issue on the 
political agenda. Actually in October 2013 the Chamber of Deputies approved a 
parliamentary bill that would have become two months later the base of the decree: it 
constituted an attempted means to cool down the climate of tensions and anti-political 
feelings. 
The decree 149/2013 (converted into law 13/2014) totally abolished the direct 
contribution system from 2017 and gradually, but significantly cut the funds from 2014 
(25% reduction in 2014, 50% in 2015, 75% in 2016). The old system was replaced by 
fiscal incentives for 2×1000 of Irpef contributions. Quite similar to the short-lasting 
4×1000 contributions supplied by law 2/1997, this voluntary financial support goes 
directly to only one eligible political party expressed in the taxpayers’ declaration. In 
order to get these benefits, parties have to previously enter into a register held by the 
now called Commission for the Guarantee of the Bylaws and for the Transparency and 
Control of Political Parties’ Accounts, the same committee instituted by law 96/20129. 
Parties have to submit their statute in compliance with democratic rules (art. 3.2). 
Other measures contemplated in the law established a per-person cap of 
€100,000 in value per year in favour of a single political party (originally 200,000 in the 
decree) Innovative fundraising strategies were regulated: campaigns conducted by 
telephone, SMS or other telecommunications methods are disciplined under a set of 
rules approved by telephone operators authorized to provide public electronic 
communication services, in accordance with the guidelines set by the 
telecommunications authorities. 
Transparency requirements from law 96/2012 were confirmed and a further 
threefold definition of political party was advanced to determine the political subject 
eligible to receive the benefits: 1) parties, movements or organized political groups that 
placed candidates with their symbol at the national, European, regional and provincial 
elections; 2) parties enrolled in the register connected to a parliamentary group or to a 
                                                          
9
 In July 2015 this commission has openly denounced the scarce availability of resources in term of tools 
and personnel. In order to not compromise its functioning, Parliament approved a so-called leggina in 
October 2015 (law 175/2015). In that occasion and through a bipartisan approval, checks on expenses 
related to the years 2013 and 2014 were disapplied. 
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sub-group in Gruppo Misto 3) parties enrolled in the register that took part at national or 
European elections by a coalition list with other parties and elected at least one 
candidate. 
This radical change has obliged parties in the last years to conduct intensive 
fundraising campaigns focused mainly on the 2‰ contributions in force from 2014. 
Taxpayers have the possibility to choose between 11 parties in the first year, but this 
number has grown up to 19 in 2015. Five Stars Movement had never applied to receive 
this benefit. 
Notwithstanding these efforts, the following table clearly demonstrates the 
expected difficulties after the first two years of the new financing system. Less than 20 
thousand of 40 million taxpayers (0,04%) in 2014 have intendedly destined their 
contribution to a party. In the following year this ratio is considerably increased up to 
2,7% and in total all the eligible parties got nearly 10 million euros, loose change if 
compared with the electoral reimbursement system
10
. Parties with a more rooted 
organization as Democratic Party and Northern League show the best performance in 
this innovative fundraising. 
The transition to the new system, fully in force in 2017, is producing not 
insignificants costs for the parties that are reconsidering first of all the use of their 
estates. The review involves mainly the expe1nses for national and local headquarters 
and party personnel, with frequent changes of site, layoffs
11
 and downsizing plans. In 
such context, parliamentary groups represent a minimum safe shelter in order to allow 
the parties to work. 
                                                          
10
 Actually in 2015 the total contributions have been proportionally reduced since they have exceeded the 
fixed cap of the fund (9,6 million euros). The real amount is 12.353.574,68 euros. In the data 
presentation, the Ministry of the Economy specifies that in 2014 the procedures to express the choice for 
the voluntary contribution have been less direct and more complex. 
11
 It is not a case that the decree 149/2013 (converted into law 13/2014) extended to party personnel the 
extraordinary treatment of salary integration and solidarity contracts. 
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3.4 NEW TOOLS FOR PARTIES, NEW OCCASIONS FOR CLIENTS: THE 
PRIMARY ELECTIONS. 
 
 Even if not engendered within the Italian tradition and imported from the US 
experience (Fabbrini, 2002, 2005), primary elections have been frequently used in the 
last decade in Italian politics. Sincere or not, the claim to recur to primary elections -
recently as an act of self-criticism and repentance- has worldwide crossed the most part 
of the parties, especially in Europe, more and more concerned -or oriented- to open new 
spaces for a democratic and inclusive participation and to stir and mobilize the ‘party on 
the ground’ (Pasquino, 1997; Fusaro, 2006; Hazan, 2011; Sandri, Seddone, Venturino, 
2015). 
The decentralization of the candidate selection could move the decision-making 
process out from the party in the central office and inside the party on the ground (plus 
eventually other eligible voters defined punctually in the statutes or time after time), 
creating a new occasion/event to connect with the membership and the voters, revitalize 
these relationships and so acquire more legitimacy (Valbruzzi, 2005, 2007; Floridia, 
2011). 
Primary elections could be held at national and local level and at party or 
coalitional level. Through primary elections a party or an alliance of parties could 
choose both a single candidate that, after the victory, runs as the candidate of the whole 
party/coalition for monocratic offices, and a whole list of candidates, with a priority 
order or not. 
Adding a further distinction, primary elections could be directed to define the 
candidacies for public offices or to assign party offices. The latter could be also simply 
considered as an internal frequent election guaranteed by the party statute and would not 
necessarily overlap with the first (Seddone, Venturino, 2013). The leaderization and the 
presidentialization of the politics (Poguntke, Webb, 2005) have though stretched the 
meaning of the intra-party selection, often acting as a springboard for political careers 
and so coinciding with the aspiration to a certain public office.  
We mention here as example the national primaries organized by the Democratic 
Party in December 2013 to decide the party secretary after Bersani’s resignation and 
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Epifani’s temporary regency. Won by Matteo Renzi and with significant consequences 
not only in terms of political communication those elections paved the way to the 
ascendance of the mayor of Florence as Prime Minister, replacing Enrico Letta in the 
following month. Partly also the primaries won by Veltroni in 2007 had more or less the 
same effect: promoting new party leaderships oriented to the government leadership. 
However, the object of our analysis leads us to focus on those primary elections 
that select the candidates for the public offices, since it is the public office in itself that 
represents the necessary and sufficient condition to take advantage of public resources 
and then distribute them by patronage mechanisms. 
A such bottom-up process, although internal and pre-electoral, is likely to 
produce new channels and relationships between candidates, activists and voters or 
reinforce those ties already activated in the past, mobilizing party or non-party 
personnel like in any electoral campaigning. In this sense, primary elections could serve 
also as an occasion for the clients with career ambitions to establish a contact with their 
potential and preferred patrons. 
In this sense, primary elections could achieve a further democratic goal, not only 
trying to bridge the gap between the party and the voters, but also providing an 
additional opportunity for an inclusive patronage by party or professional recruitment, 
in so enlarging the possibilities for being involved in a fruitful exchange relationship.  
In an attempt to swing the pendulum from party-destructuration to different and 
growing degrees of party-restructuration, parties may choose the scope of a given 
primary election setting the ‘selectorate’, that is people entitled to take part and vote. 
Literature has individuated basically five levels of selectorate: from the most general 
and inclusive -the voters, independently from their party affiliation- to the most 
restricted and exclusive – the leaders themselves (Hazan, 2011).  
The scope of the selectorate could affect the establishment of patronage 
relationships: in a primary election in which only the party members are eligible to vote, 
it is likely that just partisan or party members are interested in working for the candidate 
campaign, in so excluding the array of independent voters potentially interested in 
supporting the candidate both at electoral and organizational level. So we consider that 
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essentially the wider is the selectorate involved in a primary election, the higher are the 
opportunities for patronage-seeker voters.  
A limitation to this assumption could be provided by the size of the primary 
elections’ arena. For example, mayoral primaries’ campaign could rely on the exclusive 
support of activists belonging to the city in which primaries take place, or at least such 
primaries could be less inclusive than region-wide primary elections. The level of 
professionalization could make the difference in overcoming these “ethnic” barriers, 
especially in middle or low populated cities or in peripheral contexts where expertise 
and competence in campaigning could be hard to be found. Offering high standards of 
experience could represent a competitive advantage in patronage-oriented relationships. 
In any case, be the size of the primary elections’ arena large or not, be the 
selectorate wide or not, the presence of a candidate network, not necessarily related to a 
certain party allegiance, may work as a filter, building a sort of inner circle with 
personal relationships that divides the insiders from the outsider. In such situation, the 
patronage resources that could derive from a successful election would be distributed 
within that circle without any consideration for the party organization. 
If so, it is the amount of patronage resources at disposal that play a key role. If 
the cake will be large enough to satisfy the inner circle, other slices of patronage are 
available for non-personal networks. In general, this could be related to the size of the 
primary elections’ arena: if these electoral contests concern for example the candidacy 
to national elections or even to party secretaryship, winning the primary elections would 
mean administrate -or at least have an influence on- national or party resources. 
In the last years, Italian politics has been stud with primary elections chiefly 
organized by the leftwing coalition of the leftist parties at every level
12
. For our 
purposes, we exclude from this counting the online consultations organized by the Five 
Star Movement since they have been generically used both for selecting candidacies, 
expressing policy preferences and opinions about the expulsion of some members 
(Corbetta, Gualmini, 2013; Lanzone, Rombi, 2014).  
                                                          
12
 To be complete, an exception is represented by the European elections. Two reasonable factors, 
organizational and electoral, have excluded so far the recourse to primary elections: 1) the inter-regional 
size of the constituencies that divide Italy in 5 broad “macro-regions” 2) the presence of a preference vote 
open at maximum to three choices (but constrained by the gender quota). 
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Their mediate and not physical nature make them not comparable to the 
parlamentarie, the primary elections held by Democratic Party or Free Ecology and 
Freedom in December 2012 to select candidacies for deputies and senators (Musella, 
2014). The establishment of relationships and channels here is to be excluded since 
voters, mainly long-time activists, take part in the election in a lonely way, casting their 
vote in electronic polling booths. 
The empirical research, indeed, will take into account this kind of primary 
elections and will investigate their impact on patronage distribution. We consider 
meaningful to do so even if -  and because – parlamentarie have been used for the first 
time in the 2013 pre-national elections in order to “open” the 90% of the closed lists 
mandated by the electoral law. The remaining 10% would have been composed through 
nominations after an agreement between the national and the regional board.  
The importance of this consultation is stressed by Musella even if literature 
contributions are still missing: “Primary elections held on 29 and 30 December 2012 
[by the Democratic Party] chose about 800 candidates for the two houses of parliament” 
(on average almost 8 candidates for list) “and more than two million citizens took part 
in the event” during a holiday period. “[They] were the first primary elections in Italy in 
which the electoral result was neither a foregone conclusion nor even predictable” 
(2014, 248). 
The non plebiscitarian outcome makes parlamentarie an interesting and original 
object of analysis, even because, as usual, their organization has shaped their nature. In 
this sense, parlamentarie took the form of a sum of local elections, run in provincial 
districts, quite similar to the single-preference voting introduced in the early 1990s. In 
order to stand as candidate, the aspiring MPs were asked to collect the signatures of at 
least 5% of the party members in the voting. So a first minimum linkage with the 
territory and a minimum organization for collecting signatures were required. 
The figures show a competitive contest with a low concentration of the votes in 
the first elected candidate (approximately on average the 30% at national level, with the 
lowest performance in the South – 27.5%) (Musella, 2014, 254). This intra-party 
competition took place within an ideologically limited selectorate, allowing the 
participation to those that already voted for the primary elections held by the centre-left 
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coalition in November 2012 to select its leader. So not only the Pd voters were entitled 
to take part, but also all the left-wing voters, making parlamentarie an inter-party 
competitive arena, attracting the Sel voters potentially engaged on the same day in 
similar elections. 
The combination of local size and restricted selectorate could have promoted 
close personal relationships between candidates and patronage-seekers, reinforcing the 
pre-existent ties in case of incumbent candidacies. Playing a key role, the local 
organizations as a whole could have also represented a determining factor in pushing a 
candidate or another, standing as potential collective ‘clients’. Even the impartial 
contribution to the electoral process, given by some volunteers as scrutinizers for 
example, could be taken into account to explain the external reach of patronage 
relationships. Part of the empirical research will aim to assess these assumptions. 
Notwithstanding their democratic value, primary elections have been also 
interpreted as a further occasion of party control from above that at the extreme extent 
could foster clientelistic ties or spread corrupt practices, strengthening the party 
machine or apparatus that the outsiders generically would call into question through 
primaries (Bolgherini, Gelli, 2011; Cross, Rahat, 2012; Ichino, Nathan, 2013). If so, 
primaries do not provide any further occasion for the clients excluded from the prior 
patronage relationships and practices, emphasizing both party power and illegitimacy 
(Ignazi, 2014). 
The innovative reach of primaries as tool to select the Italian parliamentary class 
could be confirmed by the new electoral system, the so-called Italicum (l. 52/2015) that, 
in the course of the parliamentary discussion, has replaced the short closed lists 
(rejected by the Constitutional Court through the sentence 1/2014) with open lists, 
except for the top candidate chosen by the party, in 100 multi-member constituencies. 
The nearly similar size of the constituencies could promote the organization of 
parlamentarie held under the same system, but it is not easy to predict which 
candidacies would be assigned through primaries – whether the top or not. In a such 
context, patronage from the above could be jeopardized, increasing the likeliness of a 
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successful nation-based patronage, where the relevant relationships occur in Rome, far 
from the territory of origin or election.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT: WHICH SPACE FOR THE PATRONS? 
Today call the deputies and the senators ‘people’s representatives’ 
 does not have anymore the same meaning that this expression had in other times:  
they should be called rather employed by their party. 
Calamandrei (1956, 214)  
 
The previous chapter has analysed the Italian evolution of the patrons in the last 
decade, their nature and their external and internal dynamics, providing some evidences 
about the floor-crossing and the legislative turnover. In turn, these phenomena shape 
patronage relationships, creating new patrons and making disappear the old ones within 
the legislature or between two legislatures, reducing or increasing their reach by 
affecting the financial resources at disposal. 
Furthermore, two relevant aspects have been explored. The progressive 
downsizing of the public funding in Italian politics forces parties to recur to alternative 
resources in order to sustain themselves, encouraging the “capture of the state by the 
parties” (Biezen, Kopecky, 2014) and the withdrawal into the state and the institutions. 
Then, the possible consequences of the appearance of primary elections on patronage 
relationships have been outlined: opening a participated selection before the election 
mainly in the left-wing parties, the emergence of democratic tools to select candidates 
both for monocratic bodies and Parliament seats is expected to create and foster further 
patron-client linkages. 
The present chapter studies the institution that provide patronage opportunities 
analysed in this dissertation: the Parliament. Not only because of their representative 
nature, regional, national and European legislative assemblies recognize some spaces of 
autonomy to parties and politicians, allowing them to build their own staffs and 
organizations financed by public money. 
The first section of this chapter explains the evolution of Parliament’s role and 
its relationships with the executive, taking into account more in depth the last two 
  
103 
terms. This focus will introduce us to the main activities that parties or MPs run within 
the Parliament and, consequently, to the motivations of parliamentary patronage. 
In the second section, we will further clarify the concept of parliamentary 
patronage, object of this research. Parliamentary experience opens to other possible -
veiled or less- forms of patronage not examined by the empirical study here. In the light 
of the Italian procedures and rules, we distinguish the attribution/confirmation of roles 
and appointments that, even if it occurs in the Parliament with or without votes, it does 
not strictly derive only from parties or MPs in their political essence. 
The last two sections of the chapter identify who are the patrons within the 
Parliament. They can be constituted by collective or individual actors: the parliamentary 
groups, expression of the parties in the Houses, in the first sense and the institutional 
office-holders in the latter sense. A punctual assessment of their nature and their 
functioning in Italian experience will permit us to advance some hypotheses about the 
patronage mechanisms. 
4.1 PARLIAMENTARY FUNCTIONS: WHICH TASKS FOR THE 
CLIENTS, WHICH CLIENTS FOR THE TASKS 
The differences in resources’ supply are not the only distinguishing element that could 
condition governmental and parliamentary patronage. Actually the functions of the 
legislatures determine the quality of the patronage, its goals and its motivations 
sketching also the requirement for the clients. Examining the functions of the 
Parliament and their evolution in relationship with the executive will help us to 
understand what clients are called to do nowadays.  
Five parliamentary functions are found in the legislatures: 1) the political 
address to the formation of governmental policies (essentially through motions and 
resolutions); 2) the legislative function, intended as the traditional law-making moved 
by exclusive parliamentary impulse or shared with the cabinet (exerted more and more 
through amendments to government bills/decrees); 3) the control and the scrutiny on 
governmental or non-governmental actions at every level (through questions or inquiry 
committees or other minor tools); 4) the constitutional guarantee, acting as a 
counterweight to other powers and institutions or as a protection to secure, for example, 
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national safety; 5) the coordination with the local powers and authorities, still in a 
developing stage (Manzella, 2003). 
The growing decline of the parliament in the exclusive law-making power, 
increasingly shared with the executive in consensual processes mainly through the 
conversion of the law decrees (Capano, Giuliani, 2001a), has progressively limited the 
purely legislative function of the legislature (Kreppel, 2009), transforming it in a 
representative/expressive function in Bagehot’s meaning, especially if combined with a 
relevant symbolic policy content. The frequent elaboration of leggi bandiera, presented 
mostly at individual level, but rarely scheduled in the agenda of the committees, has 
been a by-product of the expressive function’s renaissance, using the legislative power 
as a ready-made political and communicative weapon oriented more to propaganda and 
tactical goals than to the actual passing, conditioned by their low priority (Pisaneschi, 
2014). Even the iter of scheduled bills could be far from a successful conclusion, 
creating a sort of bottleneck between the production of the bills and the effective 
approval (Capano, Giuliani, 2001b). The following tables related to the last three terms 
show the trends in bills production and their effectiveness in the committees, the most 
important filter of the legislative iter. 
Initiative XV LEG. XVI LEG. XVII LEG. 
By MPs 5062 8399 5117 
By executive 284 482 298 
By the 
regions 
28 67 52 
By the people 20 27 37 
By CNEL 4 2 4 
Total 5388 8977 5508 
Table 4.1. Amount of bills proposed in Parliament in last three legislatures. 
Our elaboration from Parliament data, updated to 15
th
 January 2016. 
 
 
XV LEG. XVI LEG. XVII LEG. 
(N) 592 1972 1162 
% on the 
number of 
presented 
bills 
10,9%% 21,9% 21,1% 
Table 4.2. Amount of bills whose examination was concluded by  
the parliamentary committees in the last three legislatures.  
Our elaboration from Parliament data, updated to 15
th
 January 2016. 
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This first filter essentially highlights the strict selection, through the agenda-
setting process, of the whole body of presented bills: governmental proposals can rely 
on a stronger priority comparing to the remaining initiatives and, as the table below 
illustrates, they show the higher rates of success at the end of the legislative iter with the 
final approval in both the houses and the coming into force. 
 XV LEG. XVI LEG. XVII LEG. 
Initiative n % N % n % 
By MPs 13 11,6 91 22,75 31 16,4 
By the executive 99 88,4 304 76 157 83,1 
By the regions 0 0 4 1 0 0 
By the people 0 0 1 0,25 1 0,5 
Total 112 100 400 100 189 100 
Table 4.3 Bills definitely approved by the Parliament                                          
in the last three legislatures.  
Our elaboration from Parliament data, updated to 15
th
 January 2016. 
 
 The overwhelming majority of governmental bills on the whole body of 
approved laws and the expansion of the executive in the parliamentary activities has 
been a consolidated trend since 1990s (Capano, Giuliani, 2003). This fact does not 
discourage though the massive production of bills by MPs, usually demanded to the 
legislative offices of the parliamentary groups or the personal assistants. In order to 
“express” their political values and policies or to strengthen the linkages with their 
constituencies, the patrons, both collective and individual, need clients for the assistance 
in the law-making. 
This exigence is also justified for the preparation of the amendments in order to 
intervene on the governmental proposals and try to modify them, especially if the 
executive does not ask for the confidence vote. The relevance of the amendments has 
steadily grown in the legislative techniques (Piccirilli, 2009), both for government, that 
sometimes corrects its decisions or recurs to the maxi-amendment, and for MPs 
(Capano, Vignati, 2008). This twofold advantage is explained by Capano and Vignati: 
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“on the one hand, government is forced to table amendments in order to resolve policy 
conflicts within the ruling coalition previously ignored or postponed during the pre-
parliamentary phase of the decision-making process; on the other hand, confirmation is 
provided of the structural trend whereby the dividing line between the majority and the 
opposition very often becomes blurred during the legislative process” (2011, 54). 
The elaboration of the most important amendments, usually object of political 
negotiation, is mainly centralized in the hands of the parliamentary groups, their 
political elites and their legislative offices, in so requiring a high professional level to 
their employees in terms of technical drafting and policy elaboration. Often specific 
consultants or experts are necessary for a more detailed study about the policies. 
For the reasons explicated above, the emergence of non-legislative functions has 
become more and more relevant, following a trend not exclusively Italian (Dickmann, 
2008). This kind of function embodies a noteworthy political meaning, especially for 
the opposition parties, that can control the activity of the government and try to address 
its political actions (Rivosecchi, 2007). Depending on the issues raised -on the base of 
local vs national or individual vs collective interest cleavages, groups or single MPs in 
their personal initiatives recur to professionals for the preparatory work, even though an 
institutional consultancy, without any political meaning or involvement, is also 
provided by the parliamentary officials (Zuddas, Piccirilli, 2012). A strong political 
affiliation or a local connection between patrons and clients, even without any party 
allegiance, could help to better define the political inputs and consequent policy 
solutions or concerns expressed in the initiatives. 
The final performances are presented in table 4.4 that assesses the concluded 
initiatives (final vote for motions and resolutions, received answered to interpellations 
and questions). The low percentages demonstrate not only a scarce interest of the 
executives towards these initiatives that enhance its accountability and responsiveness 
capacities. It is not uncommon that parlamentarians deposit these acts only for media 
motivations, claiming for their urgency, without soliciting an answer or making efforts 
to schedule it. This depends mainly on the scales of priorities laid down by the groups 
or by the single MPs (De Micheli, Verzichelli, 2004; Rosa, 2007). 
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 XV LEG. XVI LEG. XVII LEG. 
 
Pres. Conc. % C/P Pres. Conc. % C/P Pres. Conc. % C/P 
Motions 
445 210 47,19 1933 1167 60,37 1608 919 57,15 
Interpellations 
1216 612 50,33 2348 1316 56,05 1572 917 58,33 
Questions with    
oral answers 
2760 1255 45,47 5882 2650 45,05 4440 2005 45,16 
Questions with 
written answers 
9919 3292 33,19 28449 9361 32,90 16806 3729 22,19 
Questions in 
Committee 
1953 1321 67,64 8715 4866 55,83 7423 3523 47,46 
Resolutions in the 
plenary sitting 
97 93 95,88 252 251 99,60 337 336 99,70 
Resolutions in 
committees 
351 212 60,40 1412 833 58,99 1079 485 44,95 
Conclusive 
resolutions 
107 107 100 225 225 100 163 163 100,00 
Orders containing 
guidelines to the 
Government - In 
Plenary Session 
3637 3626 99,70 12827 12624 98,42 11197 11122 99,33 
Orders containing 
guidelines to the 
Government - In 
Committee 
561 534 95,19 2691 2525 93,83 2562 2064 80,56 
TOTAL 
21046 11262 53,51 64734 35818 55,33 47202 25277 53,55 
Table 4.4. Presented and concluded initiatives                                                                                  
for both political control and address to the government (XV-XVII leg.).                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Our elaboration from Parliament data, updated to 20
th
 January 2016. 
The impressive amount of parliamentary questions deserves a particular 
attention: even if parliamentarians have several other tools at disposal, they seem to 
recur more often to this instrument in a vis-to-vis strategy that put against the MP and 
the government in a relationship between equals (1 question=1 answer). Furthermore, 
the content analysis of the parliamentary questions has revealed their use as a service to 
the constituency: “candidates who are elected in a district where they do not have strong 
personal roots do not devote much effort to representing their constituency” (Russo, 
2011, 299). This emerges in the studies focused on bills as well (Marangoni, Tronconi, 
2011) just like it happened under the old electoral system (75% majoritarian and 25% 
proportional) when “those MPs elected in majoritarian constituencies have a greater 
propensity towards presenting bills than those elected by the proportional rule” 
(Capano, Giuliani, 2003, 24).  
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Beyond this quantitative analysis of the production performances, it is to admit 
that the Parliaments do not represent only a legislative-control-address arena. They 
create, at national and European level, a communicative space, “a discursive structuring 
of public networks and arenas in which anonymous circuits of communication are 
detached from the concrete level of single interactions” (Habermas, 1996, 171) and go 
in a bidirectional line with the society. The public opinion sometimes is likely to 
indirectly condition the policy-making or the agenda, not through popular off-line 
initiatives
1
, but through its expectations and its feelings (Carbonnier, 1978). 
For an incisive political action, parliamentary groups and MPs, generally 
considered as the institutional branches of the parties, should activate communication 
and information flows and maintain a stable connection with the constituency or the 
general electorate. It follows that the importance of a fluid and constant communication 
with the generic voter, local groups or specific targets asks for the engagement of 
activists or professionals responsible for the political communication, online and 
offline. From this need, a further kind of client arises: press agents or secretaries and 
spin doctors have emerged as key figures and shadow players in the political field, not 
only in the governmental sphere, but also in the Parliament at the time of the permanent 
campaigning. 
Terms like “political marketing” or “packaging of politics” have become 
frequent not only during the electoral campaigns (Swanson, Mancini, 1996; Mancini, 
1999). The news management, intended as the agenda-setting of the facts that are 
transformed into news and headlines, needs a daily commitment in facts-building, 
preparing reports or dossiers about the adversaries if a negative campaigning strategy is 
adopted or about particular issues (always the same if promoted by a single-issue party 
in the Parliament). 
In last decades, the issues of the political debate, conveyed through the media, 
have been constantly conditioned by the Europeanization of the executive agendas and 
                                                          
1
 The Italian tradition in popular legislative initiatives’ success confirms the gap between representatives 
and represented (Della Sala, 2002). It should not surprise if we look at the rate of parliamentary 
legislative initiatives approved in both the floors. The trends show the existence of a caste-model 
legislative process, with the executive at the top and the people at the bottom. 
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domestic policies. This happened also in Italy and obviously has had an impact on the 
domestic legislatures not only in financial constraints, but also in terms of the content of 
the laws, increasingly tied with EU agenda and commitments (Radaelli, 2003; Graziano, 
2013). Clearly not all the policy sectors are Europeanized at the same degree. Three 
levels usually are distinguished and often national executives for a reversible change in 
that degree, allocating more resources and increasing the level of integration about a 
single issue, as it happens with immigration nowadays. At the top of the 
Europeanization there are those policies related to the common currency or to the 
common market, inspired by the fundamental values at the base of the European Union; 
in the middle, those policies that require investments and funds for middle-term results 
such as transport, environmental issues, research, education and development; at the 
bottom those policies with a low influence of the EU institutions so far, left to 
intergovernmental agreements (immigration, justice, foreign policy and defence). 
Equally not all the provisions that come from EU institutions have to be adopted in 
vertical way as the difference between regulations, directive resolutions, demonstrates.  
The need for policy experts with a cross-national knowledge and a thorough 
comprehension of EU policies has so innovated the required profile of the clients, 
opening new opportunities for time-limited and single issue-oriented consultancies. This 
modernization is not related only to top-down flows of policies, but has received an 
impulse from the further bunch of policies coming from above, in so asking for different 
kinds of experts with local experience. 
The decentralisation, indeed, has multiplied the actors of the decision-making, 
conditioning the law-making processes with subnational constraints and differences. 
Especially after the constitutional reform approved in 2001, the differentiate 
regionalism has created 21 different policy systems, each one with its peculiarities, 
strengths and weaknesses, as the management of the health systems has shown (Di 
Giovane, Mastromarino, 2008). To govern and coordinate this efforts and policies and 
hopefully achieve mutual gains in the legislative processes, a link between the 
parliamentary groups and the regional or local representatives is expected to be 
established. These intense relationships could be developed at party level in those 
bodies that involve all the party elites and summarized in concrete proposals that 
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parliamentary groups turn into initiatives to promote in the floor and in the committees. 
It is also true that this sort of policies tends more to find a consensus if preliminarily 
negotiated at institutional level with deals between central executive and local 
governments. At the end of this process, amendments or proposals in whatever form 
could receive just a final and formal approval with broad supports in the committees or 
in the floor. 
 The performance and transformation trends that Parliament, as legislative and 
representative institution has experienced, could generally influence the minimum 
requirements asked to the clients in competitive selections held by single persons or a 
board through interviews or cv screenings. 
4.2 PATRONAGES IN PARLIAMENT: A PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION.  
In the last section of the first chapter, we have already introduced a distinction between 
four forms of possible patronage in Parliament in broad sense: the external institutional 
patronage, the inner patronage, the chair patronage -that we will examine in the fourth 
section- and the internal institutional patronage. Here we summarize the Italian 
experiences in the first two types of patronage, a useful focus to disentangle the four 
concepts and better define the parliamentary patronage in strict sense, object of this 
dissertation. 
In the external institutional patronage, the distribution of relevant offices, 
through one or more electoral steps, is common mainly by bicameral procedures 
through the joint parliamentary sittings of Chamber and the Senate. In the original sense 
these electoral moments, not preceded by any debate (Mannino, 2010), are considered 
as a sum of individual preferences casted by each member of parliament as 
representative of the Nation (art. 67, Italian Constitution). In such process, the most 
appropriate and well-known as independent figures should advance to serve in the most 
effective way those constitutional bodies that have a dominant role in the controversies 
about the constitutional legitimacy and in the conflicts between powers or in the self-
government of the judiciary. 
The progressive involvement of the parliamentary groups, as aggregating and 
facilitating units for mediation between elites in front of a huge electorate, have partially 
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affected in their composition, but not in their working, the balance-oriented bodies such 
as the Constitutional Court (one third of the whole composition, art. 135, comma 1, 
Const.) and the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM, one third of the whole 
composition, art. 104, comma 4, Const.). Under particracy practices, usually conducted 
with consensual methods, the party influence in these high institutional environments 
has though progressively extended its reach, including also persons with party linkages 
among the constitutional judges or even members of the cabinet as members of the 
CSM. 
Obviously, a set of minimum criteria to fulfil is required in order to be eligible 
to come in charge: the constitutional judges should be “chosen among judges, including 
those retired, of the ordinary and administrative higher Courts, university professors of 
law and lawyers with at least twenty years practice” (art. 135, comma 2, Const.). As for 
the CSM members elected by the Parliament, the MPs could choose “among university 
professors of law and lawyers with fifteen years of practice” (art. 104, comma 4, 
Const.). 
At the maximum degree even the election of the President of the Republic could 
be interpreted as an expression of patronage at the top, requiring though high thresholds 
-and so broad agreements- for the success of the election (a majority of two thirds of the 
assembly. and after the third ballot an absolute majority, art. 83, c. 3-4, Const.). The 
same rationale guides the election for the members of the above-mentioned bodies: a 
majority of two thirds -and after the third ballot the majority of three fifths of the 
Parliament – is required for the Constitutional Court components (l. 2/1967, art. 3), 
while the rule for the 8 members of CSM elected by the Parliament mandates a majority 
of two thirds -and after the third ballot the majority of three fifths of the effective voters 
in Parliament (l. 44/2002, art. 1). 
A further domain of external institutional patronage is represented by the board 
of directors of RAI, the publicly owned media company addresses or controlled by the 
Parliamentary Vigilance Committee. This connection should suggest a function of the 
Parliament as the transmission between the state and the society in a sensitive matter 
such as media and communication. The law 112/2004 (art. 20, c. 5, 9) assigns to this 
bicameral committee the election of seven members (of nine) and the binding approving 
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opinion, by two thirds of the committee members, about the chairperson of the board, 
appointed by the board. Albeit some merit-based criteria are defined (art. 20, c. 4), they 
appear so vague that leave space for the political interference on the management of the 
public broadcaster, as the past and recent history has demonstrated. (Dickmann, 
Malinconico, 2009; Mancini, 2009; Hanretty, 2011). 
Even the Speakers of the Chamber and of the Senate hold jointly a power to 
appoint: it occurs in those authorities that “shall act with total autonomy and 
independence of judgment and assessment” to guarantee citizens’ rights related to 
competition, fairness and transparency. It is the case of the Competition Authority (L. 
287/1990 and further modifications) where the three members in the board, including 
the President, are proposed and appointed jointly by the Presidents of the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Also in this circumstance merit-based limitations are 
posed
2
. 
Moreover, a remarkable scrutiny activity on the governmental appointments lies 
in the hands of the Parliament, developed in the competent committees. This control on 
the executive patronage is stated by the law 14/1978 and is supposed to increase the 
level of transparency, democracy, accountability and legitimacy, limiting arbitrary 
decisions and opening a discussion about the proposed appointments. This process 
concerns the chairpersons and the deputy chairpersons of public –also economic- 
entities or institutions: every appointment made by the Prime Minister, the Council of 
Ministers and the single ministers in the above-mentioned entities has to pass the 
examination of the Parliament before to come into force. A huge and various array of 
public entities are involved in this consultation that involves the candidates for the 
appointment in informal hearings before the committees (Spaventa, 1981; Dickmann, 
Staiano, 2008). It is to be added that this opportunity to intervene in the appointment 
process has to be activated by the parliamentary committees in a defined lapse of time 
beyond which the appointment procedure has anyway a successful end in front of a sort 
of silent-assent. 
                                                          
2
 At the Competition Authority chosen among judges serving on the Supreme Administrative Court 
('Council of State'), the Court of Auditors, the Court of Cassation, full professors of Economics or Law or 
respected business executives of particularly high professional repute. 
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An inner patronage with no party influence takes place inside the parliamentary 
bureaucracy according to the Rules of Procedure
3
 and other sub-rules. As the Rule 51 of 
the Rule of the Services and of the Personnel (rSPC, an internal code that disciplines the 
administrative aspects of the lower house), the hiring selection of the Chamber of 
Deputies personnel passes through open and competitive exams or scrutiny of titles and 
exams. The selected officials are subdivided into five levels according to the complexity 
of their functions, linked also to different selection procedures and different level of 
salary (D’Orta, Garella, 1997). Professional updated courses are run by the 
administration for the officials whose attendance is necessary for the success of internal 
assessments, career advancements and salary raises (rule 69 rSPC). 
In this general context, the apex of the bureaucracy follows a slightly different 
pattern. The Chamber of Deputies administration consists of 19 Services and 7 Offices, 
the latter under the control of the Secretary General, the head of the administration that 
controls, monitors and addresses all the activities of the Chamber and is its legal 
representative. The Secretary General is also the Head of the Personnel and takes part to 
the meetings of the Bureau, with an advisory vote (art. 7 rSPC) (Zampetti, 2000). 
The office of Secretary General is assigned through an appointment process. 
Proposed by the Speaker of the Chamber, this choice has to be approved by the Bureau, 
as core ‘political’ board of the administration management, composed of elected MPs 
(art. 12.4, rC). The collegial nature of this appointment is confirmed also by the 
provision about its removal, adoptable with motivations by two thirds of the Bureau, 
after the Speaker’s proposal (art. 7, c. 5, rSPC). High standard requirements are fixed: 
the Speaker has to select the name of the candidate among the deputy general 
secretaries, the Counsellors that serve as Chief of a Service or the Counsellors that 
successfully passed from at least six years the internal assessments preliminary to a 
career advancement (art. 7, c.1, rSPC). 
The discretional power to appoint, hold by the Speaker, but actually shared with 
the Bureau, has nothing to do with the spoil system practices adoptable in the public 
                                                          
3
 For the sake of brevity, in the following pages the rule of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies is 
abbreviated as rC. whereas the rule of procedure of the Senate of Republic is abbreviated as rS. 
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administration sector, at national and at local level. It configures rather an internal 
selection at the top of the administration managed by those bodies responsible for the 
third and impartial working of the administrative machine, with a threshold (two thirds 
of the Bureau) not depending on the pro tempore majorities. The shared power leads 
usually to a previous informal consultation of the Speaker with the members of the 
Bureau, considering the consensual scheme of the appointment. In this process, the 
assessment of professional criteria matters more than any other motivation. The 
evaluation is based on the internal experience -not without some nuances of personal 
and subjective judgements- that in the last twenty years appears to have privileged the 
continuity, with a low turnover. 
A similar pattern is stated for the appointment of the five deputy Secretaries-
General (art. 8, rSPC), responsible for the coordination of aggregate areas of activities 
upon the delegation of the Secretary General. They are selected among the Counsellors 
that from four years successfully passed the internal assessments (art. 57.4, rSPC) and 
are proposed by the Secretary-General to the Bureau that decides on these candidacies. 
The appointment decree is signed by the Speaker. In turn, also the Chiefs of the 
Services are proposed by the Secretary-General to the Speaker. 
These internal processes of appointments call to mind the so-called autodichia 
of the parliamentary assemblies, a prerogative recognized only to the Parliament 
through the Rules of Procedure (r. 12.4 rC, r 12.1 rS), to the Presidency of the Republic 
and to the Constitutional Court through ordinary law (l. 87/1953) (Occhiocupo, 1988). 
For what we concern here, autodichia implies a sort of administrative self-government, 
motivated by the division of the powers, that creates a domestic jurisdiction within each 
Chamber and consequently an external unappealability of the interna corporis acta: a 
no man’s land regulated only by the internal specifics sub-rules as the rSPC (Testa, 
Gerardi, 2013). This self-protection from the interference of the judiciary, increasingly 
questioned also by the Constitutional Court (sent. 120/2014) (Dickmann, 2014; 
Malinconico, 2014) and the European Court of Human Rights (sent. Savino et al., 
14/2009)
4
, is exerted in the case of the Chamber personnel through an internal 
jurisdictional committee, composed of three MPs drawn among those with pertinent 
                                                          
4
 See also the ordinance of Cassation Court (United Civil Sections) n. 26934, 19
th
 2014. 
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competences: an evident absence of a third and impartial judge complained by the 
ECHR. 
Studies of inner patronage, focused on its timing and its mechanisms, could 
provide a meaningful explanation of how the distributive choices occur at the top level 
of the administration. Such researches, though, will not be able to explain to what 
degree the party influence conditions the process for two main reasons. Firstly, the 
Bureaus and the Speakers here act as institutional bodies with responsibilities on the 
whole administration and its correct functioning, adding their preferences with a 
consensual approach to reach the high threshold. Secondly, the high legislative 
turnover, combined with the temporary nature of those bodies in the same membership- 
at maximum the full duration of a legislature, so 5 years-, facilitate the renewal of the 
patrons that, in turn, ask for clients whose acknowledged experience helps them to 
accelerate their learning process of the apparatus. Personal factors are not to be 
excluded in an exchange relationship that get competence in change of trustworthiness. 
It is more likely that in this information asymmetry an imbalance of the power in 
transactions occurs, with clients much more influential than their patrons, aware of 
being the real “elite” of the administration and often tending to reduce its “circulation”, 
in Pareto’s meaning, in order to not change the consolidated regime. The last 
appointments held in June 2015 after almost ten years from the last similar process 
appear to confirm this assumption. 
   
4.3 COLLECTIVE PATRONS: THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS. 
Once elected, “within two days of the first sitting” at the Chamber (rule 14.3, 
rC) and “three days” at the Senate (rule 14.2, rS), each MP has to choose its 
parliamentary group. By expressing this choice, the MP realizes the passage, mediated 
by the list of election, from the belonging to a party to the registration to a 
parliamentary group connected to that party, cementing the partyness of the Parliament. 
By this connection, the parliamentary groups represent “the projection” of the political 
parties within the Parliament, helping their installation and enhancing their 
institutionalization within the party system (Rescigno, 1970; Bin, 2001; Ciancio, 2008; 
Lupo, 2009). 
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It is to be clarified, though, that in Parliament the connection party-group is not 
always direct, explicit and one-to-one related because both group without parties or 
group with more parties can exist. The first is the case of parliamentary groups emerged 
by the split from pre-existing groups. In such situation the collective party switching 
precedes the formation of the party (see Future and Freedom for Italy in XVI legislature 
and New Centre Right in XVII legislature, both from People of Freedom). 
Parliamentary groups could be formed not only by divisions -be they founded on 
a party or not-, but also by sum of different parties or even different MPs, each one of 
them representing a party or a political subject. The experience of L’Ulivo in XV 
legislature provides an example of the first case: in 2007 the fusion of Democratic of the 
Left (post-communist party) and La Margherita (post-Christian democratic party) in one 
single party (PD) was previously tested in the floors of the Parliament with the creation 
of a single group, only at the Chamber tied with a same-named electoral list
5
. 
At the extreme degree, parliamentary groups could constitute more a coalition of 
persons, a congeries of small groups and acronyms gathered more to fulfil the numeric 
threshold posed by the Rules of Procedure than to achieve a policy unity and political 
synthesis. The Grand Autonomies and Freedom (GAL) group in XVII legislature at the 
Senate constitutes an expression of it, with fifteen majority and opposition senators 
sharing the belonging to the same entity and seven different recognized sub—groups 
inside the main group, that takes the political form of an institutionalized mixed group.  
In any case, parliamentary groups respond mainly to organizational necessities, 
providing an internal subdivision helpful to achieve a more democratic, orderly and 
balanced equilibrium in the proportional representation of the parliamentary scenario 
both in the plenary session and in the single Committees or Joints. Gathering deputies or 
senators in a macro-unit not necessarily defined according to political criteria, but rather 
with a minimum quota (20 at the Chamber, 10 at the Senate), the group simplifies 
internal procedures for the allotment of the resources, not only in terms of money, but 
also in terms of working spaces or time in the floor for example. Also the distribution of 
                                                          
5
 A similar experience has started in the middle of the XVII legislature when some former members of the 
Democratic party have joined the group Free, Ecology and Freedom adding the label Italian Left. Such 
aggregation intends to create a new leftist political party.  
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the institutional offices, as we will see in the next section, responds to group-based 
mechanisms (Manzella, 2003; Mannino, 2010; Lupo, Gianniti, 2013). 
 Beyond the numerical criteria, the Rules of Procedure consent the formation of 
parliamentary groups, under the prescribed threshold, that demonstrate the existence of 
a tie with successful electoral lists. This possibility in both the Houses takes the form of 
a concession granted by the Bureaus, through interpretations of the Rules provided by 
the Rules Committee. In the last Parliaments, especially the XV legislature, the first 
under the new electoral law, the Bureau has authorized the establishment of new groups 
whose name represents parties that have submitted electoral list in the respective house, 
in some case with a minimum threshold
6
 (Cozzoli, 2002, 2014; Castaldi, Cozzoli, 
2008). 
 The groups have also an incumbency advantage in the following elections: as 
confirmed by the new electoral law (art. 2 comma 36, l. 52/2015), no collection of 
signatures is required only to parties and political groups already represented in one of 
the two houses that want to run at the election presenting lists with the same name. Such 
provision realizes a sort of cartel between insiders, removing obstacles for the electoral 
participation to those experiences yet consolidated in the past and indirectly asking for a 
considerable effort in term of organization and legitimation for new comers. 
Moreover, the groups through their leaders, internally elected, are all represented 
in the Conference of Group Chairpersons, the most relevant body at political level 
chaired by the Speaker of the Chamber of the Deputies or the Senate. The Conference 
mainly sets the agenda of the plenary sittings, not only on the base of the bills 
considered by the Permanent Committees. In the practice, given its high political 
representativeness and its leading value as place of political mediation and bargaining, 
                                                          
6
 . At the Chamber, “the Bureau may authorise the establishment of a Group with less than twenty 
members provided that it represents a nationally organised party that has presented its own list of 
candidates, under the same emblem and in at least twenty constituencies, and has obtained at least one 
quotient in one constituency and national electoral returns of at least three hundred thousand valid list 
votes”.  At the Senate “The Bureau may authorise the formation of a Group with fewer than ten members 
provided that it represents a party or an organised movement in Italy which has submitted its own lists of 
candidates for the elections to the Senate in at least fifteen Regions, using the same party symbol, and 
whose candidates have been elected in at least three Regions, provided that such Group comprises at least 
five Senators, even if elected under different party symbols” (Rules, 14.2 rC, 14.5 rS). 
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the Conference has experienced an extension of its functions, deciding about matters 
generically attributed to other bodies such as the Bureau, the Rule Committee or even 
the Permanent Committees (Di Ciolo, Ciaurro, 2013). 
Particular attention deserves the Mixed Group, a fraction composed of all the 
members that do not indicate an affiliation with a “political group” and that for 
numerical reasons, in absence of other electoral requirements, could form a sub-group 
within the group. The progressive enlargement of the mixed group by party switching 
has been a steady trend in the last legislature, although the electoral system should 
suggest a strong affiliation between MPs and the party, as shown in XV and XVI 
legislature. In 1997 the internal organization of the mixed group was regulated (Rule 
15-bis rC) in order to clarify the formation of the sub-groups, political or not. At least 
ten Deputies are required to form a new intra-fraction - or at least three deputies for 
groups that represent linguistic minorities, elected within lists connected to them, or 
parties that ran for the election to the Chamber of Deputies. 
The peculiarity of Mixed Group introduces a form of shared patronage, with a 
single financial source of income that becomes object of a further internal distribution 
between the single sub-groups. In this sense, the Mixed Group works as a sum of sub-
groups and independent MPs, not always related to a party, but also connected with an 
association of deputies or senators. 
 Just recently defined by the Rule of Procedure at the Chamber as “associations 
of deputies”7 in the lack of any other legal definition than “juridically unrecognized 
associations”8, the parliamentary groups are also legal entities entitled to stipulate 
contracts for goods and services and hire personnel by private contracts (Rescigno, 
1961, 2010). They are able to do it in force of the public contributions secured by the 
budgets of the Houses that, on the basis of the decisions taken by the Bureaus, assign 
public resources for the efficient working of the parliamentary groups (Antonelli 1979; 
                                                          
7
 Rule 14.01, rC added on September 2012 and in force from October 2012, stabilizes that “Parliamentary 
Groups are associations of Deputies established pursuant to the provisions set forth in this rule. Inasmuch 
as Parliamentary Groups are entities necessary for the functioning of the Chamber of Deputies, pursuant 
to the constitution and rules of Procedure, they shall receive funds from the Chamber of Deputies budget 
to carry out their activities”. 
8
 Cassation Court (United Civil Sections) ord.n. 3335, 19
th
 February 2004. 
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Bin 2009), mainly on the base of their size
9
. Here the amount of money at disposal of 
the groups in last two terms are presented. 
 
CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES 
SENATE OF THE 
REPUBLIC 
TOTAL 
2008 33.900.000,00 37.260.648,96 71.160.648,96 
2009 35.100.000,00 36.776.240,40 71.876.240,40 
2010 35.700.000,00 37.948.625,62 73.648.625,62 
2011 36.250.000,00 37.415.224,90 73.665.224,90 
2012 35.450.000,00 37.352.070,92 72.802.070,92 
2013 32.630.000,00 21.305.189,64 53.935.189,64 
2014 32.000.000,00 21.193.956,32 53.193.956,32 
TOTAL 241.030.000,00 229.251.956,76 470.281.956,76 
Tab. 4.5 Funds for parliamentary groups (2008-2014).  
Our elaboration from Chamber and Senate final budgets. 
 
The extreme closeness between party and parliamentary groups, that in some 
cases becomes a real coincidence, and the weak ability for parties to attract private 
resources, explained in section 3.3, elevate the centrality of parliamentary groups in 
                                                          
9
 According to unofficial estimates, a single deputy, being member of a given group, contributes to its 
budget approximately with 50 thousand euros per year, while a senator approximately 60 thousand euros. 
Rules 15.3 and 15.4, rC declare: “To enable Parliamentary Groups to fulfil their functions, they shall be 
allocated premises and equipment in a manner determined by the bureau that takes account of the basic 
common requirements of all Groups and the size of their membership. To cover all the costs, including 
staff costs, as indicated in paragraph 4, each Group shall be guaranteed a single all-inclusive annual 
contribution from the budget of the Chamber in the manner determined by the Bureau. The contribution 
shall be calculated with reference to each Group’s numerical strength. The facilities and contributions 
allocated to the Mixed Group shall reflect the number and size of the political groupings therein 
established so that they may be apportioned among such political groupings with reference both to the 
common requirements of all members and to the numerical strength of each political grouping. 4. The 
contributions referred to in paragraph 3 shall be used by the Parliamentary Groups exclusively for 
institutional aims connected with their parliamentary activities and to cover associated research, 
publishing and communication functions, as well as costs, including staff remuneration, pertaining to the 
administration of their internal bodies and structures”. Rule 16, rS states: “1. Parliamentary Groups shall 
be given premises, assets and a single annual contribution from the Senate budget, in proportion to their 
size and for the purposes under paragraph 2 below. 2. Contributions from the Senate budget to a 
Parliamentary Group, as determined and defined under relevant decision of the Bureau, shall be allocated 
to such Group solely for official purposes relating to parliamentary business and related political activity, 
research, publishing and communication connected to those, and operating costs for a Group’s bodies and 
structures, including staff remuneration.” 
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supporting political activities also connected to the legislative initiatives, providing 
personnel and financial resources for policy studies and event organization. As effect of 
‘party in public office’ predominance, the core of the party organization has moved 
from a polycentric structure rooted at local level to a central elite that controls the 
resources and distributes them inside the institutions. The parliamentary groups, 
representing a longa manus of the parties within the Parliament, furnish them additional 
resources acting as collective patrons in distributive processes just like the parties. 
Under the growing pressure of the public opinion on the costs of the institutions 
and the waste of public money, new rules for the management of the parliamentary 
groups have been provided in 2012, starting from a minimal definition of what 
parliamentary groups are. Since then, the groups are asked to adopt a statute – published 
on the institutional website- and present every year a budget (Rule 15.2-bis, 2-ter rC; 
Rule 15.3-bis, 3-quater rS). If they fail to present it, they risk to lose the contributions. 
Moreover, the Rules for Procedure explicitly states that the budgets should be submitted 
to audit firms
10
 individuated by the Bureau “in order to ensure transparency and probity 
in their financial and accounting management” (Rule 15-ter comma rC, rule 16-bis 
comma 2 rS). 
The transparency and disclosure on the statutes and the final budgets of the 
parliamentary groups enacted from 2013 allows us to draw a minimal common trend 
about their internal structure, their working and their expenses. An internal hierarchy 
comes to light from the review of the statutes: we essentially individuate an internal 
elite within the group organization, as the iron-law of the oligarchy has described 
(Michels, [1911], 1962). 
All the deputies and senators form the assembly of the group, the broadest body 
that elects the chairperson of the group and votes about the budget proposed by the 
administrative manager and deliberated by the group treasurer (a MP). The assembly 
constitutes the place for the political debate and for the general addressing to 
administrative policies of the group. The management of specific administrative policies 
                                                          
10
 Some doubts have been put forward about the choice of audit firms as external controllers and the 
consequent exclusion of Corte dei Conti. (Biondi, 2012) 
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in spending and hiring is attributed to the board of the group, an inner body composed 
basically of the chairperson, deputy-chair person, treasurer and some members of the 
group elected by the assembly (as in the case of Democratic Party) or appointed by the 
chairperson (as mandated in Forza Italia-Pdl statute).    
In some cases, as the M5S group statute, the expenses above 100 thousand euros 
about single or homogenous voices have to be voted by the Assembly, whereas the 
expenses between 10 and 100 thousand euros have to be communicated to the Assembly 
at least every three months (art. 4, comma 9). The statute reflects so the collegial nature 
of the Five Star Movement with a lesser degree of delegation to the board of the group, 
whose functions are directly assigned time by time by the Assembly (art. 7.1).  
In the most part of the groups, a more centralized power is placed in the hands of 
the board where the treasurer along with the technical assistance of the administrative 
manager play the key role in proposing the expenses. The board guarantees a basic 
efficient organization under the supervision of the group chairperson that, in many 
cases, is the legally responsible for the group. A further innovation from M5S has to be 
traced in the periodical turnover of the offices and their flexible nature: the chairperson 
is elected every year, the deputy-chairperson that serves both as vicar and spokesperson 
every three months, the treasurer every year (art. 3, M5S Chamber Group Statute). 
The decision-making on expenditures that derives from the analysis of the 
statutes appears, indeed, diffused in a central elite led mainly by the chairpersons of the 
group and the treasurers. Their leadership, though, constitutes just an apical hierarchy 
with no exclusive power and influence on the hiring processes. Parliamentary groups 
serve so as collective patrons with a basic internal agreement about the distribution of 
jobs whose work will be to advantage of all the members of the group. 
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Figure 4.1 Internal composition and bodies of a parliamentary group by statute (MPs)
11
 
A thorough examination of the groups’ budgets available from 2013 brings us to 
conclude that on average approximately the 70% of the group budgets is allocated for 
the expenditures related to personnel (fixed term or consultancy contracts) with more 
than 500 persons hired (Caroli Casavola, 2014). We do not report here about the 
description of the expenses of single groups since the aim of this dissertation is to 
provide a general framework of parliamentary patronage, rather than a focus on single 
party’s practices. This orientation will guide also the empirical research. 
    The remaining part of the budget is mainly allocated on the expenses for goods 
and services. So jobs prevail in the list of the costs sustained by a parliamentary group 
and this reinforces the assumption of a particular presence of patronage within this 
structure. A common trait in the groups’ organization, basically inherited from the past 
also by the new groups, is represented by three main macro-areas individuated for the 
effective development of parliamentary activities: 1) the legislative office, that prepares 
texts and drafts of the parliamentary initiative (bills, motions, resolutions, questions, 
interpellations) and conducts preliminary policy studies; 2) the communication office, 
the evolution of the traditional press office at the age of online communication, engaged 
in the organization of press conferences or in the drafting of press releases and other 
communication activities; 3) the office for the sittings, that works as a linkage between 
the parliamentary bureaucracy and the groups about the communication and the 
                                                          
11
 The Secretary for the sitting (one or more according to the size of the groups), even if not included in 
the procedural spending mechanisms, carries out a fundamental function for the works of the sittings, 
informing about their schedule and acting as a point of reference for the parliamentary group members in 
the floor activities such as the taking of the floor, the timing of the speeches and an informal coordination 
in voting. 
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organization of the plenary and committee sittings. The administrative offices support 
the organisational and administrative activities of the group. 
  
 Figure 4.2 Basic internal organization of a parliamentary group (employees) 
 This quasi-departmental division partly affects the patronage mechanisms and 
also patronage motivations depends on the nature of the jobs, according to the principle 
“Find the man for the job, not the job for the man”12. These assumptions will be directly 
tested in the empirical research.  
4.4 INDIVIDUAL PATRONS: THE INSTITUTIONAL OFFICE-HOLDERS.  
A further sub-institution that offers resources for patronage is represented by the 
institutional office-holders, deputies or senators that serve as chairpersons of 
committees (standing or not) or as members of internal apical boards, such as the 
Bureau
13
. The rationale under this patronage opportunity, explicitly allowed by both the 
Houses, does not differ from the motivations that consent patronage to the 
parliamentary groups: concerns the effective and proper working of the offices, 
expecting that additional efforts are demanded to the office-holders because of their 
role. In this section we present a mapping of these patrons and examine the nature of 
these offices with its possible consequences on patronage motivations. 
                                                          
12
 This slogan was used by Mrs. Thomas Red Powell, of Massachusetts (National League of Women 
Voters) in the campaign for a better government. (Madera Tribune, Number 54, 7 January 1936). 
13
 At the Chamber of Deputies, this matter is ruled by the presidential decree 2nd may 1997, n. 42. Other 
information and data are not available given the strict access to administrative documents of both the 
Houses. In 2012, the Chamber reduced the salary of all the institutional office-holder staffers by 25%. 
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a) Members of the Bureau 
Facilities in term of staff -albeit in different quantity related to the office- are 
allowed to all the members of the Bureau, the body responsible for the administrative 
coordination and management of the Chamber and of the Senate (Deodato, 2002a). 
After the election of the Speaker, four deputy Speaker, three Quaestors and eight 
Secretaries have to be elected in order to establish the Bureau. All the Parliamentary 
Groups existing at the time of the election of the Bureau must be represented in it and, 
before the voting, the Speaker encourages agreements between the Groups (Rule 5 rC, 5 
rS). The electoral system (a limited vote with two preferences for the deputy speakers, 
two for the quaestors and four for the secretaries) guarantees and facilitates the role of 
the minorities whereas, at the Chamber, the Speaker, for its super partes and neutral 
position, is elected with three different quorums: the two thirds of the members of the 
Assembly in the first ballot, the two thirds of the votes including in the votes the 
blanked ballots in the second poll and after it the absolute majority of the voters (Rule 4 
rC)
14
. 
As mentioned in the second section, the Bureaus, chaired by the Speakers, 
constitute the collegial body with the highest responsibilities in the administration of the 
parliamentary apparatus (r. 2, rSPC), deciding the yearly amount of the financial 
resources necessary for its working and adopting the budget and norms or rules about 
the internal arrangement of the offices and the personnel (r. 12, rC, rS). It holds also the 
power to fix the penalties to MPs for their misconduct during the parliamentary works 
and authorized the constitution of the new groups, deciding also about the complaint 
related to it and to the composition of the committees. Some sub-committees are 
established with a narrow composition, oriented to coordinate the policies of specific 
sectors such as communication, safety and security, personnel management, equal 
opportunities and documentation quality.  
Beyond the overall view, different functions respond to each different office that 
take part to the Bureau, in so assuming a different political weight and a different power 
                                                          
14
 At the Senate the quorums differ: absolute majority in the first two ballots; absolute majority of the 
votes cast, including blank papers at the third ballot; runoff ballot between the first two candidates with 
the largest number of votes, won by the candidates that obtain largest number of votes (r. 4 rS). 
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of moral suasion. The Speaker represents the House, chairs the debates ensuring the 
compliance with the Rules (rule 8, rC, rS) and is substituted in turn by the four deputy-
speakers (rule 9, rC, rS). The rC appears to give more relevance to this office than the rS 
does: the vice-presidents “collaborate with the President” in the lower house whereas in 
the upper house they “represent the Senate at official ceremonial offices”. 
The three Quaestors (usually two from the majority groups, one from the 
opposition) supervise jointly the effective working of the House, secured by the 
Speaker; exert relevant powers in spending matters and draft the budget to present to the 
Bureau (rule 10, rC, rS).  
The Secretaries, instead, assist in rotation the Speaker during the sittings in 
practical activities such as calling the roll or checking the results of the vote and 
overview the drafting of the minutes of the sittings (Deodato, 2002b). If the number of 
groups grow during the legislature, the number of the Secretaries (one for each new 
group) is likely to increase in order to guarantee the representation of all the groups 
within the Bureau
15
.  
All these offices presuppose considerable efforts in term of tasks to accomplish 
or meetings to prepare and attend
16
. This commitment that justifies, according to the 
parliamentary internal rules, the concession of a facilitating staff paid by the Parliament, 
but contractually bound to the chairperson in a fiduciary relationship that ends when the 
patron wants. 
Some technical differences exist between the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate of the Republic in the process of attributing the budget. If at the Senate the 
budget is fixed on a simple quantitative base with a certain amount of money, at the 
Chamber this process is mediated by the correspondence of each contract to a not fixed 
                                                          
15
 An unwritten rule, consolidated in the practice and confirmed by the political negotiation that precedes 
the vote for the secretaries, assigns one secretary to one member of Sudtirol Volkspartei, the regional 
party based in Bolzano’s province that represents the linguistic minorities. 
16
 For this reason, the rC and, not directly, the rS recognize the possibility to absence during the votes if 
they are occupied, out of the houses, for institutional activities (missione). In this case, their daily 
allowance is not diminished. At the Chamber, when the institutional office-holder are in missione, they 
are considered in the calculation of the legal number (r. 46.2, rC). At the Senate, instead, they are not (r. 
108.2, rS). These rules are valid for all the institutional office-holders. 
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percentage of the salary provided to an official of the IV or the V level. This is valid for 
all the staffers of the institutional office-holders. 
b) Committees’ Chairpersons 
The most part of the parliamentary legislative work takes place in the standing 
committees, simplifying entities that in the most part of the cases constitute the first and 
immediate place for the legislative debate (Elia, 1961). Committees respond mainly to 
an internal subdivision of the workload basically organized by issues in the assignment 
of bills to discuss, draft and vote in a preliminary step. For their preparatory nature and 
huge efforts required in their functioning, committees’ works are expected to affect the 
clarity of the laws (Murgia, 2012), leaving a minor space for the changes during the 
plenary sittings. Committees also could express opinions about bills examined in other 
committees only about the matters closely related to their field of interest. Hearings -
even investigative- and questioning could be inserted in the schedule of the committees, 
making these internal bodies an inescapable point of reference for the general 
parliamentary activities. The Rules of Procedure individuates fourteen standing 
committees at the Chamber and at the Senate (rule 22 rC; rule 22 rS). 
 In the establishment phase, the parliamentary groups appoint their own members 
to the standing committees, with an equal allocation in each committee and obviously 
replicating the political scenario of the plenary assembly. No deputy may be appointed 
to more than one Committee at the Chamber (rule 19, rC) while at the Senate a slightly 
exception is valid for the members of the XIV committee that could take part in two 
committees (rule 21, rS). On the first meeting, each committee should elect its own 
Bureau composed of a Chairperson, two Vice-Chairpersons and two Secretaries (Rule 
20 rC, rule 27 rS). The duration of these offices lasts two years from the date of their 
establishment, after this period their members may be confirmed. Internal variations 
could occur during the two-years period in a process coordinated by the single 
parliamentary groups that could internally substitute their representatives. 
The chairpersons of the Committees represent each committee and convene and 
chair their meetings holding a relevant power of agenda-setting (rule 21.1, rC), however 
shared with the committee bureau and often with the leaders of each group represented 
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in the committee (Della Sala, 1993; Fasone, 2014). Considered their influence on the 
working of the committees -always subjected to their duty to protect the opposition 
rights, as expressed in the general setting of the rule of procedures-, they are usually 
individuated among the parties that support the government on the basis of political 
negotiation and so are established after the cabinet formation. The latter bargaining is 
expected to affect this “chair patronage”, usually balanced with a perspective that tries 
to find an equilibrium between the two houses
17
. 
 CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES  SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC 
I.  
Constitutional Affairs, Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers and Interior Affairs 
1
a
 Constitutional Affairs, Affairs of the Presidency of 
the Council of Ministers, Interior Affairs, 
Organisation of the State and the Public 
Administration 
II.  Justice 2a Justice 
III.  Foreign and European Community Affairs 3 a Foreign Affairs, Emigration 
IV.  Defence 4 a Defence 
V.  Budget, Treasury and Planning 5 a Economic Planning, Budget 
VI.  Finance 6 a Finance and Treasury 
VII.  Culture, Science and Education 
7
 a
 Education, Cultural Properties, Scientific 
Research, Entertainment and Sport 
VIII.  Environment, Territory and Public Works 8
 a
 Public Works, Communications 
IX.  
Transport, Post and Telecommunications 
9
 a
 Agriculture and Food Production 
X.  
Economic Activities, Trade and Tourism 
10
 a
 Industry, Trade, Tourism 
XI.  
Public and Private Sector Employment 
11
 a
 Labour, Social Security 
XII.  
Social Affairs 
12
 a
 Health 
XIII.  Agriculture 
13
 a
 Environment, Environmental Properties and the 
Land 
XIV.  
European Union Policies 
14
 a
 European Union Policies 
Table 4.6. Standing committees in Italian Parliament. 
                                                          
17 An exception to this unwritten rule occurred in 1976, at the time of compromesso storico with the 
involvement of Communist Party in the parliamentary majority, when some Communist MPs were 
elected as committee chairpersons (De Caro, 2011, 143). A recent confirmation to this rule, instead, was 
provided in July 2015 when, at the Chamber, at the end of the two-years period committee chairpersons 
belonging to Forza Italia were not confirmed after the passage of the group in the ranks of the opposition. 
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  The tables below. present the distribution of committee chairpersons between 
the majority parties in last three Parliaments, indicating their share of seats to trace a 
certain proportionality in this distribution happened at the beginning of the legislature. 
This allocation process resembles a high -and probably the most evident- form of intra-
coalitional patronage in the light of the dynamics explained in the first section of the 
previous chapter.  
Although the political and policy weight of some committees such as the I and 
the V for their leading role in the formation of the law is not considered, the figures 
reflect the fragmented scenario and the internal tension within the majority already after 
2006 vote with a crowded negotiation and some difficulties in reaching the agreement at 
the Senate. The scheme of the last two legislatures shows in the 2008 case an 
incontestable simplification with a two-groups alliance at the beginning of the term, 
when the committees are composed while in 2013 the “simplification” comes directly 
from the große koalition deal made by three-groups. 
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Beyond the internal value of the office of committee chairperson, this chair 
actually takes on greater relevance also in its external projection, especially for the 
sector and the stakeholders that the committee focuses on. Usually selected not only by 
political criteria, but also by competence and expertise on the issues that the relative 
committee will deal, the chairpersons are acknowledged as experts in those issues and 
so have particular advantages in terms of network building with the stakeholders and 
media exposure.  
They are supposed to be also in constant contact with the executive and the 
ministers whose activity turns around the common subject matters and with the Speaker 
that can convene the Conference of the Committee Chairperson. As a consequence, they 
tend to be more influential than other MPs not only in their group, but also in their 
House and in the Parliament. As far as we know from informal information gathered 
during the interviews, their staff is composed from three to six persons. 
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c) chairpersons of bicameral committees and others 
 
The prevailing role and influence of standing committees does not exclude the existence 
of other collegial bodies with chairpersons elected among MPs according to the chair 
patronage pattern. Also in these cases the chairpersons have at disposal a certain amount 
of budget provided by the Chamber or the Senate in order to build a staff
18
. We briefly 
examine here a list of these bodies, explaining their functions. 
Bicameral committees are established both by constitutional provisions and 
laws. The first case concerns the Committee for Regional Affairs (art. 126, Const.) with 
consultative functions about the dissolution of the regional councils (and about the bills 
that contain provisions on regional powers, according to art. 102.3 rC, art. 40.9 rS); the 
second case includes a wide set of committees with inquiry, address or control power 
about specific issues. 
The inquiry committees (art. 82 Const.) could be bicameral (constituted by law) 
or monocameral (constituted by a resolution) and are composed by the representatives 
of the group in proportional way. They are usually chaired by MPs that support the 
majority and have the “same powers and limits of the judicial authorities” (rC. 141.2, rS 
162) (Dickmann, 2009). There are no requirements for the members and the 
chairpersons, but usually an expertise of the object to inquire or interests related to the 
constituency lead the composition. 
The most relevant address and control committees at bicameral level are the 
Committees for the address and the vigilance in the radio and television sector (Rai) and 
the Parliamentary Committee for the Security (Copasir). Acting as parliamentary 
scrutiny on sensitive issues such as communication in public service and national 
security, both of them are usually chaired by members of the opposition.  
Special committees are necessary, instead, at the beginning of the legislature 
when the standing committees are still not composed, as happened in 2013 to convert 
the law-decrees in law. In general, their activities are increasingly low. 
A further set of bodies is established for internal goals. The so-called giunte and 
jurisdictional committees represent the branch through which the domestic jurisdiction 
                                                          
18
 In the case of bicameral committees, the budget for the chairperson staff is at the expense of the 
Chamber if the chairperson is a deputy and at the expense of the Senate if the chairperson is a senator. 
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is exerted. The Committee for the Authorization to Prosecution 
19
 and the Committee 
for the Election (unified at the Senate in one committee) are mainly called to evaluate 
respectively the requests from the judicial authorities about coercive measures upon 
MPs and the full entitlement of the elected candidates to serve as MP. Both committees 
are chaired by the members of the opposition as a counterweight and a guarantee of the 
best functioning
20
. Also the chair of the jurisdictional internal committees guarantees a 
limited amount of budget for the external personnel. 
Other committees are constituted as delegations in parliamentary assemblies of 
bodies such as Nato, European Council and Osce. For its rotating presidency (a turn 
every 10 months), it is interesting to mention also the Committee for the Legislation, 
instituted at the Chamber in 1998 to assess with opinions the formal quality of the bills 
examined in the standing Committees. 
 The total sum of the expenses for the staff of all the individual patrons (members 
of the bureau, committee chairpersons and others offices considered so far) are 
summarized in this table. 
 
 
CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES 
SENATE OF THE 
REPUBLIC 
TOTAL 
2012 14.600.000,00 15.384.381,91 29.984.381,91 
2013 11.300.000,00 11.107.147,69 22.407.147,69 
2014 10.300.000,00 9.602.850,87 19.902.850,87 
TOTAL 36.200.000,00 36.094.380,47 72.294.380,47 
Tab 4.10 Funds for staff of institutional office-holders from 2012 to 2014 (€).  
Our elaboration from Chamber of Deputies and Senate final budgets 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 The Bureaus of these Committees compose the bicameral Committee for the prosecution of the 
President of the Republic, regulated by constitutional law 1/1989. 
20
 Other Giunte are the Rule Committee chaired by the Speaker in both the houses and, only at the Senate, 
the Committee for the Library and Historical Archive.  
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d) MPs without any institutional office 
 
In a very extensive sense, we can consider as individual patrons even the 
“simple” MPs. The reason why we include them in this list, even if they do not hold any 
institutional office, is mainly connected to an economic factor. In addition to the 
allowances and the expenses, both the Chamber and the Senate recognize to MPs a 
special entry: the reimbursement of the expenses for activities related to their office. 
Part of this public money should be allocated for the contracts of aides that 
facilitate MPs’ works. Actually this kind of patronage is so scattered and depending on 
individual factors that it appears difficult to outline its mechanisms. For this reason, we 
mention here its existence, but we do not consider it in the empirical research.  
 
 
CHAMBER OF 
DEPUTIES 
SENATE OF THE 
REPUBLIC 
TOTAL 
2012 23.250.000 21.097.000 44.347.000 
2013 27.900.000 16.100.000 44.000.000 
2014 27.900.000 16.100.000 44.000.000 
TOTAL 79.050.000 53.297.000 132.347.000 
Tab. 4.11 Funds for the reimbursement of the expenses related to the MP office. (€)                                                       
Our elaboration from Chamber of Deputies and Senate
21
 final budgets. 
 
It is worthy to offer here a comparative perspective in order to point out the 
Italian anomaly and its (non)regulation
22
: this long-standing problem has been also 
discussed by the Bureau at the Chamber in 2012, hoping for a legislative innovation 
inspired also to the best practice in Europe. The matter was debated also in the floors of 
the Chamber when a bill passed in October 2012, but its iter (AS 3508) was interrupted 
at the Senate because of the end of the legislature. 
                                                          
21
 At the Chamber, in January 2012, the contribution “elected-electors” has been substituted by the 
reimbursement of the expenses for activities related to their office. At the Senate, in November 2012, a 
modification to the rule replaced the “contribution for activities to support senators” (art. 1.8.3 of the 
budget, allocated to parliamentary groups) with the reimbursement for the expenses related to the office 
(1.2.4). 
22
 For a comprehensive re-examination, see the preparatory dossier n. 399/2012 to Senate works on the 
bill AS 3508 (Study Service, Senate of the Republic). 
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The bill tried to recognize the figure of the parliamentary assistant, proposing a 
full institutionalization of this role within the Parliament structures, without any effect 
on the parliamentary bureaucracy, and asking for a greater involvement of the 
parliamentary administration in this practice both in terms of control and payment.  
The European experiences offer a many-sided regulation: in the European 
Parliament, a differentiation between local and accredited assistant exist
23
. The first are 
linked to the MEPs with contracts of employment under national private law and work 
in their country of election, whereas the latter work in the European Parliament 
buildings and are paid from it. All the names of the assistants and the respective MEPs 
are published on the website, securing the due degree of transparency. At the beginning 
of each legislature, the EP Quaestors fix the maximum number of assistants that each 
MEP could hire (art. 9.4, EP Rule of Procedures) 
The French National Assembly allows to the deputies a financing up to three 
assistants tied with the patron by private contracts. If the deputy does not use this 
financing both partly and wholly, this financing can be assigned to the parliamentary 
group. A similar arrangement is stated at the Senate, where the senators are the 
employers and can hire three full-time assistants or six part-time assistants. 
In Spain, the so-called Personal Eventual (r. 2 of the Rules of the Personnel at 
Cortes Generales) provides the direct and trusty aid to the members of the Bureau, the 
Committees Chairpersons and the single parlamentarians. As in the Italian context, 
these jobs are distributed formally by the Speaker upon the proposal of the MP and their 
salary is calculated on the base of the rules applied for the parliamentary bureaucracy. 
The contract lasts until the MP remains in charge of the office. In detail, the Congreso 
data show that, by the 31
st
 December 2014, 240 persons worked as Personal Eventual 
(one for each Committee Chairperson, two for each member of the Bureau with no 
distinction between deputies-speakers and secretaries). 
Lastly, each member of the House of Commons in UK receives from 2009 an 
allowance for the Staffing Expenditure whose control and payment procedure are 
assigned to an independent agency (Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, 
IPSA). Casual, fixed term, permanent contracts could be signed according to the 
                                                          
23
 As stated by the Council Regulation (EC) No 160/2009 of 23 February 2009 amending the Conditions 
of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities. 
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exigencies of the MP. Also internship contracts could be provided. The salaries should 
respond to certain standards fixed by IPSA. Three main figures of parliamentary 
assistants are individuated: the Secretary/Office Manager, that usually cares about MP 
agenda and meetings; the External Relations Manager that cares about the relationship 
with stakeholders or the constituency; the Research/Parliamentary assistants focused on 
policy studies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PARTY PATRONAGE IN ITALIAN PARLIAMENT: 
THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
The groups are our only real party. Our initiatives originate there  
and we need the best persons in order to achieve the best result. 
(An interviewee) 
 
In the two previous chapters we have taken into consideration and examined the 
actors and the possible objects of exchange involved in patronage relationships: parties 
and Parliament, the latter in this research assumed as an essential part of the state. On 
one hand we have analysed the parties, the party system and their transformations, both 
at organizational, electoral and financial level. On the other hand, we have assessed the 
function of the Parliament and its internal working and structures in Italy, identifying 
the spaces for patrons and their nature. 
The acquisition of all elements and potential factors involved in patronage 
brings us to formulate some hypotheses also in the light of previous analyses about 
patronage already discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation. The following 
hypotheses will be tested in the empirical research, in a synchronic approach that 
portrays the parliamentary patronage as it is and not its evolution across the time. 
H1 Party patronage in Parliament has a limited extent. Its quantity is though not 
insignificant. 
The differences between parliamentary apparatus on one hand and other apparatus, such 
as ministries, non-departmental agencies-bodies and executing institutions in Italian 
system, already objects of previous researches about patronage, describe a different 
degree of penetration by the party influence, excluding the distribution of appointments 
in strict sense. Parties hold a well-defined power to distribute jobs according to the rules 
and norms set by the administration and the parlamentarians in their administrative 
apical roles. The scattering of patronage, albeit not concentrated in few institutions, has 
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only a superficial anchoring without any ability to gain entrance in the administration at 
any level. 
H2 Reward motivations prevail compared to control motivation in the selection 
of the clients in Parliament, but they are limited by the functional demands. 
The nature of the jobs allocated as parliamentary resources could motivate the 
distributive criteria that patrons, both individual or collective, follow exerting their 
power. These consolidated practices do not imply a substitutive value to the existing 
bureaucracy that keep reining the administration in: the control motivations emerged in 
the previous studies about the public ‘managerial patronage’ are supposed to disappear, 
making room for the reward motivations and using them as a post-electoral resource. 
The reward motivation works as a facilitator just at the beginning of the relationship, 
since the patrons are interested in building a staff functional to the demands arisen from 
the practical exercise of their mandate. 
H3 Party linkages help, but always filtered by expertise and personal networks. 
Parliamentary groups and individual patrons, as a “department” of the parties within the 
institutions, are supposed to choose their clients from an array of party activists or 
workers and assign them internal positions in their staff both at top and high level, but 
the affinity with a party is a condition neither necessary nor sufficient. The evolution of 
reward motivation illustrated above is indeed symmetrical to the evolution of the 
importance of party networks in patronage mechanisms, connected to a minimum set of 
professional skills from which patrons take advantage. The residual role of the party is 
then demonstrated by the strength of the personal networks. 
H4 Elections affects timing and mechanisms of patronage distribution, 
providing in case of the primary elections a new source of recruitment. 
The availability of resources already after the elections, at the beginning of the 
legislatures, makes possible for the parties to estimate the number of clients that could 
be satisfied when they install themselves in parliamentary structures. Patrons could 
decide to leave some spaces for personnel to hire on the occasion of other intermediate 
elections (European or local) or at the end of the legislature close to the new national 
  
137 
elections. Equally, new forms of elections, such as the primary elections for the 
nomination of MPs in the party lists, are expected to influence the recruitment of 
clients, receiving a preferential treatment in the distribution. 
5.1 THE METHOD AND THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 Our empirical research is inspired by - and learns from- the study conducted in 
fifteen countries by Kopecky, Mair, Spirova and other scholars (2012) that defined so 
far patronage in the most innovative and useful meaning for our analysis. Since their 
study anchors that research mostly within a governmental environment intertwined with 
party government, this dissertation necessarily departs from that theoretical and 
empirical experience in many aspects and requires a partially alternative method for the 
correct and exhaustive comprehension of the phenomenon. 
 Scholars have adopted different approaches to measure patronage concept in 
their research. Kopecky and Spirova (2012) have collected them in four categories: 1) 
patronage recipients survey approach 2) career pathway analysis of the patronage 
recipients 3) aggregate indicators. 4) expert estimates. No one of these, in its pure 
essence, completely respond to our needs in this almost primordial stage of the research 
about the topic. Aggregate indicators are not easy to be built in the lack of data about 
this practice. An exclusive focus on patronage recipients would assess our hypothesis in 
the wrong way, since patronage is not in the hands of the clients. Equally, asking 
experts opinions and impressions about a matter that they do not handle directly could 
lead to misleading representations. 
This research takes into account all these approaches in a first preparatory step, 
preliminarily to the interviews from which we try to build a dataset. Experts and clients 
and experts are considered as facilitators in explaining how the arenas for patronage are 
set and established, why clients ask for patronage and how they come in touch with 
patrons. Fifteen interviews in conversational way with open questions about procedures 
and client mechanisms have been held to three high-ranked officials at the Chamber of 
Deputies, two high-ranked officials at the Chamber of Deputies and ten clients with a 
long experience within the Parliament structures. 
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This preliminary work just prepares the ground for a more demanding effort: 
patrons have to be directly addressed in order to achieve worthwhile results and 
explicatory findings. Their point of view could unveil from the top the patronage 
practices, casting new light on their discretional power to distribute jobs. 
Following the mapping of the potential patrons -and the consequent patronage 
opportunities- developed in the fourth section, we have essentially individuated three 
main patrons: the parliamentary groups as collective patrons, the member of the 
Bureaus and the institutional office-holders at individual level. 
So parliamentary patronage has been studied by a dataset of 64 interviews to 
patrons as privileged witnesses, selected from the two last parliamentary terms (XVI 
and XVII), from 2008 until today. The effective number of interviewees is slightly 
lesser since some of them have been patrons or co-patrons in both the terms, outlining 
so a diachronic and very opportune perspective. Interviews were conducted from 2013 
to 2015, involving influential members of Parliament (Quaestors, secretaries of the 
Bureau, committee chairpersons and members of the board of the parliamentary groups 
as its representatives)
1
. Also political personnel at top-level in the parliamentary groups 
(administrative chiefs, responsible for financial activities of the parliamentary groups, 
and organization coordinator, responsible for legislative, media and other offices as a 
whole) have been included in the interviews, given their important role as supervisors of 
the patronage process. 
For an authentic representativeness, the distribution of the patrons among the 
interviewees has been weighed according to their capability to distribute resources: 
groups have at disposal a larger amount of money compared to the members of the 
Bureau in their whole and committee chairpersons. Also the ratio of each kind of 
patrons to the total number of patrons has been considered as a measure to adjust the 
internal subdivision of the interviewees. Particular attention has been then deserved to 
represent majority and opposition groups in the proper way. The final scheme is 
                                                          
1
 This research takes substantial advantage from a scattered fieldwork lasted almost two years in 
Parliament, mainly in the Chamber of Deputies. This not deliberate approach had several positive 
consequences on the findings of this study, such as for example a higher probability to receive sincere and 
complete answers from the interviewees and a thorough inside perspective that enabled us to arrive where 
an outside observer may not get. 
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reported in the Appendix, showing that all the parties represented in Parliament, even 
the anti-system parties, use patronage. Whether they use more or less than the others is 
not a question that we want to debate here. 
 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of individual and collective patrons in the interviewees 
The interviews were guided through a semi-structured questionnaire with a 
conversional strategy, guaranteeing the anonymous management of the answers with no 
specific references here to their party. An exception to this is represented by the 
question about the role of primary elections, held only by Democratic Party and Sel. 
The first part of the questionnaire is mainly borrowed and adapted from that used by 
Mair and Di Mascio in their studies, sharing with them their goals in a different 
environment. Each individual answers about its direct and personal experience. Q1 asks 
the patrons about the patronage opportunities for parties allowed by the Parliament 
itself. The same interrogative has been object of discussion in the first-stage 
conversations with clients and experts. The three sub-dimensions of patronage (depth, 
quantity, range) are investigated respectively through Q1a (asking at what level the 
distribution occurs, three possible answers: Low/intermediate/high, graded with 1/2/3), 
Q1b (asking how much parties distribute, five possible answers: Little/ enough/ much/ 
very much, graded with 1/2/3/4), Q1c (asking how many internal institutions are 
involved: Few/ several/ a lot/ all). Later, Q2 investigates the motivations at the basis of 
the distribution (three answers: Interest in rewarding their loyal party activists and 
members/ The full functioning of their presence within the Parliament / Control the 
  
140 
institution by having personnel linked to the party), whereas Q3 assesses the criteria that 
guide the distribution (professional qualification/political link/personal allegiance). 
These questions were proposed twice, firstly asking for just a single option and 
secondly for two options combined. 
The remaining part of the questionnaire is mainly hold in conversational way 
and open questions, observing:  
1) the turnover of the clients (Q4) trying to evaluate the renewal and the 
persistence of the clients, and indirectly the frequency of patronage 
distribution within a legislature;  
2) the effect of group splits (Q5), supposed to reduce the resources for 
patronage and reset patronage relationships, letting “survive” only some 
clients; 
3) the influence of the elections (Q6-Q9) in the distribution of the resources, 
distinguishing between the initial step when most part of the resources are 
distributed (here almost assessing again the reward motivation), the 
intermediate stage, when other elections occur at local or supranational level 
and at the exit stage, when parties get ready for the new elections. Q9, 
instead, introduces the impact of primary elections on the distribution of 
patronage. This question has been addressed only to those patrons whose 
parties run such kind of internal elections. 
Lastly, a focus on the parliamentary group will be developed, also assessing the 
party allegiance in each internal department. Through Q10, indeed, we ask collective 
patrons to rank from 1 to 5 (1=insignificant, 5= highly significant) the level of party 
allegiance / affiliation in the Legislative Office, in the Press Office, in the Office for the 
sittings/Administrative office/ Other. The internal structures of the individual patrons 
have a differentiated composition according to the organizational and functional needs 
of the single patron and so make meaningless to ask such question to them. 
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All the answers were gathered in three main datasets: total answers, total 
answers by individual patrons, total answers by collective patrons. The list of the 
questions is reported in the Appendix. 
5.2 DEPTH, QUANTITY AND RANGE OF PARTY PATRONAGE IN 
PARLIAMENT 
In order to assess the extent of party patronage in Parliament, we consider it as the 
sum of three different dimension: the depth, that is at what level the distribution of jobs 
arrive considering all the apparatus; the quantity, how many jobs are at disposal of the 
patrons; the range, how many internal institutions, not only political, are involved in the 
patronage practices. 
The pervasiveness of parliamentary patronage in the eyes of the patrons is finally 
situated on a middle value that almost resembles a compromise/balance between the 
quantity of contracts and their inability to install the party within the administration. 
With the words of an interviewee, “the jobs for me are important, but for the 
administration they are a wallflower, letting apart the costs”.  
The additional value of these jobs for the patrons does not correspond to the residual 
value for the bureaucracy that refer them just as a trait d’union with the MP or the 
groups. From it derives that the crowd of the patronage recipients, still numerically non 
defined, remains stable on the surface, distributed in a remarkable set of political 
internal bodies or institutions that though become smaller considering the whole array 
of services and offices under the responsibility of the Secretary-General. 
The perception of depth is slightly stressed for the collective patrons mainly for the 
occurrence of a peculiarity: a special category of clients that actually do not need to find 
any patron. According to the rules, the so called Allegato A
2
 provides a list of persons 
that for particular conditions (stipulated in the past) were essentially hired by the 
Parliament with no objective public procedure and allocated formally in the Mixed 
Group. They can be called by the other groups that actually are almost forced to do it, 
since their budget is diminished if they do not. In this obscure middle way between the 
bureaucracy hired through competitive examinations and the jobs with a fixed duration, 
                                                          
2 Deliberation of the Bureau n. 79/1993 with following modifications and integrations 
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a noteworthy niche contributes to expand the depth of patronage in the Parliament, 
anticipating an evident persistence of the clients. 
SECTOR DEPTH QUANTITY RANGE INDEX 
Individual patrons 0,24 0,78 0,27 0,43 
Collective patrons 0,32 0,52 0,36 0,40 
Total 0,29 0,62 0,33 0,41 
 
Tab. 5.1 Extent of party patronage in Parliament 
The final index, presented in standardized values with a range from 0 to 1 (0=low, 
1=very much), is an average of the three other values, each one of them calculated 
internally in each sector as the average of the responses. The total index of each 
dimension is calculated weighting with a coefficient
3
 the greater relevance of the 
collective patrons rather than the individuals. The final index does not take into account 
this weighting intendedly. 
A specification is necessary about the quantity index: the individual patrons consider 
substantial the amount of resources at their disposal whereas the collective patrons 
evaluate them sufficient. Probably the answers are a little biased by the marginal utility 
of clients. The higher is the number of clients available for a single patron, the lesser 
will be marginal utility. On the contrary, in small contexts the marginal utility to have 
one more contract to distribute is higher. 
By the way, assessing the extent of party patronage here preludes essentially to 
weight the strength of the parties in changing the rules of the game at their advantage. 
Since the entire issue could be discussed within institutional bodies such as the Bureau, 
where extensions of the budget are possible if voted and internal measures in terms of 
personnel could be adopted, it depends on the external legitimacy of the parties whether 
increase or not range, depth and quantity of the patronage. 
In the last years, after a long season marked by the expansive management of the 
Parliament administration (and not only that one), the issue of the costs of politics has 
arisen almost like the only one priority that politics should face. Some interventions 
                                                          
3
 36 for individual patrons, 64 for collective patrons. The result is divided per 100. 
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have reduced actually their costs, but, to be honest, patronage opportunities have not 
varied in their extent. Their existence sounds like a traditional prerogative of the patrons 
- especially the individual ones- difficult to dismantle. 
5.3 WHY DO PATRONS DISTRIBUTE JOBS? 
The twofold essence of the parliamentary institutions that “hosts” both 
permanent bureaucracy (with its elites and other ordinary bureaucrats) and fixed-term 
political/institutional positions finds the best and clearest expression in the results 
related to patronage motivations in Parliament. As also explicated by the internal rules, 
patrons can rely on public resources just for the achieving of their administrative and 
functional goals. 
That is why the “clash” between reward and control motivation does not fully 
comprehend the possible motivations and a further motivation appears: the functioning 
motivation that we can define here as the control of the office and the connected 
activities that only in few cases could imply, in a quite very broad sense, the control of 
the institution.  
Here we mainly refer to the Bureaus whose members have a power to intervene 
about the situation of the administration, even if softened by the consensual (but not 
shared) management of the questions on the table. The preparatory work of these 
meetings is often -not entirely- demanded to the staff in order to provide a synthetic 
framework of the problem and a possible proposal of solution. Their influence is so 
mediated twice (by the patron in the first step and above all by the bureau).  
This rationale could be also valid -with prudence- for the staff of the main 
influential patrons such as the chairperson of the group or of the committee. In general, 
the patron themselves hold the control on the institution with their majorities, 
suggesting political inputs to the bureaucracy. In both cases, the clients come after and 
follow the processes accompanying their patron according to his or her political inputs. 
Apart from this very narrow and specific cases at top level, patrons have 
underlined their orientation in selecting “whoever works”, offering jobs in exchange of 
the achievement of regular tasks and assignments. As a consequence of the 
professionalization of the political staffs, the interviews seem to confirm this trend in 
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general, claimed nowadays almost as an urgency especially by the MPs that belong to 
small parties and groups, with less resources at disposal, more or less the same machine 
to manage and a lot of activities to organize in order to increase their presence and 
effectiveness in the parliamentary works.  
This feature is also present in the groups that represent local parties, forced to 
keep the ties with their constituency through an intense parliamentary and institutional 
work, and generally in opposition parties, called to be more active and alert than 
majority parties that usually rule the agenda. This happens also for other graspable 
reasons: majority parties have more resources at their disposal outside the Parliament, 
gained by their presence within the cabinet. 
The answer with single options
4
 put patronage as reward on the background not 
as a priority to fulfil, but as a motivation that has to cross the functional prerequisite and 
that alone is not sufficient. It is likely that, inherited from the past, this motivation finds 
more recognition within the parliamentary groups that through their elites have a 
stronger connection with the party than the simple MPs, but according to some 
“patronage supervisors”, the decrease of the resources at disposal that has concerned in 
last years both the groups and the parties has sifted that reward patronage devoid of any 
functional reasons. 
 
Figure 5.2 Motivation of patronage in Parliament (one option). Total 
                                                          
4
 The answer with double options are not reported graphically for their weak explanatory power. An 
overwhelming majority of the reward+ functioning motivation (99%) has been registered with a 
prevalence of the control + functioning in individual patrons’ motivation compared to the collective, as in 
the general trend. 
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Figure 5.3 Motivation of patronage in Parliament. (one option).  
Individual and collective patrons 
 
Reward motivations still resist in the distribution of low-ranked positions with 
less responsabilities and less demanding efforts. They tend to lower when the 
responsibilities are significant. Reward motivations may also conduct to short-term 
contracts focused on specific projects, not central in the activities of the patrons and 
with an accessory role not fully established and defined within the organization or the 
staff. The daily activities instead require functional-oriented personnel, with clear 
assignments and consolidated positions that could be confirmed in the next legislature. 
Parliamentary patronage could work as a post-electoral resource, not necessarily 
linked to the direct vote-seeking, but with the commitment in electoral activities, such 
as offline and online communication and a contribution in the campaign organization. 
Obviously this does not mean that the electoral headquarter directly moves itself within 
the Parliament after the elections. As we will see later, the elections provide occasional 
linkages with the patrons, but not always this tie is enough stable to guarantee a job. 
The decrease of the reward motivation alone confirms the gradual and steady 
weakness of the party within the society also as a political entity able to satisfy its 
activists, promoting them from outside to inside the buildings. The parliamentary staffs 
so stand as an ivory tower compared to the party, managed by party elites and elites of 
staffers. Probably other resources in terms of policies or money could be distributed 
from the center to the periphery and sometimes groups substitute the party as far as they 
can, not only in its representative function, but also in the organizational needs. The first 
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findings explained so far tend to outline a very soft form of non-bureacreautic 
clientelismo (reformulated from Kopecky, Scherlis 2008) with a distribution of discrete 
number of posts in non relevant levels of the administration; and the appreciable 
presence of reward as a motivation. 
5.4 TO WHOM DO PATRONS DISTRIBUTE JOBS? 
 The selection criteria adopted in patronage process sketch out the profile of the 
clients in Parliament, adding further confirmation to the growth of professionalization in 
political activities. Personal contacts and long-lasting relationships, initiated also 
outside the “building”, matter in a combined mix with an acknowledged degree of 
expertise and competence, not necessarily focused on specific issues. Party allegiance 
comes after, fuelling the linkage with common political values and identities and shared 
points of view on policy setting. 
Party networks seem more evanescent when individual patrons distribute. This 
could be explained by two reasons. Firstly, a shorter distance from the party in its 
organizational structure puts the parliamentary groups in a more frequent contact with it 
not only about the policy and political issues, but also about the organizational needs. 
Secondly, a more shared decision-making process in distributing jobs, exerted mainly 
within the boards or informally by its members in sub-groups, weakens generally the 
single personal networks and leaves enough space for an evaluation on the intensity of 
party affiliation, demonstrated across the time.  
 
Figure 5.4 Client profile in parliamentary patronage. (one option). Total 
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Party affiliation could contribute to get jobs from individual patrons when they 
recognize that their office is a benefit gained also by the party and basically shared with 
it. In this case, they could ask directly the party to suggest them some names or they 
already know the potential clients in combination with a personal tie. The more 
independent the individual patrons are, the less is likely that party allegiance will be 
taken into account, privileging personal networks over the rest. 
It is not rare to find in the largest groups -and also in those groups that resemble 
more a coalition of elected people with a low level of political homogeneity- some 
forms of internal factionalism even in the distribution of the jobs. This fact has a 
twofold interpretation: in this case factionalism could be seen both as a concentration or 
a sum of merely individual personal networks, all attributable to a certain faction, or -
more frequently- as a strong and staunch association to a community network with 
peculiar and distinct features.  
Often factionalized patronage in its original sense admits the coexistence of 
different sub-groups that contribute with their presence in the group to its budget and 
recognize them a minimal role. A correct use of factionalized patronage seems aimed at 
preventing conflicts in the organizational and political management of the group, with 
the secondary consequence that the real patrons here are the factions, leaving just a 
formal role to the collective patron. The professionalization of this kind of clients could 
be lower, remarking the reward motivation and assigning them not important functions. 
Without any political meaning and only with an organizational goal, the Mixed 
Groups follow a similar scheme recurring to an almost arithmetic apportionment among 
the sub-groups, in this case not politically connected one to another. This collective 
patron has a quasi-technical and formal function, dividing the resources and leaving 
directly full autonomy to each sub-group in their management. The sub-groups have not 
huge availability of jobs and if they represent political parties or association (usually 
equally small or local), a stronger party affiliation is registered. 
It is to be said that professionalization represents also a cure for the by-products 
of factionalism. Experts are often considered as third and impartial figures oriented to 
propose technical solutions (the best drafting of legislative and non-legislative acts or 
the individuation of resources to cover the expenses caused by policy proposals, for 
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example) not dependent on the policy or political content. In turn, this depends on the 
political input that the patrons address to them.  
From the answers of the interviewees it also emerges a nuanced form of party 
affiliation, a broader political allegiance, actually not related to the party membership 
card (in a general context with a decrease of the membership), but connected to the 
sharing of generic political values, often defined by difference (liberal or not, leftist or 
not). This “least common denominator” enhances the possibility to establish strong ties 
with the patrons, especially with the individual ones, that resist during the time also to 
the party transformations or failures. 
 
Figure 5.5 Client profile in parliamentary patronage (one option).                                             
Individual and collective patrons 
The mechanisms at the base of individual patrons’ choice appear guided by a 
consideration of the client as a trusted person in a face-to-face relationship. This trust 
can be based on personal reasons if the patrons already know their client for a common 
past experience, even outside politics, in which its skills have been already tested. In 
this case, given also the high turnover of MPs, a double learning process in a new 
environment could limit the possibility to effectively achieve even the minimal goals.  
That is why a certain stratification of different generations of clients, 
professionalized during the time, has occurred in the years, promoting a professional 
trust based on an evaluation of the previous experiences within the Parliament. The 
personal networks so also include the familiarity with former MPs, not necessarily from 
the same party, that can suggest some persons. This selection by-word-of-mouth-
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oriented gives a competitive advantage to the incumbent clients, in so diminishing the 
power of parties to distribute jobs by party affiliation. 
A brief mention deserves the distribution of jobs by the committee chairpersons. 
The professional requirements, very frequently demanded, are not necessarily linked to 
a specific knowledge of the subjects dealt with by the committees. A general 
comprehension of the parliamentary mechanisms and a command of public policy 
analysis are sufficient for the patrons to receive the proper political consultancy. For this 
reason, clients hold mainly political sciences and law degree and may have previous 
experience in public affairs companies. The high quality of preparatory dossiers and 
consultancy provided by the parliamentary bureaucracy without any political 
involvement diminishes the patrons’ dependence on their clients about this aspect.  
 
Figure 5.6 Client profile in parliamentary patronage. (two options). Total 
 
Figure 5.7 Client profile in parliamentary patronage. (two options).                                 
Individual and collective patrons 
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The mechanism explained so far partially changes when parliamentary splits 
occur. In such situation, a “selection within a selection” takes place because of the 
reduction of resources at disposal. Patronage relationships are affected on two sides. On 
one hand, the group A from which a sub-group of deputies splits has to select those 
clients to dismiss (if they decide that expenses for personnel have to be cut, as it usually 
happens). In this emergency situation, small reward patronage is at risk, letting prevail 
long-lasting clients. 
On the other hand, the new group B that led the split emerges as a new patron, 
drawing the interest of new clients and securing some jobs for their loyal staff both at 
personal or party level. Collective party switching, indeed, could help to increase the 
likeliness to save those old patronage relationships fostered by personal networks, 
rewarding also the faction affiliation. Professionalization always matter, but subordinate 
to other reasons. Some interviewees stated that the bigger the size of group B is, the 
more likely is for professionals to find opportunities. 
This trend gives us the opportunity to explain the role of personal networks 
within the parliamentary groups, a context that, for its nature, seems to promote them 
less than the individual patrons. All the interviewees, no matter the size of their group, 
agree that the chairperson of the group acts more as a coordinator of the distribution, 
sharing this process mainly with the treasurer and the administrative manager. At the 
beginning of the legislature, when the staffs are created, it is the board that manage the 
selection process. The personal networks are so related both to MPs that serve in the 
boards or to other MPs that support their hiring, quite often object of bargaining. 
It is clear that the patronage mobility is harder to be observed in those parties 
with long experiences, consolidated practices and trusted relationships: the most part of 
their staff serves as a group of clients that have just to wait the end of the elections 
before to come back at their office. On the contrary, as the 2013 elections show, the 
emergence of totally new political groups, not anchored within the old party system, 
improves the turnover of the clients, opening some space for the outsiders. This 
improvement is though constrained by a certain conservativism of the parliamentary 
rules that financially support the hiring of long-standing clients, in so contaminating the 
staffs. This is the case of Five Star Movement and Civic Choice.  
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5.5 PATRONAGE AND ELECTIONS 
The timing of patronage distribution does not appear conditioned by the elections held 
in the course of the legislature, both at European and local level. The reasons lie 
basically in the nature of the parliamentary groups, not supposed to serve as an electoral 
staff. They could contribute to the electoral campaigning by orienting their legislative 
and communication activities toward local issues or EU policies, but essentially the 
most part of the staff is hired at the beginning of the legislature without any massive, 
direct (or compulsory) involvement in the electioneering.  
Patronage is just rarely used as a pre-electoral/pre-reward resource in terms of 
personnel, especially in the small parties through contracts limited in the time. Some 
patrons, both individual than collective, argue that the low dependence on the groups in 
the electoral campaigning is not connected to the party’s ability to sustain by itself the 
electoral campaigning. On the contrary, it is exactly in this case that the difference 
between the parties and the parliamentary groups emerges as a constraint to the full 
development of the electoral activities. Also the different professional skills required in 
administrative or legislative practice play a key role: parliamentary staffs are not ready 
to face an electoral campaigning. 
As we have seen, the elections could affect the patronage practices immediately 
after the national campaign in order to partially reward the activists. The core of the 
staff, especially in the big groups, is though conditioned by the low turnout of the 
clients, a persistence of the staff that makes almost impossible for new clients to 
compete with them. This is the reason why the post-electoral motivations tend to 
disappear across the time in the groups that are present, with the same name or not, 
from long time. 
“Exit patronage” is not considered as a resource for the patrons, neither as a pre-
electoral tool. Budgets are planned at the beginning of the legislature without any 
orientation to spend money at the end. Usually the legislature ends almost two months 
before the election day: at the conclusion of the term, MPs reduce the intensity of their 
activities and are merely oriented to the building of alliances, the composition of the 
lists (quite decisive in the old electoral system) and the pursuit of a candidacy and a 
seat. This activity is mostly individual and consequently the clients in the collective 
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groups have not particular workloads. It can happen that by their choice, clients with a 
higher degree of party affiliation may contribute to the electoral campaigning. This 
choice is implicitly ‘forced’ when clients of individual patrons follow him or her in this 
preparatory work before the new elections in order to confirm their own position. Here 
personal networks are also implicated. The importance of the vote is double for the 
survival of both patrons and clients. 
The next nation-wide elections are though the litmus test for the parties’ 
resistance. Parliamentary groups related to parties with no chance to gain seats are or 
not related to any party experience a sort of dissolution in advance: their clients act in 
this step principally in terms of office-seeking behaviour, no matter the party or the 
provenience of the patrons. As for the individual patrons, local ties may encourage the 
strengthening of the relationships with a common involvement in the same 
constituency. 
The emergence of primary elections has been considered in the premises of the 
empirical research as an innovative tool to recruit new clients, opening new channels 
and occasions for people interested in working in politics at parliamentary level. The 
results contradict the hypothesis: for Democratic Party and Free, Ecology and Freedom, 
primaries at parliamentary level have not remarkable impact on the recruitment of 
clients (just the 9% of the patrons argues in the opposite sense, mainly individual ones). 
As we have discovered during the interviews, collective patrons suffer a certain 
persistence that we have not considered in the preliminary analysis. According to a 
patron, the patronage procedures represent “almost a ritual with no surprise, just like the 
primary elections in some cases”. The predictable results could condition the 
composition of the electoral staff, quite reduced if the efforts to win are not considerable 
(and this could be related to the general expenses in terms of money).  
To be honest, the low institutionalization of primary elections, especially at 
parliamentary level, makes difficult to generalize the trend observed, but the 
explanations provided by the patrons seem to indicate to same extent the prevalence of 
internal dynamics in the competition controlled by the parties, with scarce opportunities 
for the outsiders to ascend vertically to new positions, be them candidacies or jobs. This 
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preponderance of incumbents and insiders is not related only to the closed nature of the 
primaries. 
Long-time relationships are reinforced in primary elections that represent on one 
hand for the MPs’ staff a short and demanding electoral campaigning in a well-known 
context and on the other hand for the new comer’s staff an occasion to start a 
professional career challenging the existing situation. If the outsider registers a success 
at top level, it is possible a replacement of patronage by the leader. This is true for the 
national primaries that s-elected Matteo Renzi as the new Pd secretary, letting emerge a 
new party elite, even if not fully reflected within the parliamentary groups that were 
actually the expression the previous leadership. Once in the government, this elite with 
new inner circles has used also patronage, intended in broad sense, to change the 
situation around it (the reform-patronage), privileging personal networks with high 
personal trust and some political affiliation and rewarding also the fund givers. 
Even if primary s-elections mobilize the so-called party on the ground in formal 
and temporary way, asking for a legitimation that risks to fade some time later, the 
involvement of activists and party workers appears limited at local level and in a 
reduced lapse of time (two weeks at maximum), without any possibility to be promoted 
-if they want. 
Primaries have been a tool to recruitment just for the outsiders elected. This does 
not imply a total renewal of the clients, since they may change patron also at local level 
and contributes to the election of a new patron. In their first experimental episode, 
primaries have slightly modernized the public of the clients, with less probability to 
affect the parliamentary groups and more ability to penetrate among the individual 
patrons, including also the MPs without any institutional office. It is mainly in this 
category that clients may find good opportunities to success, supporting their patrons in 
the course of their political career firstly at local and then at national level. 
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5.6 A FOCUS ON THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS 
As we have proved in the first part of the empirical research, the parliamentary groups 
to same extent look like the last domain reachable by the parties. Often crossed by 
factionalism and internal divisions, the groups constitute the richest patron in 
Parliament, in so making them the most likely landing place for clients to satisfy with 
reward practices. 
 The last question of the interviews aimed at individuating the degree of party 
affiliation in each internal sector involved in the group activities. The final outcome 
introduces and confirms what we have advanced in the first chapter: party affiliation 
does not exclude professionalism, but actually makes it more meaningful and oriented 
to the political goals.  
The case of the press office clearly demonstrates this assumption: beyond the 
fulfilment of professional criteria (in this case the registration/subscription to an albo of 
journalists obtainable after several exams), a sort of partisan trust, more than personal, 
is necessary to achieve the best communicative performance, in a sector with a highest 
relevance and external impact. Also a ‘political’ trust lying on a common cultural 
background is sufficient, in times of eternal perturbation of patrons that can change 
label and redefine just partly policy platforms and internal structures and organization.  
The figure synthesizes the answers of patrons, providing standardized values 
with a range from 0 to 1 (0= insignificant, 1= highly significant). 
 
Figure 5.8. Party affiliation in internal bodies of parliamentary groups. 
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Other departments show lesser levels of party affiliation. This is due mainly to 
the nature of their tasks and to a stronger persistence of clients in those sector. 
Collective patrons, indeed, admit a limited turnover precisely in offices for the sittings, 
legislative offices and administrative offices. After a certain amount of time, 
communication professionals may need more stimulating work environment, looking 
for new job opportunities outside the ‘building’, but not without a political involvement, 
as the political interference on media could confirm in the best cases. 
It is also possible that people registered in ‘Allegato A’ are usually assigned to 
those functions (mainly offices for the sitting and administrative offices), diminishing 
the influence of party loyalty in those activities that take the form of almost routinary 
and ordinary work, with no political colour and involvement. 
Requiring considerable expertise for technical reasons, legislative offices are not 
usually domain of party influence, also for their impartial role in providing assistance to 
the parlamentarians. Lastly, in the big groups, the administrative offices could include at 
the top level people with previous strong party affiliation, later turned into a personal 
confidence in the management of the group. This is true also for the small groups, 
where, in addition, professional skills are taken into great account, especially in the new 
groups. 
Other departments or sub-departments could be constituted within the 
parliamentary groups. The ‘policy units’, for example, aim at preparing reports on bills 
or laws examined by the committees or into the floor or at collecting preliminary 
information for the drafting of the bills. The same tasks are institutionally assigned to 
some offices of the parliamentary bureaucracy, but their outcomes lacking any political 
and party sense could be not so helpful for the MPs. 
This work is usually demanded to young people with an appreciable academic 
background and a light party affiliation. In the groups, the pendulum switches from the 
‘job for the boys’ to the professional criteria, passing also by a given amount of fixed 
clients. In few cases, patrons admit the existence of former MPs within the group staff: 
they are hired as any other client, but with no specific roles and a certain degree of 
autonomy and independence, allowing them a sort of honorary reward. 
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In conclusion, the control of the party as a whole on the parliamentary groups 
seems quite scant compared to the past, as patrons with long experience describe. The 
evolutionary study of party patronage in Parliament is something that we leave to 
further researches. Here it has been our interest to highlight how parties take advantage 
from the state resources, in our case on parliamentary budgets. Creeping, but neither 
permanent in the space nor enduring in the time, the party influence conceived in strict 
sense, appears limited in Parliament to low level and temporary rewards and to some 
top level internal position in the parliamentary groups. They constitute a very fenced 
and delimited area within an institution that allows a limited quota of permeability just 
related to functional reasons.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study of party patronage in Parliament inaugurates a new current of 
multidisciplinary research situated at the intersection between political science, 
legislative studies and parliamentary law and procedures. 
Starting from the notion of party patronage as the power of party to appoint 
people to public or semi-public positions, this dissertation has developed and observed 
this practice in the parliamentary arena, a differently fertile ground for the installation of 
party patronage and the occurring of distributive processes that involves patrons and 
clients in exchanging jobs and expertise. 
In front of a potentially puzzling and misleading concept, the disentanglement of 
parliamentary patronage in all its many-sided expressions represents the starting point 
for further researches, also in the Italian experience, aimed at exploring in depth the 
relationship between the parties and the parliamentary structures, mainly filtered by the 
parliamentary groups in the case of that parliamentary patronage analysed through our 
empirical research. 
At the extreme degree one can say that two flows of patronage emerge: one from 
the state to the parties that claim for resources as clients -and are able to set them 
according to the rules as legislators and regulators- and another from the parties to the 
clients that search for a job. 
The concession of some circumscribed autonomous spaces is oriented to 
functional reasons and to the effective working of patrons’ activities, in so appearing as 
an exclave in the state, without any possibility to permeate its bureaucracy. In this case, 
the internal lottizzazione of public resources available in Parliament is conditioned by 
the rules and by the political dynamics, with the formation of the parliamentary groups, 
no matter which majorities and oppositions exist. 
The other forms of parliamentary patronage individuated deserve much more 
empirical attention. Each one of them could spread meaningful examples of how the 
parties acting as parliamentary groups or a sum of single MPs distribute or participate 
to/control the distribution of the public offices, be they at their disposal or not. 
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The allotment of portions of power through intra-party and inter-party agreements lies at 
the base of chair patronage, bestowing influence, control power and prestige on the 
recipient of the office. The manner in which this power to control is exerted -both at 
individual level with personal beliefs and as representative of a parliamentary group 
with specific policy orientation- could be an interesting field of research to build in the 
most comprehensive way the chair patronage model on the client perspective. 
Furthermore, a patron-oriented approach in chair patronage studies could contribute to 
better define the hierarchies and balance of power between majorities and oppositions or 
allies in executive coalitions. 
The external patronage in the hands of the Italian Parliament, as representative and 
expressive institution, guarantee-holder and institutional counterweight, has caused, in 
combination with degenerate particracy, distorted output in the public management and 
institutions, advancing lottizzazione not only in the media public company, but also in 
domains like the CSM, reachable by the factions. Originally this kind of patronage 
would respond to a democratic function and promote pluralism, representing all the 
social and cultural streams within the institutions. Like in the African ethnical 
patronage, the risk, or the by-product, is the internal reproduction and recomposition of 
external factionalism that could burden the institutional efficiency. Studies about 
external patronage could also point out the formation of the majorities in electoral 
processes in which the opposition should be included. 
Lastly, the inner patronage notion could help to explain how, how much and how 
often the bureaucratic elites circulate and conversely how they perpetuate themselves. 
Research about these practices could have a strong explanatory value in showing how 
the upper bureaucracies change ceteris paribus. The possible modifications of the rule 
of the game are always in the power of the parlamentarians within the competent 
bodies, but the strength of consolidated customs and lastly the incapability of a 
fragmented party system to reform the parliamentary rules could limit remarkable shifts 
in the paradigm. 
The findings of the empirical study on the Italian case let emerge three main trends 
in a general context little permeated by the parties: when patrons are represented by 
collective bodies as the parliamentary group, party networks and allegiance matter -
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though not excessively- in the distribution of patronage resources, combined with 
professional criteria, especially at top level; when individual patrons hold internal 
institutional offices and distribute jobs related to that office, they are likely to look more 
at personal networks in selecting their ‘clients’; the control function of patronage, 
stressed in previous studies about the phenomenon, fades making room for 
organizational and functional patronage. 
As a paradox, even the party patronage in Parliament reflects the decline of the 
parties: the parliamentary groups, the organizations that at maximum degree express and 
actualize in the floor and in the committee political values, identities, policies and 
commitments, constitute the last resistance of a weak party allegiance mixed to a certain 
level of professionalization at the top position and in some roles. 
The proliferation of the parliamentary groups through splits and new aggregations 
from party switching, not always connected with the emergence of new -successful- 
parties, worsens the situation, making party linkages less and less unstable. In such 
conditions, clients are aware that only an acceptable level of professionalization may 
ensure them a new patron, both individual or collective. As a consequence, the barriers 
that divide inside clients from outsiders are quite easy to be overcome, even if a certain 
persistence of the clients has emerged from the interviews as a heritage of the old 
structures, often merged among them. 
Personal linkages are obviously present in patronage relationships, always based on 
a minimal evaluation of the professional skills. Individual patrons are more exposed to 
this trend, since their power to distribute jobs is usually not shared with their 
parliamentary group and is considered, as it is, a prerogative of the office. 
Moreover, the scarce influence on the control of the institution has to be 
emphasized, restating the motivations at the base of the parliamentary patronage. 
Functional reasons prevail in the choice of the clients in a patronage linkage not 
necessarily long-lasting and anyway limited by the duration of the legislature. In this 
sense, we can define parliamentary patronage as a passing patronage on the surface that 
actually reproduce all the features of a job market, with its peculiarities. 
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In this research we have intendedly excluded a cross-party analysis, facilitating the 
first step of the study about the topic, also avoiding any meaningless comparison 
between the legislatures and the Chambers. This empty space could be filled in future 
with the increasing availability of data and information thanks to a less secretive, but 
fully legitimate orientation of the bureaucracy and a greater open-ness of the patrons, 
already demonstrated in this research during anonymous and private conversational 
interviews. The study of the patronage as conducted in this dissertation could be 
extended also to the regional assemblies, highlighting the role of the local party elites in 
distributive process and the permeation of the parties inside these institutions. 
All the considerations made so far about the enhancement of studies on party 
patronage in Parliament rely on two preliminary and unavoidable premises, one 
intertwined with another: 
1) Transparency helps to understand patronage and encourage study on patronage 
Patronage studies have undergone not only a transformation and an evolution in 
terms of conceptualization, but they suffered also from the lack of reliable data and the 
difficulties to operationalize the concept. Our research, based mainly on a patronage 
suppliers survey, would have not been equally significant with a quantitative approach, 
oriented to use aggregate quantitative indicators as proxy estimates for patronage jobs. 
The sources of information available do not clearly and fully provide the proper tools to 
the scholars to dissect the phenomenon by that method. The transparency of 
parliamentary budgets, both related to the whole administration and to the single 
groups, is nowadays taken for granted, but in some cases it is a recent achievement, 
slowed down during the time not only by the presence of a domestic jurisdiction. 
A full transparency of patronage practices in Parliament, with a lesser degree of 
discretion in making open the processes at informational level, will add new findings 
and explanations about parliamentary patronage features individuated so far and will let 
emerge new features. An open access to the documents -some of them until now 
unavailable even for MPs- and additional duties of transparency required to patronage 
recipients will clarify not only the regulatory framework in the use of public resources, 
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allowing a more effective systematization of the information collected, in the 
perspective of a career pathway analysis as well. 
 
2) Patronage is not an evil, but it is the fuel of democracy 
The second premise derives from the first one: the lesser hidden will be the 
patronage, the more accountable will be the patrons, the more accepted will be the client 
condition, often considered in contradiction with the exercise of the citizenship. 
Patronage has been so far considered as a matter for insiders, an exclusive practice ruled 
by elites of patrons and distribute to elites of clients. 
The professionalization of political and institutional staffs, confirmed by this 
research, seems to overrule this conventional wisdom: it is the degree of the 
professionalization that makes the difference in the selection of the clients. Personal 
channels could obviously facilitate the establishment of a relationship, but they are 
always filtered by a preliminary evaluation of the professional skills. Patronage adds 
expertise and competence to democracy, decreasing the level of partisanship in policy 
initiatives. 
In this sense, it is debatable the long-lasting assumption that patronage represents an 
evil, capturing public resources for party interests. The growing public scrutiny over the 
use of public money has surely forced the patrons -and the institutions that they 
represent-  to a more transparent management of these funds. One can discuss about the 
appropriateness and the quantity of the public resources made manageable by the 
parties, but the trends seem to indicate a substantial decrease in direct provisions, such 
as the public financing. 
Without a necessary quota of patronage, parties could not secure their correct 
functioning within the government and within the assemblies, overloading the work of 
bureaucracies and misleading their third and impartial functions. With this belief, we 
can say that the history of patronage is an history of democracy, concretely developed 
and exerted in its daily practices and activities, and that the correct use of patronage 
could provide new legitimation to the parties now acting as public utilities. This 
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consideration calls to mind the Popper saying, “institutions are like fortresses: they 
resist if garrisons are good”. 
A final reflection about the future of party patronage in Parliament is necessary in 
the light of the upcoming institutional changes: the electoral reform already enacted in 
law (l. 52/2015) that will come in force from July 2016 and the constitutional reform 
that will change the institutional arrangement if it will be approved by the confirmatory 
referendum in the next autumn. 
The new Italicum (a two-round system that secure the majority to winner) is 
expected to shape the party competition, leading probably to the formation of huge and 
catch-all party lists interested into achieving the highest possible percentage of votes 
already in the first ballot in order to overcome the 40% threshold. The structure of the 
runoff, without any resurrection of alliances and coalitions, is likely to produce big 
blocs with a variety of differences in policies and identities, but increasingly forced to 
an internal mediation or synthesis managed by the leader. A bi-party system should be 
the final result of the electoral process. 
The party fragmentation could though discourage these aggregations considering 
also the low threshold (3%) for the access into Parliament. As usual, the outputs of the 
new electoral law will be partly guided by the input of the political supply and 
obviously of the voters, with a strong influence of the party politics leaderization. 
Previous experiences, as after the 2008 elections, have already performed the 
composition of a simplified and essentially two-party system, deconstructed after few 
years by party splits in Parliament and the emergence of new political players, such as 
the M5S. For this reason, we believe that, with the same parliamentary rules, the 
endurance of Italicum outputs will be tested in the parliamentary arena, the place where 
cleavages occur and come back again about policies and chairs. 
As a consequence, the future parliamentary patronage could be affected by the 
reduction of the number of collective patrons, increasing their availability of resources 
thanks to the large number of MPs enrolled in it. The 3% threshold could permit to 
small parties to receive seats and form small groups, recognized not for numerical 
reasons, that may distribute little resources. Clients competition so could be directed to 
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the big groups and at the same time these groups could hire personnel with party 
allegiance. 
The total supply of patronage would change also in its mechanism because of the 
transformation of the Senate in a non-elected assembly that gathers local politicians. It 
will be particularly interesting to observe if patronage in the new scenario will be driven 
from above, as an extension of the local representatives, or if the existing model will 
persist, with party linkages - whether existent- formed at national level. Also the 
rearrangement of the Senate functions is expected to change the functions of clients in 
an institution less central both in the political debate and in the legislative process. 
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APPENDIX 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE   
 
Q1. Is this institution formally reachable by political parties? Do people linked to 
political parties have the power to distribute jobs within this institution? 
Q1a. If so, at what level? Low/intermediate/high 
Q1b. If so, how much? Little/ enough/ much/ very much 
Q1c. If so, in how many internal institutions? Few/ several/ a lot/ all 
Q2. Why do you actually distribute these jobs?  
- Interest in rewarding their loyal party activists and members 
- The full functioning of their presence within the Parliament  
- Control the institution by having personnel linked to the party 
Q3. Do people receive their jobs because of 
- Their professional qualification 
- Their political link  
- Their personal allegiance  
Q4 Is there any internal turnover of people hired from the beginning to the end of each 
term? If yes, how often do patrons change clients?  
Q5 How parliamentary splits affect patronage practices? 
Q6 Does the electoral campaign organization affect patronage at the beginning of the 
term? 
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Q7 During the legislature, other elections at different levels take place. Do they and 
their performances affect patronage during the term?  
Q8 Few months before the end of the legislature, parties prepare electoral campaigning. 
Does this fact affect patronage in the final part of the term? 
Q9 Did primary elections organization affect the distribution of jobs? If yes, how much? 
(This question has been addressed only to those MPs or administrative coordinators that 
belong to parties that have promoted primary elections) 
Q10 How would you rank the level of party allegiance/affinity for people appointed in 
following fields within the parliamentary groups? (from 1 to 5, 1=insignificant, 5= 
highly significant):  
Legislative Office/Press Office/Office for the sittings/Administrative office/ Other  
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 2008-2013 2013- CURRENT 
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC 
BUREAU  
OF THE 
PRESIDENCE 
Member Member Member Member 
Member Member Member Member 
Member Member Member Member 
 
 
 
PARLIAMENTARY  
GROUPS 
 
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
COORDINATOR 
Majority 
Group 
 
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
COORDINATOR 
Majority 
Group 
 
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
COORDINATOR 
Majority 
Group 
 
 
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
COORDINATOR 
Majority 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
 
MEMBER OF THE 
GROUP BOARD 
(MP) 
Majority 
Group 
 
MEMBER OF THE 
GROUP BOARD 
(MP) 
Majority 
Group 
 
MEMBER OF THE 
GROUP BOARD 
(MP) 
Majority 
Group 
 
MEMBER OF THE 
GROUP BOARD 
(MP) 
Majority 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Majority 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
Opposition 
Group 
PERMANENT 
COMMITTES 
Committee chairperson Committee chairperson Committee chairperson Committee chairperson 
Committee chairperson Committee chairperson Committee chairperson Committee chairperson 
Committee chairperson Committee chairperson Committee chairperson Committee chairperson 
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